THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

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SYLLABUS

FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING

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College of Naval Warfare
Naval Command College

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

SYLLABUS

FOREWORD

This syllabus and study guide contains both an overview and detailed description of the National Security Decision Making Study. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

1. Overview. The National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision-making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges, within national resource constraints. The Department provides instruction in: the strategic planning and selection of future military forces and their potential use as a tool of national power; the nature of economic, political, organizational, and behavioral factors affecting selection and command of military forces; and in using expanded critical thinking skills to formulate and execute strategy to achieve desired outcomes within complex national security organizations. The NSDM Study is an executive development course designed for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College. Major emphasis is placed on the preparation of officers and civilians for senior-level command and staff assignments. Selection of concepts and materials is predicated on the belief that an effective career executive does not apply discrete disciplines, but rather is required to synthesize many disciplines relevant to different situations. Moreover, the appropriate point of view is an integrative one that seeks a balanced use of reasoning based on both an academic and professional foundation. For this reason, the NSDM Study employs a multi-discipline approach, synthesizing selected concepts from economics, political science, strategy, leadership, psychology, management control, and other related disciplines. All instruction seeks to utilize the broad experience of the student body and focuses on making and implementing critical decisions within the national security environment. Areas selected for special attention are:

- The changing domestic and international economic, political, and military environments affecting national security.

- Major joint military force planning concepts, issues, and choices.

- The structure and process for planning and programming joint military forces and the interface of that process with the federal budgeting process.

- A conceptual understanding of the tools for critical thinking and deciding among complex defense issue alternatives.

- The context of and political, organizational, and behavioral influences on national security decision making and implementation.

- Selecting strategies to achieve key goals from a position of leadership within complex national security organizations.

The principal methodology of the NSDM Study emphasizes active learning in a seminar environment. Concepts are studied and applied to cases representing real and complex issues. Cases offer a unique opportunity for parallel learning. A single case can explore a critical issue or concept and, at the same time, allow application of appropriate decision making frameworks.

2.   Objectives. Our goal is to provide the student with a highly professional and useful learning experience. The intent of the NSDM Study is not the mastery of particular techniques, but rather it is the expansion of the student's personal philosophy of what constitutes an integrative, balanced, executive point of view. Our joint learning objectives are to:

a.   Increase understanding of the context and domestic and international political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that influence national security decision making and implementation.

b.   Increase ability to perform effectively as a senior-level decision maker, commander, or member of a staff in the national security decision making structure.

c.   Apply the results of critical thinking and analysis to decisions and implementation involving complex, resource-constrained national security issues.

d.   Increase understanding of key concepts and issues that impact on, and are useful in making strategy, choosing and programming future joint military force structure, and addressing planning challenges.

3.   Course Frameworks. The NSDM Study encourages the student to develop three general and related frameworks:

- The first conceptual framework involves assessment of the complex factors critical to development of strategy, the sizing and structuring of future forces, and the allocation of scarce defense resources.

- The second conceptual framework provides a systematic approach to decision making and to formulating a strategy for implementation of decisions in a large organization within the national security environment.

- The third conceptual framework identifies the context and political, organizational, and behavioral influences that shape decision making in large, complex national security organizations.

4.   Organization of the Study. In pursuit of these objectives, the NSDM Study is divided into the following three major courses, which are taught in parallel fashion during the trimester; followed by the National Security Decision Making Final Exercise (FX):

a.   Decision Making and Implementation Course   23 Sessions

b.   Policy Making and Process Course   23 Sessions

c.   Security, Strategy, and Forces Course   26 Sessions

d.   NSDM Final Exercise   18 Sessions

Specific focus, objectives, guidance, and reading assignments for all sessions in the NSDM Study are contained in Annexes A through E of this Syllabus. These Annexes provide the basis for programming daily course work and should be read before the introductory session of each course and module. The National Security Decision Making Box and issued textbooks contain all of the required readings for the course.

5. Requirements

a. *Individual Student Responsibilities.* Students are expected to prepare fully for each instructional session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussions. Learning requires the students' active involvement. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to vigorously enter into discussion are central to the Department's learning method.

b. *Workload.* Study requirements have been structured to provide for a generally even workload throughout the trimester. Some peaks will naturally occur, and students are urged to discuss any perceived overloads with the appropriate instructor. Advanced planning and careful allocation of a scarce resource, time, will help mitigate these peak workloads. Past experience has indicated that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 45 hours of in-class and out-of-class work, as reported by students in past end-of-course questionnaires.

c. *Required Readings.* All required readings listed in the Annexes are important to the development of course concepts and to the quality of seminar discussion. Supplementary readings provide additional material for a more in-depth development of specific topics but are not expected to be read for the seminar session. Required readings are all provided in the NSDM box. Supplementary readings are available through the College library.

d. *Case Preparation.* Cases identified in the Annexes should be prepared for seminar discussion in accordance with instructions by individual faculty members. Assessments should be completed in advance so that the discussion can focus on the concepts involved and the potential solutions of the issues in the cases.

e. *Verbal and Written Assignments.* Each course has verbal and written requirements that provide the opportunity for feedback and interaction among faculty and members of the class. Some of these assignments are not assigned a grade, but give individuals the ability to assess their comprehension of course material and assess progress in the NSDM Study. The following is a composite listing of the ungraded course requirements:

Course	Requirement	Type Effort	Due Date
DMI	Student Reflection Paper	Written/Individual	19 August
SSF	Paper Topic	Written/Individual	14 September
FX	Seminar Progress Brief	PowerPoint/Seminar	11 October

f. *Graded Activities.* An overall grade will be assigned to CNW students for the NSDM Study based on graded requirements for each of the three courses. The activities and weights assigned are as follows:

Course	Requirement	Type/Basis of Evaluation	Date	Weight
PMP	Midterm Examination	Individual. Ability to demonstrate mastery of course concepts in a logical and concise way. Completed in class	8 Sep	10%
DMI	Midterm Examination	Individual. Ability to apply the Decision Making and Implementation framework to a contemporary case study and evaluate its quality and usefulness in terms of course concepts. Take home exam.	14 Sep	15%
SSF	Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper	Individual. Ability to analyze, research, and articulate a major strategy and/or force planning issue. This is the major paper of the NSDM Study. Topic submitted by 30 March.	13 Oct	30%
PMP	Final Examination	Individual. Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study. Completed in class.	20 Oct	20%
DMI	Final Examination	Individual. Ability to apply the Decision Making and Implementation framework to a contemporary case study and evaluate its quality and usefulness in terms of course concepts. Take home exam.	20 Oct	15%
FX	Exercise	Seminar. Ability of seminar to apply SSF, PMP, and DMI concepts and present a coherent, professional PowerPoint presentation reflecting the seminar's unique NSS, NMS, and supporting force structure.	20 Sep; 11, 18, 24–31 Oct; 1–9 Nov	10%

g. *Exam/Paper Return Dates.* The exams and paper will be graded and returned to students by close of business on the following dates:

PMP Midterm Examination	19 Sep
DMI Midterm Examination	27 Sep
SSF Paper	24 Oct
PMP Final Examination	31 Oct
DMI Final Examination	1 Nov
FX Grade Assigned	7–8 Nov

h. *Grading Criteria*. The overall policy for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College Instruction 1520.2M (with Change #1). The most salient point in this instruction is:

> "Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35%-45% 'A's' and 55%-65% 'B's' and 'C's' can be expected from the overall War College student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would rarely if ever be expected to reach an overall 'A' to 'B/C' ratio of greater than or equal to an even 50/50 distribution."

Grading of the NSDM examinations will be consistent with the following standards:

Letter Grade	Numeric Range	Numeric Equivalent	Description
A+	97-100	98	Work of very high quality.
A	94-<97	95	Clearly above
A-	90-<94	92	average graduate work.
B+	87-<90	88	Expected
B	84-<87	85	performance of
B-	80-<84	82	the average graduate student.
C+	77-<80	78	Below the average
C	74-<77	75	performance
C-	70-<74	72	expected for graduate work.
F	0-<70	65 Or lower	Unsatisfactory work.

Grades assigned by instructors for papers and examinations will be expressed in whole numbers and in letter grades and their numeric equivalent from the scale above.

The FX grade will be determined by a three-member faculty team and assigned to the seminar as a group. Each seminar will be given the opportunity to grant additional credit to a limited number of students whom the seminar believes contributed in a significant and constructive way to the FX process. A detailed description of this process will be provided in the FX guidance memorandums.

Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average, to two decimal places, along with corresponding letter grades with pluses or minuses, as appropriate.

In all grading decisions, each student has the right to appeal a grade, first to the instructors, then to the Course Directors, and finally to the Department Chair. This appeal procedure must begin within one week of receipt of the grade from the instructor. Such a review may either sustain the grade, lower it, or raise it.

6. Plagiarism. Occasional incidents of plagiarism require that we bring this matter to your attention. Plagiarism is defined in NWC Instruction 5370.A as:

a. Duplication of an author's words without *both* quotation marks *and* accurate references or footnotes.

b. The use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes.

Students are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when borrowing another's words *or* ideas. Failure to do so will lead to severe disciplinary action. It is the *student's* responsibility to resolve any questions regarding the use of another's words or ideas *prior* to submitting written products. The use of your own ideas and words from a previous paper must also be fully footnoted. When in doubt, confer with your instructor *prior* to submission of your work.

7. Seminar Assignments. Each student is assigned to a seminar group representing a balanced distribution of services/agencies and functional expertise. Three faculty members are assigned to each seminar, one for each of the three courses of the NSDM Study. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

8. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings. Seminars generally meet in the morning on Mondays through Fridays. Classes are normally 90 minutes long, except on days when selected topics require an extension of class time. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is contained in Annex F of the syllabus. A weekly schedule is promulgated as well, and reflects schedule revisions made necessary because of late changes, such as additional visiting speakers, etc.

9. Faculty Office Hours. The faculty will be available to assist in mastering the course material, to review progress, and for counseling as required. Faculty office hours also provide an excellent opportunity to review assigned tasks, to discuss general problems, and to make recommendations for improvement of the course. Students are urged to use this opportunity. Faculty members are generally available throughout the week when not teaching, however, many also teach electives, participate in war games, instruct groups outside the War College, and travel for course development purposes. To ensure most efficient use of limited student time, it is suggested that a mutually agreeable time be arranged beforehand.

10. Key Personnel Contacts. If you require additional information in your studies or if interpersonal problems develop in a course that cannot be dealt with to your satisfaction by your instructor, please contact one of the following individuals:

Chair of the Department	Prof. Joan Johnson-Freese Room: C-206 Tel: 1-3540
Executive Assistant of the Department	Prof. Kevin P. Kelley Room: C-206 Tel: 1-3540
Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director	Prof. Timothy N. Castle Room: C-304 Tel: 1-6429
Policy Making and Process Course Director	Prof. Richard J. Norton Room: C-307 Tel: 1-6442
Decision Making and Implementation Course Director	CAPT Rand D. LeBouvier, USN Room: C-313 Tel: 1-6450
NSDM Final Exercise Directors	Prof. Thomas R. Fedyszyn Room: C-319 Tel: 1-6453 Prof. Laurence L. McCabe Room: C-311 Tel: 1-6017
Academic Coordinator	Mrs. Margaret B. Jones Room: C-206 Tel: 1-4746

NSDM-1   NSDM COURSE OVERVIEW

A. Focus. The National Security Decision Making Department course educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision-making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges, within national resource constraints. This session will address how the course is organized to achieve its objectives.

B. Objectives

- Provide an overview of the course and its objectives.

- Identify key graded and un-graded events that will occur during the trimester.

- Identify key NSDM Department leaders to assist students in knowing who they can turn to with questions, issues, and suggestions.

C. Guidance

1. Read the first seven pages of the syllabus and Annex F in order to familiarize yourself with the basic course content, objectives, requirements, and schedule.

D. Required Readings

1. College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College National Security Decision Making Syllabus, Fall 2005, pages 1–7 and Annex F.

NSDM-2   INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus. This session is intended to provide an opportunity for faculty and students to introduce themselves, to address important administrative issues, and to provide an overview of the content of each subcourse and the Final Exercise (FX).

B. Objectives

- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the faculty and students.

- Discuss social and administrative matters.

- Present an overview of the content of each of the three subcourses and the FX.

- Provide an opportunity for the Seminar Leader to solicit volunteers for seminar leadership positions.

C. Guidance

1.   The NSDM syllabus annexes provide an overview of the content of each portion of the NSDM curriculum and specify the requirements for each individual seminar session. Reading the first few pages of each annex will provide the student with insight into how the course will unfold and the requirements placed on the student.

D. Required Readings

1.   College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College National Security Decision Making Department Syllabus, Fall 2005. Annex A through Annex E, scan the first few pages of each.

NSDM-3   **ECONOMIC POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

A. Focus. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedrich von Hayek once defined economics as "the study of the unintended consequences of human action." All economic actors face the problem of *scarcity*, which requires them to make *choices*. What they must forgo as a result of their choice is called cost, more specifically *opportunity cost*. National security choices are explicitly economic choices. The political economy of a state strongly influences its strategic choices, including its overall economic policy. Market-oriented economies tend to emphasize *absolute* wealth and power, while those that rely more on government guidance of the economy emphasize *relative* wealth and power. The traditional goal of U.S. economic policy is to maximize prosperity—non-inflationary economic growth. Moreover, the United States believes a strong domestic economy will in turn generate global economic growth in both developed and developing international economies resulting in a more secure, stable global security environment. This session looks at the "economic problem" (scarcity) in general, contrasts the ability of various systems of political economy to deal with scarcity and achieve wealth and power, and assesses the national security implications of the various approaches.

B. Objectives

- Understand the relationship between a strong economy and the availability of resources for national defense.

- Assess the ability of the various systems of political economy adequately to answer the three fundamental economic questions: what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce.

- Understand the relationship between a strong and prosperous domestic economy and the global security environment.

C. Guidance

1. The essay by Owens lays out the scope of political economy and its relationship to national security. The political economy of national security can be analyzed on three levels: (1) How do various systems of political economy seek to achieve and maintain wealth and power? (2) How does a given system allocate scarce resources in order to provide for the common defense? (3) How do players in the international system relate to others in economic terms? At the first level, which system of political economy best achieves the state's twin goals of prosperity and security? At the second level, how do we determine the allocation of the resources necessary to produce goods for competing ends, both private and public? At the third level, what is the relationship between a state's economic policy and its national security as well as global security? What do we give up when we choose among ends? How do the answers to such questions affect defense planners?

2. Stiglitz discusses the role of government or the public sector in a "mixed economy." What role should government play in allocating resources? What are "market failures"? Are they offset by "government failures"? What criteria should be used to determine the relative weight of government or the market in the allocation of resources? What are the pros and cons of government's role in the economy?

D. Required Readings

1.   Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "The Political Economy of National Defense." Chapter 16 in *Strategy and Force Planning.* 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 247–260.

2.   Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The Public Sector in a Mixed Economy." Chapter 17 in *Strategy and Force Planning.* 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 275–295.

NSDM-4   NSDM FX AND COURSE REVIEW

A.   Focus. This session provides the opportunity to review the seminar's FX presentation and the feedback provided by the faculty panel during FX-16. Additionally, this final session offers the faculty teaching team and seminar a dedicated session to review subcourse concepts and address end of course questions as well as any administrative or curriculum based issues.

B.   Objectives

- Review faculty panel feedback provided to the seminar leader following FX-16.

- Review major subcourse themes and their value to the practicing security professional.

- Address end of course administrative issues as required.

C.   Guidance. Discuss faculty feedback on the seminar's FX presentation. Review the major themes of SSF, PMP, and DMI in the context of future value to the practicing security professional. Each subcourse provides an important skill required to successfully participate at the senior, strategic level of national defense. Lacking an understanding of any one of the three will place the student as a significant disadvantage at the senior, strategic level of national security policy development. Each student should understand the relevance of each and how mastering unique subcourse skills contribute to a successful military or civilian career in national security.

D.   Required Readings. Review feedback on the seminar's FX presentation and be prepared to discuss with the seminar and the teaching team. This feedback was provided to the seminar leader following the presentation in session FX-16.

ANNEX B
DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Leading Change, Challenging Assumptions
STUDY GUIDE

1.   Scope. The Decision Making and Implementation course is about making choices and getting things done in large, complex national security organizations. The course emphasizes the study and use of critical thinking in the *formulation and execution of strategy* to lead change to achieve desired organizational outcomes. A fundamental premise of the course is that the range of leadership skills needed in more senior positions is noticeably expanded and *different* from those used in direct leadership positions. The course will cover concepts and cases that provide a discrete, although complementary, approach to SSF and PMP, and form an essential element of the NSDM FX. The course will be presented at the strategic, multidisciplinary leadership level. DMI will stress your personal role as a senior decision maker and your organizational role as a steward of implementation.

The DMI course begins by considering decision making at the higher echelons of military organizations. In the first five sessions we explore the profession of arms, civil-military relations, ethics, the influence of personality in organizational settings, and particularly the differences you can expect to encounter when leading large organizations. These initial sessions are intended to provide professional context for all that follows. Subsequent sessions explore complex decision making processes over a wide range of situations. Exposure to these concepts and case studies will aid future leaders as they face the change, innovation, and transformation processes that are part of the current national security environment.

The course information will be addressed in five sections. Each examines a basic question that is crucial in leading large, complex organizations:

- Who am I?

- Where are we?

- Where should we go?

- How do we get there?

- Are we getting there?

Part I of the course will cover the first three questions that focus on formulating strategy. Part II of the course deals with the final two questions that focus on executing strategy.

2.   Course Objectives. The objectives of the DMI course are to enhance the professional abilities of future leaders in the national security environment by increasing their competence to:

a.   Conduct an assessment of the leadership challenges that will be faced in subsequent assignments.

b. Develop the ability to conduct a comprehensive assessment of a large, complex organization.

c. Apply elements of critical thinking to effective decision making.

d. Develop the ability to create strategic guidance to achieve desired outcomes.

e. Understand and apply various methods of implementing organizational strategy.

f. Understand and apply various measurement and control systems to assure the achievement of desired outcomes.

Our overarching goal is to help develop leaders who can make optimal choices and achieve results consistent with the security needs of a nation facing an uncertain future replete with risks and ever more constrained by limited resources.

3. Course Structure. DMI will meet in seminar up to three times weekly. DMI assignments will include basic concepts and readings that reflect current thinking about decision making and implementation. We will use case studies that challenge students to make practical use of those readings in analyzing defense or national security related issues. The case study methodology demands **active** participation of all students in order to develop a firm grasp of course concepts and familiarity with the use of the practical tools offered.

4. Course Study Guide. This DMI Study Guide is the primary planning document describing how the course is structured. For each seminar session it identifies the focus and objectives of that particular session. Reading assignments and general questions highlight key concepts or ideas presented in the readings. Supplementary readings are provided for each session on the NSDM portal at http://nwcintranet/NSDMportal/ for students who wish to explore a particular subject in greater depth. Students are not required to read supplementary material.

5. Course Requirements. A brief, non-graded, written reflection paper will be assigned in DMI-1 and handed in and discussed during DMI-3. A midterm exam will require students to demonstrate their understanding of concepts presented in Part I of the course. The final examination will require students to synthesize and present course material from Part II of the course.

6. Course Material. All course material is distributed and organized in the NSDM box. Course materials include a syllabus and study guide, selected readings, case studies, and the following publications:

- Forester, C. S. *The General.*
- GAO Report 05-70 *Military Transformation: Clear Leadership Accountability, and Management Tools are Needed to Enhance DoD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities.*
- *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*.
- Rumsfeld, Donald M. *Transformation Planning Guidance.*

DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Leading Change, Challenging Assumptions
COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND & STAFF — 2005

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PART I: DECISION MAKING—FORMULATING STRATEGY

DMI-1   INTRODUCTION TO DMI/DMI PART I

A. Focus. DMI will examine the decision making process with the goal of understanding issues and problems that confront leaders in an uncertain security environment. Once decisions are made, they must be implemented, but it is in implementation where even the most accomplished leaders stumble. Too frequently, good or seemingly rational decisions fail to achieve intended results because the implementation of the decision was overcome by factors outside the immediate control of any single person. The DMI course framework presents the approach of posing and answering five key questions for the leader within the context of their organization: *Who am I? Where are we? Where should we go? How do we get there?* and *Are we getting there?*

Professionalism includes an appreciation and acceptance of the need for continual study and is a part of the response to the "*Who am I?*" query. Professionalism also includes the development of greater expertise and the ability to use increased critical thinking skills to make difficult decisions. As we enter the realm of strategic leadership, we find ourselves in a different place where events are often outside our immediate span of control and frequently outside our individual comfort zones. Maintaining the key elements of personal leadership and transitioning to organizational stewardship requires a different set of tools and a new perspective. Thousands of articles and books have been written about strategic leadership. None offers a single solution or a panacea for all the challenges a strategic leader will face, and neither does DMI. The desired outcome of DMI is for you to develop your own framework for decision making and implementation based on your understanding of what motivates you and your organization. The development of that understanding is where DMI will help you focus.

B.   Objectives

- Describe the flow of the DMI material that will be presented in the course.

- Discuss briefly the issues and challenges that complicate making and implementing decisions in large, complex national security organizations.

- Reflect on the specific skills or new knowledge that may be needed to lead a large, complex organization.

- Assess the concept of military transformation, the decisions that led to that concept, and the efforts to implement that concept within DoD.

C.   Guidance

1.   The "Introduction to DMI" reading discusses a general approach for making and implementing decisions at middle and senior levels in the national security profession. Reflect on your professional experiences and the growth of your decision making and implementation skills as you have progressed in seniority. What additional decision making or organizational implementation skills could prove useful to you?

2.   To what extent are Field Marshal Slim's recommendations for command consistent with your own beliefs on the subject? What, if anything, has Slim missed?

3.   FM 22-100, Chapter 7 addresses interpersonal, conceptual, and technical skills necessary for leading at the strategic level. As you continue to develop a personal framework for leading larger and more complex organizations, analyze the skills addressed and how they pertain to your professional development.

4.   The case study is the GAO review of DoD's Strategy for Transformation. What does GAO believe DoD has done correctly? What does GAO recommend DoD do to ensure Transformation becomes a reality? If you were given the task of designing a way ahead for DoD Transformation, what would it include?

D. Required Readings. NOTE: If you have not already done so, please read pages B-1 through B-3 of this study guide before the readings assigned below.

1.   DMI Faculty. "Introduction to Decision Making and Implementation," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, December 2004. (A general framework that should be personalized and adapted by students to assist them as they move on to progressively more responsible positions in national security organizations.)

2.   Slim, William. "Higher Command in War," transcript of an address delivered at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1970. (British Field Marshall Sir William Slim discusses elements of a successful, personal leadership strategy.)

3.   Department of the Army. "Strategic Leadership." Chapter 7 in FM 22-100. Washington, D.C.: 31 August 1999, paragraphs 7-1 through 7–57. (Addresses strategic leadership skills.)

4.   **Case:** GAO Report 05-70 *Military Transformation: Clear Leadership Accountability, and Management Tools are Needed to Enhance DoD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, December 2004. Read "Highlights" page only. (GAO reports that DoD has a reasonable, well-conceived strategy for transformation. Executing that strategy will be a significant challenge if implementation plans and tools are not developed.) (Available in the NSDM box, general section.)

Additional Information: May be obtained at **http://www.militaryreadinglist.com/index.html.** This website contains recommended reading lists for each of the services and the Joint Staff.

A link to this website is contained on the DMI Student Portal at http://nwcintranet/ NSDMportal/DMIFacultyStudentPortal. This portal also contains readings and documents in folders provided for each seminar, and is a very useful source of information.

DMI-2 THE PROFESSION OF ARMS: ETHICS, STEWARDSHIP AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

A. Focus. As one takes on greater responsibilities in complex national security organizations, a part of honing critical thinking skills includes reflection on the more fundamental tenants of our profession. As emphasized in the first session, this aspect of professionalism and the need for continual study is a part of the response to the "*Who am I?*" query. As a leader gets more senior, the impact of one's decisions and implementation strategies communicate deeper professional and ethical messages to the organization. Accompanying these ethical messages are also important implications concerning organizational stewardship, the ability to candidly challenge long held assumptions, and the honoring of American traditions of civil control of the military. Why should we as military professionals care about ethics? What are we talking about when we consider ethics, and what, if anything, concerning ethical behavior is different as one gets more senior? Should a keen awareness of the traditions of high personal and ethical standards in our military be a part of your strategy in making choices in complex national security organizations, or is it best or more often left to the personal and intuitive domain?

As we fulfill our oaths of office as commissioned officers, what standards might we keep in mind as we work to "bear true faith and allegiance" to the Constitution? Is the military held to a higher standard than other professions and the public at large, and if so, why? Polls indicate the American people today hold the military in high regard. At the same time, some analysts contend today's military is more isolated, alienated, and less representative of the society it protects. Civil-military relations include civilian attitudes towards the military, uniformed military attitudes towards civilian leadership and society, and civilian control over the military. It is incumbent upon military professionals to comprehend the character of civilian-military relations established by the authors of the Constitution and the changes in civil-military relations that may affect our nation in the future, as they make and implement important national security related decisions. These significant issues will form part of the context of the entire DMI course, and it is important to consider them as background in the study of each session's readings and case studies.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend concepts of professionalism and their meaning for military officers.

- Understand the importance and tradition of high ethical standards in the military profession.

- Comprehend the relationship, both historically and presently, between the U.S. military and the nation's civilian leadership. Examine the importance of civilian control of the military.

- Apply the concepts of ethics, stewardship, and civil-military relations to case studies of senior strategic leaders who have successfully dealt with these issues.

C. Guidance

1. Huntington's thesis is that: "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional . . ." What are the distinguishing characteristics of any profession, and do you think they help to define military officers today, particularly in terms of service to society? What are your reasons? Beyond those general characteristics, what specialized knowledge and ability distinguishes military officers as professionals? Is Huntington's evaluation correct? If not, what has changed?

2.   Brennan provides some fundamental guidance in thinking about ethics in the military profession. Can one become more ethical or virtuous by habit, practice, training, and education? Does the management of huge defense budgets and professional military values coincide in the area of stewardship and accountability? Is there an element of morality that is just a strong "fundamental sense of human decency," as well as a type of "high intelligence?" Is it time to stop talking about ethics and just demonstrate our standards by example and action?

3.   General George Washington's leadership during and at the end of the War of Independence set a standard for American military professionals committed to selfless subordination and service to the nation. Is the first commander-in-chief's example of integrity, resoluteness, and good judgment a realistic and pertinent standard for today?

4.   Were General George C. Marshall's accomplishments due in large part to his character and trustworthiness? Did Marshall demonstrate a particularly deep appreciation for the unique relationship of the American populace to its military? How was Marshall able to "stand steadfastly for his beliefs while at the same time maintaining his loyalty to his civilian commander-in-chief?" Was Marshall "one careful demon of integrity?"

5.   How did Marshall and Washington gain experience in civil-military relations, and what impact did their experience have on their dealings with their civilian political superiors? How did they come to be so trusted by their civilian superiors as well as by their military subordinates? Can the military leader still be subordinate to civilian authority without being "politicized? Can Washington and Marshall serve as appropriate role models for military officers today in terms of integrity, candidness, professionalism, and civil-military relations?

6.   General Hoar states that weighing honesty against loyalty is an abiding responsibility of leaders. Is there perpetual friction and competition between loyalty and honesty, and can honesty end up a "casualty?" Does the oath of office taken by all military officers provide the necessary direction as to where primary loyalties lie?

D. Required Readings

1.   Huntington, Samuel P. "Officership as a Profession." Chapter 1 (Extract) in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 7–17. (A classic piece dealing with military officers as professionals serving society.)

2.   Brennan, Joseph Gerard. "Professionalism and Ethics," drawn from presentations given to military audiences by the author in 1986 and 1994. (Examines foundations of ethical philosophy, inquiry, and behavior as related to the military profession.)

3.   **Case:** Calhoun, William M. "George Washington and Civil-Military Relations," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Focuses on key aspects of General Washington's professionalism and his respect for and deference to civilian leadership during and after the War of Independence.)

4.   **Case:** Brower, Charles F. "George C. Marshall: A Study in Character." A paper prepared for the 1999 Joint Service Conference on Professional Ethics. (Relates examples of General Marshall's character and accomplishments.)

5.   **Case:** Hoar, Joseph P. "Critical Dilemma: Loyalty Versus Honesty." "Commentary" from U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 2005, p. 2. (Discusses the conflict caused in decision makers when tension occurs between loyalty and honesty.)

DMI-3 LEADING LARGE, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS—WHAT'S DIFFERENT?

A. Focus. Leading large, complex organizations requires additional and sometimes different skills "to get the job done." The environment is different: you will lead and affect significantly more people; you will have a larger role in determining organization priorities and where resources will be applied; and you will help choose the future direction, missions, goals, and objectives that will define organization purpose and endeavor. As a leader in this environment, you might ask yourself: "Will the things that have made me successful to this point work at the next level? Will I need to lead differently? If so, what must change? And, if not, why not?"

B. Objectives

- Examine the unique issues of leading large, complex organizations.

- Discuss the differences between leading and managing and how both roles influence a senior official's approach to guiding a large, complex organization.

- Reflect on the specific skills or new knowledge needed to lead a large organization.

C. Guidance

1. Student papers. This session will focus primarily on individual student observations and opinions about the challenges of leading larger and more complex organizations. Leadership *traits* (personal credibility, integrity, motivational, and communication skills) remain absolute requirements to lead at senior levels. But is more required? Among the key issues we will examine are what new or different *skills or tools* we may need to develop or expand upon as we become more senior in order to lead effectively. Where and how might (must) you adapt the familiar Military Decision Making Process framework to guide your leadership efforts in the future? As you contemplate those possible differences, consider briefly what Hoenig and Finkelstein have to say on the subject and how their observations about the private sector may have application for you as you become a more senior leader in DoD.

2. Hoenig states "most great leaders are challenged to show leadership at both ends of the scale all the time." Do you agree? What are the challenges of scale that uniquely confront military leaders as they assume command of larger organizations? How must you adapt your leadership framework or approach to provide strategic direction and guidance that will enable your subordinates to develop plans and objectives to achieve your goals? What new skills or knowledge are necessary to be successful at the next level?

3. Finkelstein purports that "spectacularly unsuccessful" executives exhibit seven leadership *habits* that led to the demise of their enterprises. While only the most spectacular exhibited all seven, most exhibited four or five of these traits. Which of these seven habits are potential pitfalls for leaders of military organizations and how will you ensure that you or your boss do not fall prey to their negative or destructive aspects?

D. Required Readings

1.   Hoenig, Christopher. "Total Leadership: Size Matters." *CIO Magazine*, May 1, 2001, http://www.cio.com/archive/050101/lead.html (accessed 3 January 2005).

2. Finkelstein, Sydney. "Seven Habits of Spectacularly Unsuccessful People." Chapter 9 in *Why Executives Fail—And What You Can Learn From Their Mistakes*. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.

3. **Case:** *Student Reflection Papers* that answer the question, "Is It Different?" (Tasking assigned during DMI-1 Introductory Session).

DMI-4   LEADING CHANGE IN WAR: *THE GENERAL*

A.   Focus. The case study for this session describes a British Army officer's rapid ascent from a relatively junior officer to one of the more senior leaders during World War I. *The General* by C. S. Forester is a work of fiction, but is based upon the author's observations of actual British military leaders. In fact, the protagonist General Curzon is thought to represent a composite portrait of Generals French and Haig who were widely criticized well after the war by their contemporaries and historians for their unimaginative leadership in the trench warfare that characterized the Western Front in World War I. There are several themes that will be addressed in the seminar discussions of this case study. One is the changing nature of the protagonist's responsibilities as he rose to a strategic leadership position. Another is the wisdom of the general's instinctive reliance—even after he had arrived at the most senior levels—upon the same decision making and implementation skills that brought him success in the early stages of his military career.

Note on *The General*. Forester's characterization of the flawed personality of General Curzon is candid. With a fine ear for the vernacular of the day, he accurately portrays the attitudes, prejudices and speech used by British officers and political leaders, who had been raised and trained in the late Victorian period. Thus, Curzon sometimes expresses racial stereotypes and uses terms that are offensive and clearly not endorsed by the Naval War College. Specifically, such terms are found in Chapter 10 and Chapter 13 in the edition of *The General* issued to students. Students may omit pages 95 and 130 from the required reading. Those who choose to do so will not find the value of the book or this session diminished.

B.   Objectives

- Identify the types of internal and external factors that influenced General Curzon and that might still influence senior decision makers.

- Describe how the nature and demands of effective decision making changed as General Curzon ascended the organizational ladder.

C.   Guidance

1.   How would you describe Curzon's decision making style in his early years? What elements of this style did he retain throughout his career? What new characteristics had he developed by the time he was in command of the Forty-Fourth Corps?

2.   What were the differences between decision making and leadership at the direct or tactical level and at senior or strategic levels in *The General*? Which of these differences did Curzon appreciate?

3.   What changes or innovations did Curzon accept willingly or even advocate? Which did he oppose? Would you characterize Curzon as an innovator?

4.   How would you describe Curzon's strategy for leading a small organization versus a large organization? Was there any difference? Should there be? (NOTE: This theme will be examined again from the German perspective during DMI-12.)

5.   How was British policy and strategy formulated? What impact did winning and losing on the battlefield have on shaping this policy? What role did Curzon play in shaping strategic policy?

D. Required Readings

1.   Curry, Peter E., and Jeffrey H. Norwitz. "Background on C. S. Forester's *The General*." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (Provides a broad, historic foundation for the book as well as character and terminology lists.)

2.   **Case:** Forester, C. S. (Cecil Scott). *The General*. Annapolis, Md.: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1987 (available in the NSDM box, general section).

DMI-5 PERSONALITY TYPE: THE MBTI (LECTURE)

A. Focus. Henry Ford was reputed to have complained of having to deal with an entire human being when all he really wanted was a "set of hands." Understanding "entire human beings" is no easy task, but this session aims at improving your abilities in that important endeavor. That understanding is critical to answering the question: *"Who am I?"* as well as developing the skills to foster constructive human relationships in any large organization.

This session focuses on one psychological instrument that measures individual preferences by classifying them into various types. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) assesses the primary personality functions of perceiving and judging. Succeeding at anything takes both perception and judgment; you have to determine what the problem or situation is, and then you have to decide what to do about it. You become aware of the problem or situation through your senses or by intuitive processes. In order to decide on a course of action, you apply some form of logic to judge the situation. Everyone uses some combination of these preferences in their daily lives, and your combination of perception and judgment impact how you relate to others. This session begins with the aim of getting to know yourself better, with the belief that this will also help you understand others.

B. Objectives

- Examine your own MBTI preference type and interpret/verify the results.

- Explain how the use of tools like the MBTI and similar type theories can aid interpersonal communication.

C. Guidance

1. The Buckwalter and Banker reading provides an overview of the four dichotomous scales that make up the sixteen personality preferences described by the MBTI. The authors also discuss the relationships between the various elements that make up the MBTI personality types. What are the basic elements of the MBTI?

2. The lecture will highlight the important relationship between a person's perception and judgment preferences, and identify how people with different combinations of Sensing (S), iNtuiting (N), Thinking (T), and Feeling (F) tend to approach a situation. How do they differ in their handling of facts and possibilities in their dealings with other people? How can you help others who may not share your preferences perform better? How can others' dissimilar preferences help you do your job better?

D. Required Reading

1. Buckwalter, David T., and Joe Dan Banker. "The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: A Primer." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005. (A brief description of the MBTI and outline of the various preferences that are assessed by the instrument.)

E. Required Lecture. A lecture will be presented on interpreting the results of your MBTI. Spouses and teenage children are encouraged to attend!

DMI-6   ASSESSMENT

A.   Focus. Assessment is the critical point of departure for making and implementing complex decisions; it is the process of conducting a comprehensive appraisal of the current situation. When assessing an organization, you should consider its missions and the challenges it faces. You need to understand organizational culture, strengths, and weaknesses. You also need to identify threats and opportunities in its current and future environment. Finally, you have to consider the expectations of major stakeholders who will influence the organization's success or failure. A good answer to the question "*Where are we?*" requires considerable thought.

B.   Objectives

- Identify key elements of organizational assessment.

- Develop an approach for conducting an organizational assessment.

- Apply your approach for conducting an organizational assessment to a case study.

C.   Guidance

1.   The first reading explores fundamentals of assessment. What are some of the key factors used in determining: "Where are we?" Based on your own experience, what dimensions of assessment would you add or change? Why?

2.   The *Challenger* case study looks at NASA, a large complex organization. In reading the case, consider the following questions:

- What are NASA's missions? How have they changed?

- What do stakeholders see as NASA's missions? How do stakeholder expectations of NASA differ?

- How well have NASA's leaders assessed their environment and organization? What external and internal factors are influencing them?

- Have NASA's leaders a clear vision? Have they defined alternatives for achieving it? How well have they evaluated their alternatives?

- How does NASA's culture influence the organization? What are the strengths and weaknesses of NASA's measurement and control systems?

D.   Required Readings

1.   DMI Faculty. "Assessment." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005.

2.   **Case:** Phillips, Duane. "The Decision to Launch *Challenger.*" Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

DMI-7   STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, THREATS (SWOT)

A.   Focus. In continuing the process of assessment and answering the question, "*Where are we?*" leaders must develop a clear understanding of the organization's culture, its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and core competencies that define its environment. This understanding will allow you to properly prioritize the issues that face your organization. A good SWOT analysis enables and informs all the subsequent steps in the formulation and execution of strategy. SWOT is an excellent way to start any assessment, and it is highly recommended as a first step in the NSDM FX as the security environment is assessed.

B.   Objectives

- Identify the internal strengths and weaknesses of an organization.

- Identify the external opportunities and threats impacting on an organization.

- Recognize how SWOT includes a consideration of mission, core competencies, stakeholder expectations, and culture.

- Apply the SWOT analysis to enable the discovery and prioritization of organizational issues.

C.   Guidance

1.   SWOT asks several questions that guide analysis:

- Strengths—What do you do well? What makes your organization unique? Why is your organization chosen over another? What service do you provide that no other can? What are your advantages?

- Weaknesses—What do you do badly? What can you do better? Does another organization operate more effectively than yours? What things does your organization avoid?

- Opportunities—What are the opportunities available to your organization? What are new trends of which you can take advantage? What does the future hold?

- Threats—What challenges do you face from outside the organization? What are you not doing that your stakeholders expect you to do? Are you keeping pace with technology and changing requirements? What could put you out of competition?

2.   The SWOT analysis should lead you logically to a restatement of your mission and prioritization of your key challenges. Your mission statement should require you to know the answers to the following questions:

- Who are we? This question goes a long way to determine why your organization is different and what your stakeholders expect of you.

- What basic social or political needs or problems do we exist to meet? The answer to this provides a justification for your existence.

- How do we recognize, anticipate, and respond to these problems or needs? This forces your organization to look outside itself.

- How should we respond to our key stakeholders? This addresses your stakeholders' needs.

- What is our guiding philosophy and culture? This helps ensure your strategy is properly aligned and consistent with your guiding philosophy and culture.

- What makes us distinctive or unique? This helps you identify your core competencies.

3.   The QDR provides some insight as to the state of DoD today. What external and internal factors are influencing DoD? Does the DoD leadership have an accurate assessment of their environment and organization? How does DoD's culture influence the organization? What are DoD's internal strengths and weaknesses? What external opportunities and threats does DoD now face?

D.   Required Readings

1.   DMI Faculty. "Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats: Knowing Your Organization." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005 (article focuses on assessing your organization using SWOT analysis).

2.   Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2001, 3–11 (available in the NSDM box, general section).

3.   **Case**. DMI Faculty. "Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005 (This case will be distributed in class prior to the session).

DMI-8   ISSUE DEFINITION AND ALTERNATIVES

A. Focus. Good decisions are good choices among alternatives. But you cannot make good choices unless those alternatives address the issue that concerns you, or can help solve the problem you face. That is why we consider issue definition and alternatives together.

Analysis is a process for making a sound decision. Because the same issues arise again and again in Washington, in somewhat different guises, analysis is also part of an ongoing debate. To drive up the quality of that debate, you should define your problem as broadly as practicable. You should propose alternatives as imaginatively as you can.

Analysts often say: "Tell me your assumptions, and I will tell you your conclusions." For this reason, you need to think carefully about the way you "frame" an issue. In addition, you should identify your driving assumptions and state them explicitly.

B. Objectives

- Understand how to define a problem.

- Understand the importance of alternatives and techniques for developing them.

- Understand how assumptions bound or "frame" an issue.

- Explain breadth, neutrality, and viability. Understand why you must trade off these qualities in assembling a set of alternatives.

- Apply the concepts involved in issue definition and evaluation of alternatives to a current case study.

C. Guidance

1.   In "Issue Definition and Alternatives," Hoyler talks about defining a problem and coming up with alternative solutions.

2.   The LCS case readings provide background information and introduce some of the challenges the Navy is facing in littoral operations.

- How would you define the issue? What's the problem?

- What are alternatives to the LCS, as a solution to that problem?

- What marks does your set of alternatives deserve, with respect to breadth, neutrality, and viability?

D. Required Readings

1.   Hoyler, Marshall. "Issue Definition and Alternatives." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005.

2.   **Case:** Calhoun, William M., ed. "The Littoral Combat Ship and Sea Power 21." Newport, R.I.: Navy Warfare Development Command paper, February 2003.

3.   **Case:** Kelley, Stephen H. "Small Ships and Future Missions." United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 128, no. 9 (September 2002): pp. 42–44.

4.   **Case:** O'Neil, William D. Extract from "Technical and Operational Prospects for a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) (Revised)." Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 2002.

5.   **Case:** Brown, David. "Storms Ahead for LCS, DD(X)?" *Navy Times*, 26 January 2004, 8.

DMI-9   CRITERIA

A.   Focus. To choose wisely between alternatives, we need to consider three things. First, effectiveness: how well does each alternative give us what we want? Second, cost: what does each alternative require us to give up? Third, risk and uncertainty: how much confidence can we have in our estimates of effectiveness and cost? We address effectiveness and cost in this session, we talk about risk and uncertainty in the next.

Alternatives always embody a mix of characteristics, or *attributes*. To compare alternatives, we have to decide what we care about in making that comparison, and choose the cost and effectiveness attributes that we will use to do so (i.e., our *criteria*). We also have to choose evidence to determine, for each criterion, how much each alternative differs from the others (i.e., our *measures*).

We evaluate our criteria and measures against standards for which we use the labels validity, reliability, and practicality. Validity denotes the degree to which criteria identify things worth worrying about in choosing between alternatives. Reliability refers to the extent to which a measure will give you the same answer, no matter who does the measuring and no matter how often. Practicality refers to whether the knowledge gained from using a particular measure justifies the cost of doing so. Selection of criteria and measures requires judgment about the appropriate balance of validity, reliability, and practicality, given the context of the problem.

B.   Objectives

- Discuss the importance of criteria and measures for cost and effectiveness.

- Review the most important types of cost and the most important types of "dollars."

- Explain validity, reliability, and practicality when evaluating criteria and measures. Understand why you must trade off these qualities.

- Discuss the differences between effectiveness and efficiency when comparing alternatives.

- Understand subtle and possibly harmful effects of quantification in defense analysis.

- Apply the concepts of criteria and measurement to a current case study.

C.   Guidance

1.   As you read, "Criteria," think about the basis on which you have made choices in your own recent decisions, professionally or personally. How did you compare alternatives and what were your criteria for effectiveness? For cost? How did you measure each? How would you rate your criteria and measures in terms of validity, reliability, and practicality?

2.   In the case study, Hoyler presents observations from various sources concerning U.S. policy in Iraq. As you read "What Next in Iraq?" think about what you know from the case and all other sources. Consider these questions:

- What do you see as the U.S. government's alternatives now? What alternatives might a different Administration consider?

- What should we care about, in choosing between those alternatives? (i.e., what ought to be our *criteria*?)

- What measures should we use to compare the alternatives' effectiveness? To compare their cost?

- How would you rate those criteria and measures in terms of validity, reliability, and practicality?

- Can you imagine measures that would provide a more complete and accurate picture?

D. Required Readings

1. Hoyler, Marshall. "Criteria." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005.

2. **Case:** Hoyler, Marshall. "What Next in Iraq?" Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, August 2005. (This case will be distributed in class prior to the session.)

DMI-10 RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

A. Focus. Uncertainty is unavoidable in our business. We cannot always imagine what might happen. Even when we can imagine a range of possible future events, we have to make judgments about the likelihood of each such event. And even if we can form high-quality estimates of probability, we have to make judgments about consequences, or payoffs. For the reasons just described, coping with risk and uncertainty relies heavily on judgment.

People have been dealing with risk and uncertainty ever since they have been on the planet, and have developed some fairly useful coping techniques. We discuss some of these techniques in this session. We argue that successfully coping requires imagination, skepticism, analysis, and a relentless, open-minded search for relevant information.

B. Objectives

- Understand the importance of judgments about future outcomes, their probability, and their consequences.

- Understand how imagination, information, and analysis can improve those judgments.

- Apply the concepts of risk and uncertainty to a current case study.

C. Guidance

1. "Supreme Commander" presents risk and uncertainty projected onto the backdrop of Eisenhower's decision to commence OVERLORD. What were the specific areas of risk in the OVERLORD campaign?

2. How did Eisenhower deal with risk? What information could Eisenhower's staff have assembled to help their boss make better decisions?

D. Required Readings

1. Hoyler, Marshall. "Coping with Risk." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005.

2. **Case:** Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Worries of the Commander." In *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower*. New York: Doubleday, 1970, pp. 392–409. (In this chapter, Ambrose discusses the risks that Eisenhower faced concerning OPERATION OVERLORD.)

DMI-11 DECIDE AND SET FUTURE DIRECTION

A. Focus. Deciding the way ahead for an organization is one of the most important tasks expected of a senior leader. Choices must be made about what the organization will (or will not) do as it strives to accomplish its mission. Those decisions answer the question: "Where should we go?" for the organization. Setting the course for the organization must include creating and communicating a vision of the future that relates the organization's place in that future. In deciding future direction, leaders must identify the *critical gaps* that challenge the organization's ability to perform its mission and to satisfy the expectations of its stakeholders. Once those gaps have been identified, the decision maker must identify possible solutions and then choose the alternative that best accomplishes the goals and objectives that define mission success. This choice provides the initial *strategic guidance* that forms the basis for an organizational strategy. That guidance must be widely communicated and allowed to evolve as it is engaged by the organization and its stakeholders. Once an organizational strategy has evolved and the associated strategic guidance has been communicated, it must be implemented. That requires the leader to clearly and explicitly identify in broad and practical terms the organization's priorities, goals and the resources required.

B. Objectives

- Discuss how stakeholders' expectations and leadership's vision influence formulation of an organizational strategy.

- Discuss the elements that should be addressed in strategic guidance as part of organizational strategy.

- Comprehend the critical linkage between the formulation and execution of strategy.

- Understand the process of how you would take a chosen alternative and develop it into a vision and strategic guidance to support that decision.

- Apply the concepts of vision, strategic guidance, and strategy to a current case.

C. Guidance

1. *Setting a Course: Strategy and Strategic Guidance.* Why does this reading differentiate between *reactive* and *proactive* views of the future and their impact on organizational strategy? What must a *vision* provide? What basic elements must strategic guidance address?

2. *Sea Power 21.* Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark, in a 12 June 2002 speech at the Naval War College, shared his operational vision for the Navy in the 21st Century. Entitled "Sea Power 21," it focuses on the issue of future readiness and the three capabilities needed to achieve this readiness: Sea Strike, the ability to project offensive power; Sea Shield, the ability to project defensive power; and Sea Basing, the ability to project the sovereignty of the U.S. around the world through sea-based forces. Is Admiral Clark's vision clear and compelling, and is it consistent with the Navy's values? Is it just "old wine in new

bottles?" That is, has he really articulated a new and compelling vision for the future? What key, critical decisions lay ahead for the CNO to achieve success through Sea Power 21?

    3.   U.S. Navy's 3/1 Strategy. In April 2005, the U.S. Navy embarked on a project to better articulate its investment decisions as they related to the Navy's contributions to the Global War on Terrorism; Stability Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and Homeland Defense, while retaining the ability to conduct Major Combat Operations in the Maritime environment. The 3/1 Strategy is designed to make Navy investments responsive to higher level guidance promulgated by the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and inform the Navy's PPBE process in support of the Joint Force and Joint Force Component Commanders. In what areas does the Navy's 3/1 Strategy focus its guidance? Why there? Does the guidance identify the Navy's priorities and important strategic goals? Does it give broad guidance about how the Navy will achieve its goals and objectives?

D.   Required Readings

    1.   DMI Faculty. "Setting a Course: Formulating Strategy and Strategic Guidance." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (Describes factors to be considered when developing organizational strategy and strategic guidance.)

    2.   Clark, ADM Vern. "Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College–reprinted excerpt from a 12 Jun 2002 address. (A speech given during the Current Strategy Forum that outlines the CNO's vision for the Navy.)

    3.   **Case:** DMI Faculty. "U.S. Navy's 3/1 Strategy—Strategic Guidance for Future Investments." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2005. (Describes Navy's approach to future investments to support likely maritime and joint operations in the coming years.)

DMI-12 STRATEGY AS A GUIDE

A. Focus. A precise description of strategy is difficult to pin down. The word means different things to people in different circumstances. One should always keep in mind, however, in the final analysis, *strategy is what the organization is doing now . . .* whether it intended to or not. Strategy is what the organization executes as it strives to achieve desired ends. It is comprised of two related but distinct components: S*trategic guidance* that defines the cause and effect hypothesis that will enable the organization to achieve a desired set of goals; and the successful *execution* of that guidance. Strategy succeeds or fails on the soundness of its assumptions and the guidance that emanates from those decisions, ***and*** on how well it is executed. To be effective, all strategies and the plans that spring from them must be able to answer one basic question for everyone in the organization, "What do you want *me* to do?" The essential link between having a good strategy and executing it is the ability to communicate it in such a way that every individual at all levels *understands* what is expected of them and how it contributes to attaining desired organizational objectives. Finally, strategy is predicated upon a set of assumptions that reflect an organization's understanding of its environment and the changes occurring in it. Change can make those assumptions inappropriate and make the chosen strategy wrong. Hence, we must always challenge our assumptions and look for evidence that our most strongly held beliefs/opinions may be wrong.

B. Objectives

- Describe how organizations turn strategy into strategic guidance in order to identify strategic goals and basic approaches to achieve them.

- Discuss the challenges in formulating strategy and identifying the necessary elements of strategic guidance.

- Understand the cascading nature of strategy as it is received and translated by each level of the organization.

- Apply the concepts of strategic guidance, strategic goals, strategic approaches, and the cascading nature of strategy to a case study.

C. Guidance

1. How do you define strategy? What considerations go into formulating effective strategic guidance? What limits do Mintzberg and Westley describe in the "rational" process of *thinking first* about strategy before communicating and implementing strategic guidance? What other ways are available to develop strategy and the guidance that flows from it?

2. Organizations are faced with incessant and pervasive change that threaten their existence as well as well as their success. What traits must organizations have to survive in the uncertain environments in which they compete? What does Ratcliff mean by the statement "Strategy is getting it right and doing it right?" What are cascading objectives and why are they important? Absent everything else, what at a minimum must be communicated about strategy to the members of the organization?

3. Case Study. What were the approaches to strategy used by the German Army in mid-1917? How well did the German Army evaluate cause and effect to align their organizational activities? What were some of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats of the German Army of 1917? How did they affect strategy development within the organization? How did the German assessment and response to these factors compare to the conclusions reached by the British as described in *The General*? What were some of the operational goals that the German Army was trying to achieve? Was their overarching strategy thoroughly communicated and did it provide a guide for action for achieving their goals?

D. Required Readings

1. Mintzberg, Henry, and Frances Westley. "Decision Making: It's Not What You Think." *MIT Sloan Management Review* (Spring 2001): pp. 89–93.

2. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Strategy IS Execution," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005.

3. **Case:** Lupfer, Timothy T. *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.* Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, July 1981, vii–ix and 37–58.

DMI-13 FORMULATING STRATEGY

A. Focus. Finding the way ahead for an organization is one of the primary responsibilities of a leader. We expect our leaders to accurately assess their organization, develop concepts of vision and strategy to succeed in the future, and articulate actionable strategic guidance to get the organization to its desired destination. Even in a relatively stable environment for an organization with a clearly defined mission, setting and communicating such guidance is difficult. In a dynamic environment that imposes new missions while demanding large-scale innovation, the processes of formulating strategy are even more complex.

The case study that culminates Part I of DMI describes how the Mine Warfare Command is challenged by having to perform a demanding and critical mission with little support from the outside and cultural problems within its ranks.

B. Objectives

- Conduct an assessment of the leadership challenges faced by a senior leader.

- Conduct a comprehensive assessment of that leader's organization to include issues, organization and current environment.

- Set organizational direction for that organization and convey the decision though strategic guidance.

- Demonstrate understanding of the key concepts presented during DMI Part I through application to a case study.

C. Guidance

a. What is your assessment of the challenges and issues facing Mine Warfare Command? Which issue, in your opinion, predominates?

b. Focusing on this issue, what alternatives might you propose to the admiral to address this issue? After an analysis of these alternatives, which would you recommend?

c. In selecting an alternative, the admiral has made a decision that will form the basis of a way ahead for Mine Warfare Command. Do the existing mission and vision accommodate this decision? If not, what mission changes and vision statement might you propose?

d. Using the revised mission and vision, what would you recommend as strategic guidance to show a clear path toward eventual implementation of those changes?

D. Required Readings

1. **Case:** DMI Faculty. "Mine Warfare Command: Is the Way Ahead Clear?" Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005. (A case study designed to allow the student practice in conducting an assessment and developing strategic guidance.)

2.   **Case:** Castelli Christopher J. "Clark Defends Plans To Move Mine Warfare Command To San Diego." *Corpus Christi Caller-Times,* May 23, 2005. Extracted from the *Early Bird.*

3.   **Case:** Truver, Scott C. "A History Of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare In The Post-WW II Era: A Political Perspective." Text of a presentation delivered at MINWARA Conference, Panama City, Florida, 24 May 2005.

DMI MIDTERM EXAMINATION

A. Focus. This examination covers Part I, "Formulating Strategy," of the Decision Making and Implementation course and will be prepared outside of class. Your DMI instructor will provide further guidance.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus and additionally include the ability to craft a convincing argument, in writing, using concepts drawn from the DMI course, concerning the future direction and strategy a national security organization should pursue. The paper should convey the desired direction with sufficient clarity to serve as a foundation for the implementation of those decisions.

B. Objective

- Assess a situation involving a large, complex national security organization and decide upon a viable future direction and strategic guidance to demonstrate mastery of Part I course concepts and theories.

PART II: IMPLEMENTATION—EXECUTING STRATEGY

DMI-14 IMPLEMENTATION

A. Focus. During Part I, "Formulating Strategy," we emphasized the complexity in making wise decisions in an uncertain environment. The strategy that was formulated sets the direction for an organization and emphasizes the *Strategy as a Guide* course theme. While arriving at a proper direction is critically important, research indicates that most programs and organizational changes do not fail because the desired destination was flawed. To the contrary, most of these efforts meet their demise because the implementation was poorly planned or the leadership failed to assure that the organization continued in the desired direction. Thus, in this part of the DMI course, "Executing Strategy," we will progress from making choices to getting things done.

We begin this part of DMI by considering *implementation*—the question is: "*How do we get there?*" Today's session will cover some fundamental concepts dealing with subjects such as intended and emergent strategies, the what/who/when/where/how parts of the implementation plan, sources of resistance and ways to overcome resistance, change agents, and aligning the organization's resources with the strategy. We also discuss several broad approaches to implementation and preview perspectives on evaluating achievement of organizational goals.

Subsequent lessons in this phase will focus on other specific techniques and issues involved in implementation (e.g., reconciliation/negotiation, structure, policy, technology, and human capital). While all of the phases of the DMI framework are interrelated and continuous, we will see that these final two phases of our framework, implementation and assuring performance, are nearly inseparable. There will be aspects of an implementation plan that deal with techniques to assure performance, and control and performance measurement systems will be shown to be among the most powerful of implementation tools. By the end of this part of DMI you should have a more sophisticated appreciation for the importance and difficulty of implementation and assurance—both are essential to *getting things done*!

B. Objectives

- Explain and discuss various approaches for executing the organization's strategy and achieving desired outcomes.

- Recognize how these approaches would apply to the situation described in the case study.

C. Guidance

1.   The first reading asserts that most major organizational change efforts fail due to poor implementation or follow-up. Has this been your experience thus far in your career? Why would this observation be even more accurate in cases of larger, more complex organizations? This reading asserts that, at least for significant change, implementation *never* proceeds according to planned strategy. Why or how could this be a good thing?

2.   The second reading offers a number of elements that any implementation plan should consider. Among these, which do you consider the most important? Can any be safely ignored? How important are earlier efforts in defining problems and making assumptions about risk and uncertainty to formulating elements of the implementation plan? How important is being able to measure performance and accomplishments to arriving at a suitable implementation plan?

3.   Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed the *Transformation Planning Guidance* (*TPG*) in April 2003. This document outlines the process the department intends to pursue to keep transformation on track. In terms of the prior readings, what kind of a change approaches does the *TPG* represent (structural, policy, technology, human capital, or some combination)? Would you predict successful implementation of DoD transformation given this approach?

4.   The former Director of the Office of Force Transformation claims that Network-Centric Warfare is "at the very center of force transformation." Do you agree with him? Do the two pages reproduced in DMI 14-4 seem like a feasible implementation strategy? What would you add to that brief text to make successful implementation more likely?

5.   The GAO has recently criticized the department for "no one person or entity having the overarching and ongoing leadership responsibilities or the accountability for achieving transformation results." The department disagreed with GAO. What is your evaluation of the GAO criticism and DoD's counterargument? What additional organizational structures or policies would you institute to ensure successful transformation? How do technology and human capital play in the overall plan for transformation?

D.   Required Readings

1.   DMI Faculty. "DMI Part II: Executing Strategy." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005. (Introduces part II of the course and offers a perspective for considering implementation and performance assurance issues.)

2.   DMI Faculty. "DMI Phase III: Implementing Strategic Guidance." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005. (Introduces this phase of the framework and offers elements that could be considered in creating an implementation plan and implementing major change in a large, complex organization.)

3.   **Case:** Rumsfeld, Donald M. *Transformation Planning Guidance*. April 2003, pp. 1–14, scan Appendices One and Two, pp. 23–27 (available in the NSDM box, general section).

4.   **Case:** Director, Office of Force Transformation. "Strategy for Implementation." In *Implementation of Network Centric Warfare*. January 2005, pp. 11, 12.

5.   **Case:** Report GAO-05-70. *Military Transformation: Clear Leadership Accountability, and Management Tools are Needed to Enhance DoD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities.* Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, December 2004, "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation," pp. 32–34. (Available in the NSDM box, general section.)

DMI-15 PRINCIPLES OF RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION

A. Focus. Conflict resolution and negotiation are integral to implementing a decision. Until now, we have focused on individual and organizational perspectives in choosing from among alternatives. In dealing with a complex national security issue, many other organizations will also be going through decision-making processes. They may prefer other alternatives based on different yet reasonable assumptions and criteria. Negotiation is the process of identifying underlying interests that form each party's positions and the issues they bring to the table. Moving various stakeholders toward a consensus or a settlement is an essential part of good leadership.

B. Objectives

- Understand the importance and difficulties of achieving consensus or settlement and the value of analysis in dealing with these difficulties.

- Recognize and apply basic negotiation strategies and techniques in a series of brief exercises.

- Establish the foundation for the negotiation exercise in the next session.

C. Guidance

1.   The first reading addresses the conceptual and practical aspects of negotiation. As you read, consider professional or personal negotiations you have witnessed. Were the guidelines offered in the reading applied in those situations? If not, would some of these points have been helpful in reaching a better conclusion?

2.   The second reading focuses on the way in which culture affects negotiation. The author defines culture as, "the socially transmitted beliefs, behavior patterns, values, and norms of a given community." How is the author's assessment useful to both international and organizational cultural differences? How can over-reliance on such knowledge be harmful to successful negotiation?

3.   The third reading offers insights to some common problems faced by decision makers. While many executives know a great deal about negotiations, this article discusses some common errors and occasional losses of focus that render decision makers less effective.

4.   The fourth reading is a fictitious scenario that represents the exercise background for DMI-16. At the end of the DMI-15 session, you will be assigned to a negotiating team and provided role instructions to prepare for the exercise. Please do not share your confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecard with anyone outside your negotiating team.

D. Required Readings

1.   Fink, Susan, ed. "Reconciliation Principles." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (Discusses some of the considerations and techniques for successful reconciliation and settlement through negotiation.)

2.   Salacuse, Jeswald W. "Coping with Culture." In *Making Global Deals: What Every Executive Should Know About Negotiating Abroad*. New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 42–71. Scan pp. 41–54, and read pp. 55–71. (Knowing the culture, personality, and organization of the parties increases the prospects for successful negotiation.)

3.   Sebenius, James K. "Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators." *Harvard Business Review* (April 2001): pp. 87–95. (A classic discussion of the essentials for a successful negotiation.) (Available in the NSDM box, general section.)

4.   **Case:** Murray, Charles H., and Douglas G. Hancher. "Vieques Island Training Range Re-Utilization Negotiation Exercise." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005.

DMI-16 NEGOTIATION EXERCISE

A. Focus. Negotiations may take many forms. The most common negotiations form is informal and usually includes only two parties. There are also situations that involve numerous parties and their interests, which are more complex and difficult to resolve. This exercise requires you to apply the negotiation principles and techniques introduced in the last session.

B. Objective

- Apply the principles of reconciliation and negotiation to a complex case study.

C. Guidance. (*This session is two hours long*).

1. In this session, you will participate in a negotiation involving multiple parties with many overlapping and conflicting interests and positions. Your preparation prior to this session includes getting your negotiating team together to think through the issues for your role as well as the likely positions and interests of the other parties. Together, you should identify your objectives and develop a strategy for achieving them. Prior to beginning negotiations, a spokesman from each team will make a short introductory statement.

2. Please do not share your confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecard with anyone outside your negotiating team.

3. Be prepared to discuss your strategy at the conclusion of the exercise. Did it work as planned or did you change your approach as the negotiation progressed? Why?

D. Required Reading

1. Individual instructions and scorecard for the exercise (distributed in class during DMI-15).

DMI-17 IMPLEMENTATION: STRUCTURAL/POLICY

A. Focus. The introduction to Part II of the course (DMI 14-2) introduced *four* approaches for potential initiatives to help achieve organizational objectives. *They are structural*, *policy*, *technology*, and *human capital*. Leaders frequently change some aspects of those categories to achieve organizational objectives and improve performance. This session concentrates on structural and policy considerations together because they are frequently the first areas considered for change. Specific "W4H" (what, who, when, where, and how) guidance for each initiative is *necessary* to ensure desired outcomes. As stated in *The President's Management Agenda: Fiscal Year 2002*, ". . . good beginnings are not the measure of success. What matters in the end is completion. Performance. Results. Not just making promises, but making good on promises."

B. Objectives.

- Examine how strategic guidance is implemented.

- Evaluate structural and policy approaches in terms of W4H (what, who, when, where, and how).

- Apply the concepts of structural and policy change implementation to a current case study.

C. Guidance.

1. The DMI Faculty paper makes three points. The first is that initiatives dealing with organizational structure and policy are often the first places where leaders look to identify ways to implement change, *and changes in one will tend to affect the other.* For example, if I flatten the organization structure, I will see improved internal and external communication (output) that will lead to better stakeholder service and mission accomplishment (desired outcome). Second, there are a range of structural reconfiguration and policy options that can be applied to stimulate organizational transformation. In all cases, structural and policy changes should identify the implementation details of *what*, *who*, *when*, *where*, and *how* (W4H). Lastly, in the implementation phase, *who* is accountable for producing results is a key concern.

2. Shortly after becoming CNO, Admiral Clark initiated structural and policy initiatives in his OPNAV staff. The purpose of the OPNAV reorganization was to support his strategic goal of current readiness. Are the supporting structural and policy objectives clear and consistent with respect to the strategic goal? Is each objective supported by a sufficient implementation plan in terms of W4H? After examining the implementation plans, give your interpretation of his overarching approach.

D. Required Readings

1. DMI Faculty. "Implementation: Structural and Policy." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (Addresses structural and policy concepts related to effecting organizational change.)

2.   **Case:** DMI Faculty. "In Pursuit Of Alignment: The CNO and the OPNAV Reorganization." *NWC Printing*, January 2005, (Describes structural and policy changes the CNO made in the OPNAV staff during his tenure.)

DMI-18 IMPLEMENTATION: TECHNOLOGY

A. Focus. This session will explore another of our implementation approaches: implementing change through technological innovation. While new technology can spur profound change, the second and third-order effects of insertion of a new technology may go well beyond the "technology will fix it" level that most Americans embrace. We will argue that technological change is "subtle" and produces more effects than a strictly "instrumental view" of technology would predict. The session offers practical recommendations for anticipating (or at least, coping with) technological changes and emphasizes that major technological change is inseparable from the other change approaches we discuss in DMI.

B. Objectives

- Identify key organizational systems and functions potentially impacted by the insertion of new technology into a large, complex organization.

- Explain a sensible approach to aligning technological change with other organizational strategies to enhance overall performance.

- Apply the concepts of technological change implementation to a current case study.

C. Guidance

1.   The first reading defines technology and sketches broad impacts of two landmark technologies in history. Is the definition of technology provided in the reading useful? What elements would you add or subtract? The author asserts some sweeping effects for the two technologies discussed. Are these asserted effects plausible? What could some of the effects be (anticipated and unforeseen) of global netted communications technologies?

2.   In introducing any new technology into an organization, what do you believe to be the most important factor that should be taken into consideration? What important lessons can be learned from previous attempts to initiate technological change? How can one anticipate unexpected effects that the introduction of a new technology might produce?

3.   Peter Drucker asserts: "The most valuable asset of a 21st-Century institution . . . will be its *knowledge workers* and their *productivity*." Do you believe him? Will the advent of information technologies accelerate the trend toward making those of us in military organizations less like manual workers and more like knowledge workers and technologists? If we are the latter, how should we implement change? How should we structure our organizations? How must we lead our organizations?

4.   The Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is seen as an integral part of Sea Power 21's "FORCEnet" initiative and is to enable the services to become more "network-centric" organizations. The case describes the actions of one senior leader, RADM Charles L. Munns, at a critical stage in program implementation. What were the major issues that confronted RADM Munns? Were the difficulties primarily "technological?" Was the admiral adequately prepared to lead NMCI implementation? What actions did he take that could be applied to other technological insertions? What unintended effects might NMCI produce?

D. Required Readings

    1.   Buckwalter, David T. "Technology in History." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (This paper provides a brief discussion of the broad impact on society of two landmark technologies in modern history.)

    2.   Buckwalter, David T. "Implementation: Technology." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005. (The reading discusses pertinent considerations when instituting technological change. The paper concludes that major technological innovation will actually impact all of the other "implementation approaches" discussed in DMI.)

    3.   Drucker, Peter F. "Knowledge-Worker Productivity: The Biggest Challenge." *California Management Review* 41, no. 2 (Winter 1999): pp. 79–94. (Drucker argues that future productivity growth will depend on effective management of the "knowledge worker"— and the required techniques are nearly opposite those pertinent to manual workers!)

    4.   **Case:** Linn, Thomas C. "Leading Strategic Change: Implementing the Navy Marine Corps Intranet." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2005.

DMI-19 IMPLEMENTATION: HUMAN CAPITAL

A. Focus. Human capital is widely acknowledged as the federal government's most important resource in the Information Age. Human capital, according to Nalbantian et al., "is the accumulated stock of skills, experience, and knowledge that resides in an organization's workforce and drives productive labor." It is an *asset*, not a cost, and as the more perceptive leaders have noted in the past, "people are the only resource of war that actually appreciates, rather than depreciates, over time." More recently, military leaders have begun to appreciate more fully that how they define their goals and objectives has direct implications for the *mix* of people doing the *work* required and the resultant opportunity *costs* of those decisions. Such decisions have strategic implications for the organization; consequently those decisions about human capital must be made within the context of overall organizational strategy.

The Department of Defense is beginning to take larger note of its personnel policies, especially as it takes steps to reduce the size of the active duty force, rebalance the active and reserve components and convert military positions to civilian positions. What processes does DoD have in place to identify, acquire, train, and retain the "right" kind of people for the future force? This session will look at the processes used to develop a Human Capital Strategy and integrate those considerations into a plan for implementation. This session will address such questions as: "What *is* strategic human capital management, and what do I need to know about it to effectively lead at a higher level?"

B. Objectives

- Examine strategic human capital management approaches for achieving desired outcomes in a complex national security organization.

- Apply the concepts of human capital change implementation to a current case study.

C. Guidance

1. GAO describes strategic workforce planning as aligning a human capital program with overall strategic goals and developing long-term strategies for recruiting, developing, utilizing, and retaining the organization's workforce. How does your organization treat its people—like an expense, or like a capital asset in which to invest? Does your organization utilize processes for the strategic management of human capital beyond just hiring, compensating, promoting, disciplining, and handling grievances? If so, do these processes consistently function as a means to achieve the organization's desired results?

2. Nalbantian et al. provide a description of Human Capital and it key components that should be considered when making choices about what kind of people should do the organization's work. They introduce the concept of an Internal Labor Market as a means to analyze who is acquired, trained and retained in the organization. How might the military services use these concepts to shape their forces in the future?

3. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently examined the Department of Defense's recent personnel initiatives to determine whether it has a comprehensive and data-based system to correctly identify the right mix of active duty and reserve personnel needed to

implement its new defense strategy. What does GAO see as the major problem with the way the Office of the Secretary of Defense is providing the military services guidance regarding personnel levels and desired future skill sets? The military services all use different processes to identify their personnel requirements—what are the ramifications of this disparity on OSD Human Capital Strategy planning? How well does DoD appear to managing the military-to-civilian conversion and rebalancing the active and reserve components of the military? What does GAO recommend OSD do to get its Human Capital Strategy better aligned with its updated defense strategy?

D. Required Readings

1. Excerpt: U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Workforce Planning*, GAO-04-39. Washington, D.C.: GAO, December 2003, http://www.gao.gov.

2. Nalbantian, Haig R., Richard A. Guzzo, Dave Kieffer, and Jay Doherty. Chapters 4 and 5 in *Play to Your Strengths: Managing Your Internal Labor Markets for Lasting Competitive Advantage*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004, pp. 73–102.

3. **Case:** U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense Strategy,* GAO-05-200. Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 2005, http://www.gao.gov.

DMI-20 ASSURING PERFORMANCE

A. Focus. The first reading of the session introduces the requirement for feedback and measurement to answer the central question of the ASSURE phase, "*Are we getting there?*" An assumption of the ASSURE phase is that one of the most powerful influences on behavior in the workforce is the control and measurement system—leaders really do get what they measure! In the ASSURE phase, we will examine several control and measurement systems. The second reading takes a look at the first of these systems—Robert Simons's four levers of control termed belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control systems. The "Corps Commander" is the third reading and case. It includes all aspects of DMI covered to date and is a useful synthesis thus far. Particular attention will be placed on the application of Simons's four levers of control. The session concludes with a discussion of the four perspectives mentioned in DMI 14-1 (stakeholders, resources, internal processes, and learning and growth) in preparation for reading the DMI-21 case in the next session.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the Corps Commander's application of the four levers of control (belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control systems).

- Reintroduce the four perspectives (stakeholders, resources, internal processes, and learning and growth) to support the importance of adopting a systemic approach to control and measurement.

C. Guidance

1.   The DMI Faculty paper addresses the need for a control and management system to assure desired outcomes. Why is an ASSURE phase so essential for leaders attempting to change large, complex organizations? How are the four perspectives used to help balance organizational priorities and establish specific cause and effect relationships that can be measured?

2.   Simons's article addresses the balance between control and empowerment. What does Simons mean by diagnostic, belief, boundary and interactive control systems? In your opinion, are they applicable for a large, complex national security organizations?

3.   Malone presents the session's case. The post-Vietnam Army of the 1970s was an organization in crisis. The effects of Vietnam, the switch to an All-Volunteer Force, and draconian budget cuts left the Army as a truly hollow-force facing a superpower Soviet Union opponent. The Army's answer was the Air-Land Battle (ALB) doctrine that fundamentally shifted from a focus on defensive warfare to an offensive, maneuver, and distributed battlefield perspective. The new doctrine was published in Field Manual (FM) 100-5 in the summer of 1982. LTG Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., took command of III Corps, headquartered in Ft. Hood, Texas, in spring 1982. He would remain the Corps's Commanding General until his retirement in 1985. The Corps was one of the first to transition to ALB, and General Ulmer was given the job of making the transformation happen. To prepare for the case, concentrate on examples of

how General Ulmer used each of the four levers of control. What is the role of strategy as a guide and stewardship in this organizational setting?

D. Required Readings

1. DMI Faculty. "Assure Performance." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (Addresses key concepts to ASSURE that ASSESS, DECIDE, and IMPLEMENT efforts produce results.)

2. Simons, Robert. "Control in an Age of Empowerment." *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1995. (Addresses a leadership and management system based on four levers of control.) (Available in the NSDM box, general section.)

3. **Case:** Malone, Dandridge M. "The Integration of Internal Operating Systems: An Application of Systems Leadership." Chapter 13 in *Strategic Leadership: A Multi-organizational-Level Perspective*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1992, pp. 219–236. (The case illustrates the use of strategy as a guide, four levers of control, and organizational perspectives to help lead change in a large, complex organization.)

DMI-21 MEASURING PERFORMANCE

A. Focus. What gets measured will drive organizational behavior. Linking measurements to objectives requires careful consideration. The first reading examines the relationship among inputs, outputs, outcomes, efficiency, effectiveness, and potential dysfunctional effects of measuring. The second reading focuses on challenges faced by the Rhode Island National Guard. It is used to introduce a second control and measurement system termed *management by results*. Initially, we'll stress the alignment of objectives (what needs to be done) with structural, policy, technology, or human capital initiatives (inputs to achieve objectives) and feedback measures of results (output). Subsequently, the case is used to demonstrate how stakeholders, resources, internal processes, and learning and growth perspectives can help to refine objectives and develop feedback measurements based on more complete W4H cause-effect reasoning.

B. Objectives

- Examine the methods and purposes of measurement and understand its potential dysfunctional effects.

- Understand how the elements of management by objectives/results might be used to develop a control and measurement system.

- Apply the four perspectives to ensure an organization's objectives address the systemic aspects of a control and measurement system.

C. Guidance

1.   The DMI Faculty paper further explores measurement considerations and challenges dealing with outcomes, outputs, and inputs. Unintended and sometimes dysfunctional effects can be profound. Understand these dysfunctional effects and how they can be avoided.

2.   Buckwalter tells a story about the Rhode Island National Guard (RING) and its commander, MGEN Reginald Centracchio, USAR. What are the issues that most concern MGEN Centracchio given his responsibility for multiple missions and organizations? If you were in Centracchio's position, what would be your three most important issues or challenges in order of priority? Did a consideration of stakeholders, resources, internal processes, and learning and growth help you to determine the priority list? What would you do to resolve the most important challenge and what would you measure to focus on desired results?

D. Required Readings

1.   DMI Faculty. "Measuring Performance." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2005. (Explores the effects and pitfalls of measurement systems.)

2.   **Case:** Buckwalter, David T. "Changing The Guard." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Describes the challenges associated within the Rhode Island National Guard.)

DMI-22 INTEGRATING CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT

A. Focus. A control and measurement system will drive organizational focus. Properly developed, it helps organizations translate their strategic goals into operational objectives by aligning measurements with strategy (using the cause and effect hypotheses) to drive both behavior and performance. Taken in total, such a system becomes a strategy map used throughout the entire organization. The case concerns General Eric K. Shinseki, USA, the Army's 34th Chief of Staff. It describes his effort to transform the U.S. Army. The case touches on all aspects of DMI, and in that respect represents a synthesis of course concepts to include mention of a control and measurement system (a balanced scorecard approach). An example of the U.S. Army scorecard will be reviewed in class.

B. Objectives

- Exercise critical thinking in determining the relationship between perspectives, objectives, and measures.

- Appreciate how a balanced scorecard or similar approach has the potential to influence lasting organizational change.

C. Guidance

1. Boyer provides an analysis of General Shinseki's attempt to transform the U.S. Army from June 1999 to June 2003. How would you define the organizational challenge he faced and what were his primary goals? Did he have a coherent organizational change strategy that considered stakeholder, resources, internal processes, and learning and growth perspectives? How effective was the strategy and where were the most serious points of resistance?

2. Galloucis describes how General Shinseki initiated a strategic management and measurement system (Strategic Readiness System) as part of his transformation efforts. It is based on the concept of a balanced scorecard. What were the bureaucratic challenges he faced in terms of people, organization, and process? Based on the reading alone, do you think Shinseki's initiative will last and continue to influence long-term transformation?

3. The Balanced Scorecard 101 reading provides an introductory overview of a balanced scorecard approach for a fictitious business organization called "Burgers-R-Us." How does multidimensional thinking in the "Burgers-R-Us" example help to establish perspective-driven objectives? How does this multidimensional approach compare to what we did in last session's RING case? Do the objectives support each other from the bottom up? Do the measures represent outputs or outcomes for the organization?

4. Barberg reinforces Balanced Scorecard terms. How does the author describe a strategy map? Based on his discussion of leading measures, what would be a good leading indicator for "Burgers-R-Us" customer perspective measure?

D. Required Readings

1. **Case:** Boyer, Peter J. "A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?" *New Yorker*, July 1, 2002, pp. 54–67. (A case study of General Shinseki's attempt to transform the U.S. Army.)

2. **Case**: Galloucis, Michael S. "The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS): The Road to Improved Readiness or Just Another Bright Idea?" Research paper for Core Course 5603, National War College, Washington, D.C., undated. Read only pp. 1 and 5–12. (The paper continues the case. It explains how General Shinseki initiated a Strategic Readiness System to guide and track organizational transformation.)

3. "Balanced Scorecard 101," www.exinfm.com/workshop_files/scorecard_101.pdf. (Provides a basic description of a balanced scorecard.)

4. Barberg, Bill. "Balanced Scorecard Best Practices: Understanding Leading Measures," www.businessintelligence.com/ex/asp/code.133/xe/article.htm. (Clarifies Balanced Scorecard terminology.)

DMI-23 EXECUTING STRATEGY: SYNTHESIS CASE

A. Focus. The DMI course introduced a framework and themes focused on decision making and implementation using strategy as a guide to lead change in a large, complex organization. This requires critical thinking, a sense of stewardship, and sound human relations. By now, each of you should have internalized and adapted them to your own personal framework for formulating and executing strategy "to make it happen." This session will provide an opportunity to further consolidate and synthesize your thinking by examining former Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy for reinvigorating the Department of State.

B. Objective

- Apply the DMI concepts for leading change in a large, complex organization using a current case study.

C. Guidance

1. The DMI Faculty paper, DMI 1-1, provided an overview of the course. Review overall themes and concepts of the Assess, Decide, Implement, and Assure phases of the course.

2. Harris examines Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy for transforming the State Department. How would you describe his strategy? Did he approach transformation by considering alternative perspectives? What structural, policy, technology, and human capital changes are evident? Can you identify cause and effect hypotheses implied within each of these areas?

3. The classroom session will explore the State Department web site to demonstrate former Secretary Powell's control and measurement system to promote lasting organizational change.

D. Required Readings

1. DMI Faculty. "Introduction to Decision Making and Implementation." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, December 2004. (A general framework that should be personalized and adapted by students to assist them as they move on to progressively more responsible positions in national security organizations.) (Provided in session DMI-1)

2. **Case:** Harris, Shane. "Powell's Army." *Government Executive* (November 2003): pp. 18–28. (The article examines Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy for transforming the State Department.)

DMI FINAL EXAMINATION

A. Focus. The final examination covers Part II of the DMI course and will be an out-of-class evolution concentrating on the implementation and assuring performance phases of DMI.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus and include the application of the student's framework as developed using the DMI Part II course concepts and theories.

B. Objective

- Evaluate a situation requiring implementation of a significant change to a U.S. national security organization from the perspective of a senior cognizant leader to demonstrate mastery of course concepts and theories.

ANNEX C
POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS
STUDY GUIDE

1. Scope. The Policy Making and Process (PMP) course is designed to increase the students' understanding of the political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that are relevant to national security decision making at the national level, at major headquarters units, and joint operational commands. This understanding will increase the students' future professional competence as senior-level participants in the national security community. The PMP course is presented in two major parts: the International and Domestic Environments and the National Security System and Process.

The first part of the course is intended to provide a more thorough understanding of the complex environment within which national security policy is made. The initial sessions introduce a model that can be used to understand and evaluate the factors that influence national security policy making and the processes through which the government makes national security policy. This is followed by lessons on international actors, the tools they use to exert influence on the United States and the constraints that may be imposed upon the United States by the nature and distribution of military, political, and economic power in the world. The next lessons focus on the main actors in the domestic political system: the Congress, interest groups, the news media, and public opinion. These sessions address the roles of the actors in the U.S. system of government and the various ways in which these actors strive to influence national security policy decisions.

The second part of the course examines formal policy processes inside the executive branch of government with particular emphasis on the National Security Council system and the various policy, planning, and resource allocation systems used in the Department of Defense. During this part of the course, each of four perspectives (or ways of looking at and analyzing the decision making process) will be examined in considerable detail because of the insight they provide. There will be separate sessions on the rational, organizational behavior, governmental politics, and cognitive perspectives. These perspectives will also be applied to the formal policy processes that shape national security decision making.

The course will conclude with a "current policy analysis" which provides an opportunity to use the model and perspectives to improve the students' understanding of the material and ability to identify key influences on a future policy matter. The final exam will require students to apply course concepts in analyzing a case that will be similar in content and complexity to the current policy analysis case in the preceding session.

Case studies are used throughout the course as a vehicle for applying the model and associated course concepts to real world situations.

As students enter the Planning Challenge and NSDM exercise modules, they should have a clear understanding of the various actors and influences in the policy making process that will affect decisions made about strategy and force planning. Students should be able to anticipate how theses actors and influences will affect the strategies and force structure recommendations that they will make as a seminar in the exercise.

2.   Course Objectives. The objectives of the PMP Course are to enhance the students' future professional competence as participants in the national security environment by increasing their understanding of:

- The context of the decision-making process and the organizational, political, and behavioral influences on national security decisions, and

- The formal processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made.

3.   Course Structure. The PMP Course will meet two to four times each week in a seminar format. Seminars require the active participation of all class members. Maximum learning during the trimester depends upon the sharing of expertise and experiences by all members of the seminar.

4.   Course Study Guide. This PMP Study Guide is the primary planning document for the course. For each session it identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions, reading assignments, and cases. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class. Supplementary readings are listed for use by those students who desire to explore a particular topic in greater depth.

5.   Course Requirements. Each student is expected to complete all required readings prior to each session. There will be two exams: a mid-term essay and a final analysis of a case which involves situations drawn from the national security environment in which the typical graduate will be expected to perform.

POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE—2005

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PART I: THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PART II: THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND PROCESS

PMP-1 INTRODUCTION TO POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS

A. Focus. With all national security organizations facing important questions about their roles and missions, as well as force size and composition, it is important that key participants in those organizations understand the environment in which these issues will be addressed. The Policy Making and Process (PMP) course is designed to increase the students' understanding of the major political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that are relevant both to national security decision making at the national level and at major military commands. Knowledge of these phenomena will increase a student's ability to continue to develop as an effective leader, staff officer, and participant in this vital process.

B. Objectives

- Describe the general requirements and content of the PMP course.

- Identify the elements of an input-output model for use as a tool for case analysis.

C. Guidance

1. Analysts build models to help them analyze and understand complex issues. The PMP input-output model seeks to do the same for national security decisions. How might such a model be helpful to you as a participant in the national security decision-making process?

2. The Powell speech describes the "political" aspects of decision making at the national security level. What new skills and perspectives does the Powell speech imply you will need as you move up the triangle?

3. What are the responsibilities of the various elements in our government as articulated in the *Constitution of the United States*? How do the principles established in this document affect the national security decision-making process? How do they affect the organizations in which you serve?

4. What are the key decisions in the video, "Retreat from Beirut?" Who were the key actors? What factors affected the decision-making process? At what point was a massive failure of U.S. policy inevitable?

D. Required Readings

1. PMP Faculty. "An Introduction to Policy Making and Process." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2003. (Introduces the input-output model and provides general guidance concerning the PMP course.)

2. Powell, Colin S. "The Triangle Analogy." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College reprinted excerpt from a 6 June 1990 address. (A speech to NWC students discussing the role of politics from the point of view of former CJCS General Powell.)

3.   *The Constitution of the United States of America* and *The Declaration of Independence.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. (Scan and retain. Distributed as a small pamphlet in the NSDM box.)

E.   Case

1.   "Retreat from Beirut." During the second half of this session, a Public Broadcasting System documentary entitled "Retreat from Beirut" will be shown in class. This video and the required reading on Lebanon for PMP-2 will be the basis for classroom discussion during PMP-2.

F.   Supplementary Readings

1.   Hilsman, Roger. *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992. (Describes the "political process" of decision making and provides a realistic description of how Washington actually works in making defense and foreign policy. Available NWC library—JX1417.H54 1992.)

2.   Duncan, W. Raymond, Barbara Jancar-Webster, and Bob Switky. *World Politics in the 21st Century.* New York: Longman, 2001. (This text provides a good overview of many of the factors and issues that will be examined in the PMP course. It offers a decision making model that is similar to the PMP model. One of the authors was on the NSDM faculty during the early 1990s. Available NWC Library—JZ1305 .D83 2004.)

3.   Wittkopf, Eugene R., ed. *The Future of American Foreign Policy.* New York: St. Martin's, 1994. (Collection of essays on domestic and international influences on U.S. foreign policy. Available NWC library—JX1417.F88 1994.)

4.   *The Federalist Papers.* James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton wrote these commentaries in 1787–8. The articles were published in New York newspapers in a successful attempt to sway the voters of the Empire State to ratify the Constitution. The Federalist Papers can be accessed over the internet at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/const/fed

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PMP-2 INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: "LEBANON REVISITED"

A. Focus. One of the principal objectives of the PMP course is to increase awareness of relevant political, organizational, and behavioral concepts useful in the analysis of national security cases. An example of such a case was the Reagan administration's responses to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s. To dampen continuing conflict and increase the chances for an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the Middle East, the Reagan administration actively employed the diplomatic and military resources of the United States Government during 1981–83, but was ultimately unable to control events in Lebanon. When American military forces were withdrawn in February 1984, many wondered how the Reagan administration had become so deeply involved in the Lebanon crisis.

B. Objectives

- Explain a complex national security case using the input-output model.

- Describe the major factors that influenced the decision(s) in this case.

C. Guidance

1. Which international and domestic factors affected the president's decisions? Did any of these factors change over time?

2. What were the dominant factors that drove the decision to redeploy the Marines?

3. Did actions taken in Washington constrain the performance of military officers at the operational level? If so, in what ways?

4. Should military officers consider political, social, and economic factors when advising their military and civilian superiors?

5. How can a systems model assist in understanding national security decision making?

D. Required Readings

1. Hall, David K. and William R. Farrell. "Lebanon Revisited." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 1997, with excerpt from *Foreign Service Journal* (June 1984).

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Friedman, Thomas L. *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. New York: Doubleday, 1989. (This New York Times reporter gives a very readable personal account of the Middle East, including the tragedy of Beirut. Available NWC library—DS119.7.F736 1989.)

2. U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. *Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut*, Hearings. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. (The report of the Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on the Armed Services, on their investigation into the

bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Available NWC library—UG432.L4.A33 1983.)

3.   Hammel, Eric. *The Root Redux: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. (A story of the Marines involved in Beirut between August 1982 and February 1984, with emphasis on the August–October 1983 period and based upon participants' viewpoints. Available NWC library—DS87.H335 1985.)

4.   Frank, Benis M. *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982–1984*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. (Account of the deployment of Marines to Lebanon during the period 1982–1984, focusing on presence and operations conducted versus analyzing policy. Available NWC library—VE23.F73 1987.)

5.   *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983* (The Long Commission). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. (The report of the Long Commission on the investigation into the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Available NWC library—UG432.L4.D62 1983.)

6.   Esposito, John. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1987. (An overview of contemporary politics in Islamic states. Available NWC library—BP63.A4.N423.)

7.   Pintak, Larry. *Beirut Outtakes*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988. (A correspondent's experiences in Lebanon during the crisis. Available NWC library—DS87.53.P56 1988.)

8.   For a number of links that provide an overview of Lebanon today see: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/indiv/area/MiddleEast/Lebanon.htp

PMP-3   THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (PART I)

A.   Focus. Despite the considerable military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States, its national security process and policies are often shaped by the actions of other actors such as states, nations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in a constantly changing international system. Current trends toward greater and more complex economic, political, and military interdependence within the international political system suggest that international actors may gain even greater influence in future U.S. policy making. For effective participation in the international political system, U.S. policy-makers must understand the full range of instruments available to influence international behavior, and that these same instruments can be used by others to influence our will. By studying the distribution of power in the international political system and the tools and rules used to translate that power in international relations, we can gain insight, and perhaps foresight, that can contribute to both better policy and more successful policy process.

B.   Objectives

- Identify concepts and organizations useful for analyzing the international political system.

- Analyze the current international political environment and some of its trends.

- Discuss how the international political system influences the U.S. national security decision-making process.

C.   Guidance

1.   The Teague reading provides a framework for analyzing the international political system. The author identifies four areas of emphasis: principal actors in international politics, various forms of action available to actors, some rules that apply in the international political system, and current trends. With these concepts in mind, how can we use them as a guide for analyzing the international political system? What has changed in this system in recent years? Each student should be able to identify the "actors, rules, and tools" commonly found within the contemporary international political system and how they interact with each other.

2.   Stigler offers a brief history and discussion of the structure of the UN. This article introduces the four main purposes of the UN Charter: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. It addresses two main questions: What role does the UN play in the international system? How has the UN aided and obstructed U.S. foreign policy?

3.   Farah and Ottaway describe the development of a multi-billion dollar oil project agreement between multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and the government of Chad. This article illustrates many of the concepts discussed in the other readings. Who were the major actors in this situation? What were their sources of power and/or influence? What tools were employed by various actors? What international rules were involved? Did some rules or issues take precedence over others? If

so, why? How did all this affect the outcome of the situation? What does this portend for future international economic development plans or agreements?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Teague, George E. "The International Political System." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Provides a basic framework for understanding the principal actors, the rules that they operate under, and how they interact within the international political system.)

2.   Stigler, Andrew L. "The United Nations in the International Arena." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2005. (Provides a discussion of the role of the UN in international politics and the UN's effect on U.S. foreign policy.)

3.   Douglas, Farah and David B. Ottaway. "Watchdog Groups Rein in Chad Oil Deal." *Washington Post*, January 4, 2001, p. A14. (Illustrates the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations and the complex interaction of multiple international actors in the development of an oil pipeline in Chad.)

E.   Case. None.

F.   Supplementary Readings

1.   Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age." *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 1998): pp. 81–89. (The authors contend that states are resilient, continue to command the loyalties of the vast majority of the world's people, and states continue to maintain control over material resources in this era of interdependence during the information age. Available NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 0015-7120.)

2.   Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Affairs (*Spring 1998): pp. 29–46. (A discussion about the study of international affairs as a competition between realist, liberal, and radical traditions. The author contends that there is a continuing clash between two post–Cold War camps: those who believe that world politics has been fundamentally changed and those who believe that the future will mirror the past. Includes a useful listing of articles by numerous authors who examine realism, liberal approaches, radical approaches, or constructivist approaches to international affairs. Available NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 0015-7120.)

3.   Libicki, Martin. "Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar?" *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1999): pp. 30–43. (The author discusses the extent to which globalization has increased the ability of smaller countries to acquire various elements of power and influence the behavior of larger countries. Available in the NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 0015-7228.)

4.   Interview with Kofi A. Annan, U.N. secretary-general, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 21, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997). (Elected U.N. secretary-general on 17 December 1996 to serve a five-year term, Annan provides his perspective on emerging security trends that UN and world leaders must confront. Available NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 1046-1868.)

5.   Strange, Susan. "The Erosion of the State." *Current History* 96, no. 613 (November 1997): pp. 365–369. (Strange argues that the long struggle for liberty made at least some states accountable to the people, but globalization, by shifting power from states to firms, has allowed international bureaucracies to undermine that accountability. Available NWC library periodical collection.   http://www.nwc.navy.mil/library/7Journals&Newspapers/NWCLibraryPeriodical HoldingsList6.htm#F.) (27 January 2004).

6.   Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Globalization: What's New, What's Not? (And So What?)" *Foreign Policy* (Spring 2000): pp. 104–119. (The authors distinguish between globalization and interdependence and then define the concept of globalism to describe the state of today's world. They discuss four dimensions of globalism: economic, military, environmental, and social/cultural, and use the concept of "thickness" to describe the degree of globalism that exists in each dimension at any given time. Finally, they discuss factors that affect the thickness of globalism and how this phenomenon affects international politics. Available NWC Library ISSN 1015-7120.)

7.   The UN IN-BRIEF. From the web site, (http://www.un.org). (An overview is presented including the six main bodies that make up the UN structure.)

PMP-4 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (PART II)

A. Focus. In the previous lesson we discussed several important actors and rules in the international system. In this lesson we note that since 1989–90 a number of new actors, rules, and trends have appeared on the international scene and that these factors present major challenges to policymakers. Specifically, we discuss the power of ideas and norms, developments in international law, the role of religion, and the spread of terrorism. Each of these developments has major implications for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Though not easily measurable, ideas have always been important components of the international system. Today, several important norms—ideas that govern behavior by shaping what actors believe is appropriate behavior—are in a state of flux. Norms of sovereignty have been eroded by changes in public opinion regarding the right to intervene for humanitarian causes. The outcome of these developments is directly relevant to the location and frequency of future military operations.

In addition, several factors appear to be leading to rapid changes in international law, including failing states, WMD proliferation, and terrorism and the potential need for preemptive actions against it. International terrorism itself is as old as world politics but terrorists are now using new tools, organizational networks, recruitment techniques, and methods of execution. New levels of cooperation and patience are required in order to disrupt these networks and institutions.

Religion, long considered the domain of individuals or communities, has become a global force to be reckoned with and affects issues ranging from national identity to terrorism. Under certain conditions, fundamentalism and nationalism can fuse with religious interpretations, producing dire consequences. This volatile mixture has created new actors and unleashed powerful emotions. In order to shape the kind of world we want, difficult decisions will have to be made about whom to deal with and what tools to use. Similarly, the spread of new norms and developments in international law may require a concerted effort at shaping the marketplace of ideas. As the world becomes more complex, so must our proficiency with the full spectrum of tools of power and influence.

B. Objectives

- Identify post–Cold War concepts and organizations critical for analyzing the international political system.

- Analyze new trends, actors, and rules in the evolving international political environment.

- Discuss how these factors influence the U.S. national security decision-making process and how that process should adapt to new conditions.

C. Guidance

1. Garofano describes a series of developments bearing on the making of U.S. foreign policy. What are international norms? How are they created, and what is their life cycle? What

are the implications of developments regarding norms of sovereignty and humanitarianism? What recent developments in international law could have a major impact on U.S. foreign policy and defense policy? Does international law merely reflect the norms of the most powerful states? Is religion becoming more important in international politics? If so, how might the United States respond and participate? Terrorism presents a host of challenges. Which of these challenges can be dealt with by the United States alone, and which require cooperation or coalition action? What is the relationship, if any, between religion and terrorism and what can we do about it? Finally, is al Qaeda a new kind of transnational organization? How must the United States respond?

2.   Crenshaw describes the globalization of civil war and terrorism. What are the major milestones in the globalization of terror? What defines, in her view, the "new" terrorism? How has U.S. policy responded, and why? Relate your answer to the I/O Model, which considers inputs from both domestic and international variables. Which are most important to explaining U.S. vulnerability to terrorism? Crenshaw describes the ideas that underlie the strategies of both sides. Where do these ideas come from and what is the likelihood that they might change?

D. Required Readings

1.   Garofano, John. "Actors, Rules and Trends in International Politics since 1989." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2004. (We are accustomed to thinking about international relations in terms of large states, fixed national interests, and power relations. Ideas and internationally accepted norms, however, may be growing in importance. In addition, bad transnational actors like al Qaeda, trends in economic globalization, and trends in international law will all affect the constraints within which leaders make national security policy.)

2.   Crenshaw, Martha. "Why America? The Globalization of Civil War." *Current History* 100 (December 2001): pp. 425–432. (The September 11 attacks were the culmination of years of growing anti-Americanism that has become increasingly globalized. Terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens result from a combination of the channeling of religious feelings and ideas and strategic, instrumental logic. The United States needs to consider both of these in combating terrorism.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Jurgensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.* University of California Press, 2001. (Available NWC Library—BL 65 .V55 J84 2001.)

2.   Crenshaw, Martha, ed. *Terrorism in Context.* Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. (Available NWC Library—HV 6431 .T4665 1995.)

3.   Lennon, Alexander T. J. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks.* MIT Press, 2003. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

4.   Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism.* Columbia University Press, 1998. (Available NWC Library—HV6431 .H626 1998.)

5. Kirshner, Jonathan. "Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War." *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1998): pp. 64–91. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

6. Rowe, David M. "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): pp. 195–231. (Available http://ejournals.ebsco.com/Article.asp?ContributionID=1006937, accessed on 30 January 2004.)

7. Davenport, David. "The New Diplomacy." *Policy Review* 116 (December 2002/ January 2003): pp. 17–31. (Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection ISSN 0146-5945.)

8. Godson, Roy and Phil Williams. "Strengthening Cooperation against Transnational Crime." *Survival* 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): pp. 66–89. (Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0039-6338.)

9. Dragnich, Alyssa K. "Jurisdictional Wrangling: US Military Troops Overseas and the Death Penalty," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 4, no. 2 (Fall 2003): pp. 571–580. (Available from NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

10. Abbott, Kenneth W. "International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts." *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no. 2 (April 1999): pp. 361–379. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

11. Stromseth, Jane E. "Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment." *The American Journal of International Law* 97, no. 3 (July 2003): pp. 628–52. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

12. Zacher, Mark W. "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): pp. 215–50. (Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0020-8183.)

13. Enderlin, Charles. *Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002*. New York: Other Press, 2002.

14. Pressman, Jeremy. "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" *International Security* 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): pp. 5–43.

PMP-5 CASE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM—LANDMINES

A. Focus. For nearly a decade, an organization known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines has spearheaded an international movement to eliminate the production and use of antipersonnel landmines (APLs) anywhere in the world. Supported by hundreds of states, IGOs, and NGOs, this movement led to the development of an international treaty commonly known as the Ottawa Treaty. The case study discusses this movement and demonstrates how this and other events in the International Political System influenced the establishment of U.S. APL policy during the Clinton Administration, as well as identifying some of the issues and events that may have influenced the Bush Administration's decision concerning this policy.

B. Objective

- Illustrate the relationship between the international political system, domestic political system, and the national security system in national security decision-making.

C. Guidance

1. Using the case study and the input-output model, analyze President Clinton's decisions to not sign the Ottawa Treaty and to announce a new U.S. APL policy.

2. Which specific events or changes in the international political system (IPS) shaped President Clinton's decisions? What major IPS actors, rules and tools were involved?

3. How did the domestic political system (DPS) affect President Clinton's decision to not sign the Ottawa Treaty? To implement his own APL policy? What was the role that DoD, DoS and the NSA played in shaping the president's decisions?

4. What has changed within the IPS since the 1997 policy announcement that influenced the Bush Administration's decisions concerning APL policy? Which actors influence the process, and how will they do so?

5. What changes or events in the IPS might lead to a major shift in U.S. policy toward landmines?

D. Required Reading

1. Teague, George E. "Antipersonnel Landmines: A U.S. Policy-Making Minefield." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. International Campaign to Ban Landmines Website, http://www.icbl.org. (Website provides information about the organization, on-going initiatives, and status of the Landmine Ban Treaty, as well as a number of recent newspaper and journal articles related to the organization or the treaty and a list of related sites.)

2.   Human Rights Watch. "U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Policy," http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslm/USALM007-01.htm (accessed 10 January 2001). (Article reviews Presidential Decision Directive 64 issued on 23 June 1998, summarizes U.S. policy activity since that date, and provides updates on the Landmine Ban Treaty and the Conference on Disarmament.)

PMP-6   CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET

A.   Focus. This session will discuss the important role played by Congress in the legislative and budgeting process. Special emphasis will be given to discussing the importance of Congress and the critical role that it plays with respect to the military services. There is also opportunity to review some fundamental aspects of Congress, including how the federal legislative branch functions. Finally, PMP-6 offers the opportunity to review the complex steps of compiling the federal budget, the different Congressional roles with respect to the budget, and how the enactment phase of the budget process uses the products of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process to return a series of laws to DoD that appropriate and direct our expenditures.

B.   Objectives

- Understand the important role of the legislative branch, its different parts, and the processes that allow Congress to introduce, develop, enact, and oversee legislation.

- Understand how the budget process (and pressures external to DoD reflected in that process) affects resource allocation for DoD in particular and the country more generally.

- Understand a variety of related concepts (deficit vs. debt, on budget and off budget, GDP, etc.) that help place the budget in context as a significant statement of national priorities.

C.   Guidance

1.   The first reading by ADM Crowe reviews the importance of Congress and the necessity of working with the legislative. The author describes the necessity and difficulty of the service's relationship with Congress. He introduces the criticality of understanding how Congress works, plus the advantageous nature of personal relationships with different lawmakers. In very candid remarks, ADM Crowe grants the reader insight towards the differences between the military officer and the lawmaker, and the effect this has in the complex world of turning policy and preference into laws and budgets.

2.   The second required reading briefly describes the powers of Congress relative to national security as provided for in the Constitution. It also discusses some of the legislative dynamics relevant to the Congress. When the planning, programming, and budgeting is complete in the Pentagon, after the DoD budget is reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget and integrated with the budgets of other Executive Branch agencies, and after the President's Budget is submitted to the Congress, it still represents nothing more than a proposal for spending in the next fiscal year. It is predominantly the prerogative of Congress, not the Executive Branch, to determine how taxpayers' money is spent. Just as force planners attempt to answer the question of how much is enough, Congress answers the question of how much is authorized (given permission) and appropriated (actual dollars). These goals, which often conflict, are accomplished through the federal budget process. Some knowledge of this process is central to complete your understanding of how we allocate defense resources. When involved in any part of the defense resource allocation process, you should be sensitive to the needs and peculiarities

of the Congressional process. It is, after all, the culmination of the entire effort that confirms or changes all that has gone before. Some issues to consider in this session include:

- Why is enacting the federal budget so contentious and time-consuming?

- What are some of the national priorities that compete with defense?

- What factors and contexts make defense funding unevenly vulnerable, i.e., easy to cut in some ways and difficult to cut in others?

- What methods are appropriate to determine the adequacy of the defense budget?

D. Required Readings

1.   William J. Crowe, "Congress and Defense." Chapter 13 in *The Line of Fire*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. (Discusses personal perceptions of practicing the "political arts" in dealing with the Congress on national security matters.)

2.   Turregano, LTC Clemson G., and LtCol Doug Mason, "The Constitution, the Congress, and the Federal Budget." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2002. (Briefly discusses the origins of the Constitution and democratic thought and the role of Congress in the national security policy process.)

3.   Mason, Douglas E. "Marine One." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005. (The case describes DPS influences on the acquisition of a new airframe for the Presidential helicopter fleet.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Davidson, Roger, and Walter Oleszek. *Congress and Its Members*. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000. (A comprehensive analysis of the functions, procedures, norms, and external relations of the U.S. Congress. Available NWC library—JK.1061.D29 2000.)

2.   Keefe, William J. *Congress and the American People*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980. (A very thorough discussion of Congressional procedure and similarities between the chambers. Available NWC Library—JK1061 .K39.)

3.   Harris, Fred. *In Defense of Congress*. New York: St. Martin's, 1995. (This work provides unique insights into Congress as an organization, and thoughts on improving Congressional accountability and process. Available NWC Library—JK1021 .H37 1995.)

4.   Dodd, Lawrence C., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. *Congress Reconsidered*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993. (Superb anthology of articles describing the challenges facing Congress today. Available NWC Library—JK1061 .C587 1993.)

5.	Davidson, Roger H., ed. *The Post–Reform Congress*. New York: St Martin's, 1992. (A very thorough discussion of the influence of the dramatic changes in the 1970s on Congressional leadership, procedures, and process. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

6.	Smith, Hedrick. *The Power Game*. New York: Basic Books, 1988. (This is an easy-to-read, basic, and accurate synopsis of the political process. Available NWC Library—JK271 .S577 1988.)

7.	Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. *Interest Group Politics*. 6th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002. (Well-regarded compilation of essays that covers the main aspects of interest groups and their ability to influence policy. Available NWC library—JK.1118.I565 2002.)

8.	Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge*. 2d edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000. (A good single volume on foreign policy and the decision-making process by an author [Snow] who has served on the faculties of the Naval, Army, and Air War Colleges. Chapter 8, "Outside Influences I: Interest Groups and Think Tanks," is particularly relevant. Available NWC library—JZ.1480.S55 2000.)

9.	Hinckley, Barbara. *Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. (Hinckley argues that the conventional wisdom that Congress and the executive branch are continually at odds with each other over foreign policy is largely a myth. She notes that despite flurries of activity, both branches benefit from the appearance of conflict, but in reality, Congress usually votes with the president in the end. Available NWC library—JK1081.H56 1994.)

10.	Navarro, Peter. *The Policy Game*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984. (Navarro's premise is that contained in every governmental policy are winners and losers of what he terms is the Washington "policy game." He argues that the use of policy by private constituencies or interest groups is ultimately harmful to the national public interest. The author urges his readers to become more aware of how and why policy is made in the Washington environment. Available NWC library—JK1118.N38 1984.)

11.	Phillips, Kevin. *Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall Street, and the Frustration of American Politics*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1994. (A scathing attack on the failure of politics in Washington and how the government has seemingly lost touch with the American electorate. Phillips is a former Reagan Administration official who is described by *Time* as "the Nostradamus of Washington." Available NWC Library—JK2249 .P48 1994.)

12.	Robinson, William H., and Clay H. Wellborn. *Knowledge, Power, and the Congress*. Washington, D.C.: The Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991. (Robinson and Wellborn argue that the historical overriding concern in Congress is how to be informed on issues of increasing complexity. The authors note that this has been a major problem for Congress since 1789 and one which has been exacerbated in modern times to the larger number of complex issues faced by Congress and the vast array of voices–both public and private–contending for influence. Available NWC library—JK1067.K64 1991).

13. Sinclair, Barbara. *Unorthodox Lawmaking*. The Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000. (An overview detailing how legislation increasingly follows non-traditional paths in the House and the Senate, primarily due to partisan changes in Congress).

14. Both the House and Senate have official websites at: http://www.house.gov and http://www.senate.gov. A good site for general information on interest groups is: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/, and links to most of the prominent think tanks are at: http://www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/Documents.center/psthink.html.

PMP-7   DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM (LECTURE)

A.   Focus. Seminar sessions on the domestic political system introduce and explore pertinent DPS actors, rules, and tools, including Congress, the federal budget, interest groups, public opinion, and the domestic media. This session will provide an opportunity to hear from a Washington "insider" in the DPS, either a principle actor or someone closely associated with principle actors, domestic rules or tools.

B.   Objective

- Identify the domestic rule sets and tools used by the speaker.

- Review the role the speaker may have in influencing policy decisions.

- Consider what, if any, impact the speaker may have on the military services.

C.   Guidance. Those who have not participated in domestic political processes often have difficulty appreciating the complexity of the interactions between both houses of Congress, the American public, the domestic media, and a myriad of interest and lobbying groups. Approach this presentation with an eye on how elements within the DPS use domestic rules and tools to assert influence on domestic policy making. While the lecture is important, the question and answer session will be key in putting the speaker's experiences in context for individual students. Before the lecture give some thought to potential questions, perhaps drawing on your experience with the legislature, the Congressional staff, or the budget process in your previous jobs.

D.   Required Reading. None.

E.   Supplementary Reading. None.

PMP-8   INTEREST GROUPS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE NEWS MEDIA

A.   Focus. Public opinion represents one of the most potent forces found in the U.S. political landscape, yet it is not easily to energize or control. In many ways public opinion is the prize fought over by numerous actors in both the domestic political system and national security system. No leader, including senior military leaders, can simply dismiss public opinion as irrelevant. The majority of the U.S. public gets its knowledge of domestic and international events from mass media sources. Leaders in government and of an ever increasing number of special interest groups are well aware of this fact and seek to use the media as a conduit to communicate and gain support for their agendas. This is not to imply the media is solely a passive participant in the process of forming public opinion. Great debates have raged regarding the role of the media in this process. The age old, often uneasy, relationship between the media and the military also bears on the formulation of public opinion. The Department of Defense recently initiated a policy of embedding reporters with combat units in Iraq. This has added another dimension to the public opinion arena. This session focuses on public opinion, interest groups, the news media, and the complex ways in which they can interact.

B.   Objectives

- Analyze and discuss the strengths and dangers of public opinion, how public opinion is formed, and how it can impact the national security decision making process.

- Analyze and discuss how interest groups, think tanks, and public opinion influence national security decision making.

- Discuss how the national and international media may influence public opinion.

- Discuss the policy of embedding reporters with combat units, challenges associated with this policy, and what embedding may portend for the creation of public opinion in the future.

C.   Guidance

1.   Norton provides a broad look at the formulation and power of public opinion. How is public opinion formed? How powerful a force is public opinion? Is it a positive or negative force? Is the U.S. sufficiently well-informed and wise to have a say in national security policies? In what ways is the U.S. public consistent? In what ways is it volatile? What are the implications of this article for political and military leaders?

2.   Calhoun provides an overview of interest groups and think tanks. What are some examples of interest groups active in U.S. politics today? Describe the various methods used by interest groups to influence policy making. Which portion of the U.S. public are they most likely to influence? What are some of the checks on the influence of these groups?

3.   Paul and Kim discuss the sometimes complimentary and sometimes divergent goals of the press and military, including risks associated with embedding as well as recommendations to address shortcomings of the embed system.

D. Required Readings

1. Norton, Richard J. "Public Opinion." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Examines the sources, formulation, and aspect of public opinion.)

2. Calhoun, William M. "Interest Groups." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2002. (Briefly discusses organized interest groups and their role in influencing decision makers and the formulation of U.S. policy.)

3. Paul, Christopher, and James J. Kim. "Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System in Historical Context." Rand Corporation, 2004.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L. Tedin. *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact.* New York: Longman, 2001. (Discusses the make-up of the U.S. public, how public opinion is formed and trends in public opinion analyses. Available as an Inter-library loan through the Naval War College library)

2. Yankelovich, Daniel, and I. M. Destler. *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. (Examines post–Cold War developments in U.S. and the significant increase in the importance of economic issues in the mind of the American people. Available NWC library—E885.B49 1994.)

3. Graber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics.* 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2000. (Reviews different manners in which media influences U.S. public perceptions and national policies. Available NWC library—HN90.m3 M43 2000.)

PMP-9   CASE STUDY: THE KC-767 TANKER LEASE

A.   Focus. As we saw in previous sessions, the founders of our nation deliberately chose a system of government that shares the responsibility of governance of the United States between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Each branch possesses a unique view of issues and policy decisions based primarily on "who they answer to." Members of Congress answer to their constituents and must take into account the local effects of policy and procurement decisions. The president is elected by voters from across the nation and looks at these issues in a broader context. He is supported by agencies of the federal government who are led by civilian appointees but are made up of career civilian and military members who are expected to work within policies and laws that are introduced by Congress and approved by the president. These members make recommendations concerning, and will work with, the programs and weapon systems that are funded by Congress and approved by the president for many years. Because of the high stakes involved, the debate is lively and contentious. In addition, because there is so much at stake, special interest groups operate in key locations and seek to influence the decision making process. One of the most powerful tools at each of these groups' disposal is the media which, as we've discussed in prior sessions, is a powerful way to influence public opinion which can also be a critical factor in determining the outcome of the decision making process.

B.   Objectives

- Understand the role of Congress in the procurement of defense systems

- Understand how special interest groups including major corporations, seek to influence procurement decisions

- Understand the role and power of the media during the debate of ideas involving procurement of defense systems

- Understand the military officer's role in the procurement process

C.   Guidance. After the Department of Defense decides what it would like to procure, Congress, through a system of committees, authorizes and funds these programs. These committees do not always reach the same conclusions. The case we will examine in this lesson will allow us to analyze the effects of the inputs on the decision to procure the next generation tanker aircraft for the United States Air Force. As you read this case, take note of the various inputs from different parts of the Input/Output Model and note the effects that these inputs have on the decision maker and the other actors involved.

D.   Required Reading. Ducey, Roger H. "The Next Tanker." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005.

E.   Supplementary Reading. None.

PMP-10 PMP MIDTERM EXAMINATION

A. Focus. The PMP mid-term examination requires the student to demonstrate mastery of the ways in which the international political system, the domestic political system, and various tools, rules, and norms associated with them affect U.S. policymaking on major national security issues. The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus.

B. Objective. To evaluate student understanding of the course material presented in Part I of Policy Making and Process.

C. Case. A case will be distributed prior to the examination.

PMP-11 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES

A. Focus. There are a variety of different ways to explain how national security decisions are made. One perspective is that national security decision making is a rational process. From this perspective, policy choices are made by decision makers who carefully evaluate all the possible options, understand the consequences of each option relative to well-defined national interests, and choose the option that best promotes those national interests. Other perspectives emphasize the different interests, experiences, and analytical capabilities of the various organizations and individuals involved in the decision-making process. These perspectives see decisions as resulting from organizational processes, imperatives, and pressures; from the interpersonal dynamics among key advisors; or from the personal convictions, values, or cognitive limitations of the decision-maker. The Cuban Missile Crisis is used mainly to illustrate the usefulness of the four perspectives in analyzing policy choices, but also is an example of a major Cold War confrontation involving the risk of nuclear escalation.

B. Objective

- Illustrate the analytical elements and assumptions in the Rational Actor, Organizational Behavior, Governmental-Politics, and Cognitive perspectives on the decision making process.

C. Guidance

1.   What are the essential elements and assumptions in the Rational Actor perspective? Does the Rational Actor model fully explain the decisions in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

2.   What are the essential elements and assumptions in the Organizational Behavior, Governmental-Politics, and Cognitive perspectives? What insights into the Cuban Missile Crisis can be gained through these perspectives?

3.   How can analytical perspectives be used by someone working within the national security arena?

4.   In its ultimate approach to the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, did the United States choose the most appropriate policy?

D. Required Readings

1.   Miskel, James F. "Four Perspectives on Decision Making." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2001. (An overview of four different ways of analyzing a national security decision and the relationship of these perspectives to the Naval War College input-output model. This reading draws heavily upon a recently updated classic political science text, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow.)

2.   Norton, Richard J., James F. Miskel, and Keith Duncan. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2001. (A concise summary of the Cuban Missile Crisis.)

3.   Stigler, Andrew. "Kennedy's Blunder? Reappraising America's Options in the Cuban Missile Crisis." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2004.

E.   Supplementary Readings

1.   Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999. (The Cuban missile crisis is analyzed from the perspectives of three different decision-making models. Available NWC library—E841.A44 1999.)

2.   Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, eds. *National Security Decisions— The Participants Speak.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990. (Oral history interviews with numerous participants in contemporary national security decision making. Available NWC library—UA23.N2485 1990.)

3.   Brugioni, Dino A. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.* New York: Random House, 1993. (A detailed account of the Cuban missile crisis. Available NWC library—E8841.876 1991.)

4.   Wyden, Peter H. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. (An account, drawn heavily from survivors' narratives, of the CIA-backed invasion that helped set the stage for the missile crisis. Available NWC library—F1788.W9.)

5.   May, Earnest R., and Philip Zelikow. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1997. (Transcripts of the audio tapes of EXCOM meetings during the Cuban missile crisis. Available NWC library—E841 K4655 1997.)

6.   Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. (Contains a chapter on the Cuban missile crisis critically analyzing the Kennedy administration's policies before and during the crisis. Available NWC library—D25.5 K27 1995.)

7.   McMaster, H. R. *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.* New York: Harper Collins, 1997. (Chapter on Cuban missile crisis summarizes the crisis and suggests how the lessons learned from the crisis may have affected policy towards Vietnam. Available NWC library—D8558 M43 1997.)

8.   There are a number of extensive websites on the crisis, including: http://library .thinkquest.org/11046/; http://gwis.circ.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/index.html; and http:// lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/x2jfk.html.

PMP-12 THE PRESIDENT AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

A. Focus. This session discusses the powers of the president in national security decision making, various management styles presidents have employed to get advice and information, the role of the NSC, and the changing relationship between the President and the Congress.

The Constitution provides the foundation for the president's responsibility for national security and foreign policy. Over the last two centuries, a series of wars and national emergencies have increased the power of the presidency. Since the Cold War, the increasing complexity of international problems has also required that the president gain advice and information from a wide variety of expert sources, all while working within an expanding Executive branch.

The National Security Act of 1947 established a formal body of advisors called the National Security Council. The law provides the president with an organization that provides advice, analysis, and interagency coordination on national security issues and policy formulation. The President maintains the ability to determine how the formal processes and principal advisors are utilized within his administration. Also, he possesses the ability to establish informal processes based on his leadership style and personality. The law also provides the president with an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). Selected by the president, the APNSA works as his personal advisor on national security policy. The president's professional and personal relationship with the APNSA and the role the APNSA played in the decision making process has been different among presidential administrations.

Some presidents have relied heavily upon the interagency process of the NSC to frame the discussion by providing analysis and coordination of the issues and policy recommendations. Other presidents have made their decisions alone or after consultation with a small group of trusted advisors. Finally, some presidents have taken inputs and been directly influenced by personal contacts and international or domestic events that are seemingly unrelated or not directed related to the national security issue. Should national security decisions be the result of a rational process? Does the NSC and the APNSA provide such a tool? Is rational policy making the guarantor of effective policy?

The president's relationship with the Congress has also evolved over time. From a secondary role in the 19th century, the president emerged as a prime mover behind foreign policy during the Second World War. The office retained primacy on most security policy issues throughout the early Cold War, with some limitations imposed following Vietnam and Watergate. Recent cases provide a prism through which to examine this relationship and assess, as the second reading puts it, whether the president is still dominant.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the role of the president in formulating national security policy.

- Evaluate the interrelationships between the president and his key advisors within the formal and informal structures of the National Security System.

- Understand the role of the National Security Council staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

- Understand the changing relationships between the president and the Congress on foreign policy issues.

- Assess the evolution of U.S. policy towards North Korea with respect to the above issues.

C. Guidance

1.   Williams and Sullivan discuss the role of the president in the national security decision making process and the responsibilities and function of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). What tools and rules in the national security decision making process are available to the president? What is the function of the APNSA?

2.   LeLoup and Shull ask whether the president is still dominant on foreign policy. They present a number of interesting graphs on the historical relationship. What do they look like if we draw the lines out to the current administration and Congress? They then assess three cases. Do they prove their point about the evolving relationship?

3.   The North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, pressured the United States and other regional actors with nuclear blackmail in an effort to force the world towards a solution to his country's ongoing problems. The case study by Norton studies the policy options and the decision made by President Bush. Relate this back to the rational perspective: To what extent does the rational perspective tell the whole story and what lessons can be learned?

D. Required Readings

1.   Sullivan, Sean C. "Crafting Foreign Policy: Understanding the Role, Power and Style of the Chief Executive." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2004. (A discussion on the President and the APNSA and their roles and responsibilities in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.)

2.   LeLoup, Lance T., and Steven A. Shull. "Foreign Policy." Chapter 5 in *The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in National Policymaking*. Allyn and Bacon, 1999. (Assessment of changing relationship over time and on three particular issues: Gulf War I, Cuba Sanctions, and Panama Canal Treaties).

3.   Norton, Richard, "North Korea." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Pika, Joseph A., John Anthony Maltese, and Norman C. Thomas. *The Politics of the Presidency*. 5th edition. Congressional Quarterly, 2002. (A comprehensive book on presidential politics, the influences on the president (such as congress, the public and the media), and how

Presidential character and performance are measured. Includes a look at President George W. Bush's first 180 days in office. Available NWC library—JK516 .P53 2002.)

2.   Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge*. 2d edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000. (A good single volume on foreign policy and the decision-making process by an author (Snow) who has served on the faculties of the Naval, Army, and Air War Colleges. Available NWC Library JZ1480 .S55 2000.)

3.   Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "NSC's Midlife Crisis." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1987–88): pp. 80–89. (An evaluation of the major phases of the NSC current history, and general lessons drawn from its use by the president. Available in the NWC library periodical collection—ISSN: 0015 7228.)

4.   Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson. *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council.* Calif: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988. (A definitive book covering the origins, personalities, problems, and remedies up through the Bush administration. Available NWC library—UA23.D4145 1988.)

5.   Lord, Carnes. *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. New York: Free Press, 1988. (A former NSC staffer's analysis of the functions of the NSC staff and the obstacles that presidents have faced in making policy and having the policies implemented. Available NWC library—UA23.L7 1988.)

6.   Crabb, Cecil. *American National Security: A Presidential Perspective*. New York: 1991. (A comprehensive text on how presidents have worked through the national security issues of their time. Available in the NWC library—E744.C795 1991.)

7.   U.S. President's Special Review Board. *Report of the President's Special Review Board*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987. (A critical look at the failure of the NSC on the Iran-Contra issue during the Reagan presidency. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

8.   Lowenthal, Mark M., and Richard A. Best, Jr. *The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1993. (A summary review of the pre-NSC conditions that caused its creation, a review of the modern presidents, and a concluding section on major trends. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

9.   Washington, D.C.: White House Home Page, http://www.whitehouse.gov. (A great web site containing the latest national security policy statements.)

10. Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler. *A New NSC for a New Administration*. The National Security Council Project, Policy Brief #68, Brookings Institution, http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb068/pb68.htm.

11. White House National Security Presidential Directive-1 website, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. (Describes the makeup and responsibilities of President George W.

Bush's National Security Council, as well as provides links to other Presidential Decision Directives and Executive Orders.)

12. PRG Report; A newsletter of the Presidency Research Group of the American Political Science Association (Spring 2003). (Discusses the evolution of the Bush approach to foreign policy making, written by David Clinton, associate professor of political science at Tulane University.

PMP-13 DEFENSE PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS: LECTURE

A. Focus. The defense resource allocation process is the means by which the U.S. government decides "who gets what" in funding national security requirements. The decisions made in this process govern the activities of every individual associated with the Department of Defense and affect the future capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. Therefore, it is important that you, as future leaders in the national security arena, understand at least the general structure and objectives of the process. This lecture provides an overview of the process for identifying requirements, developing programs responsive to those requirements, funding the programs in DoD's budget, and supporting the programs through Congressional budget decisions.

B. Objective

- Analyze the policymaking process that is used by the U.S. government to devise strategy, identify requirements, develop programs, and provide resources for the nation's defense.

C. Guidance

1. During the PMP course you will become familiar with the policymaking processes that govern how governments operate. This lecture will examine the components of DoD's defense planning and resource allocation processes and focus on the functional aspects of the process as the foundation for subsequent discussions in the seminar. We ask that you:

- Keep focused on the strategic picture that organizes how the DoD allocates resources using various mechanisms.

- Note where, and how, the components of the process interconnect.

- Note the key organizational players and the role each plays.

D. Required Reading

1. Martel, William C. "Defense Planning and Resource Allocation." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper.

E. Supplementary Readings. See the bibliography at the end of Chapter 1, *Resource Allocation: The Formal Process* at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/pubs.htm.

PMP-14 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERAGENCY SYSTEM

A. Focus. The Interagency System assists the president in developing, coordinating, articulating, and implementing National Security Policy. A large number of departments and agencies beyond the Defense and State Departments have important national security-related responsibilities and are active participants in the Interagency System. Additionally, since all participants within the process can influence the outcome, even a policy decision that is primarily military in nature, can be directly affected by non-military agencies. Studying the system will increase one's effectiveness within the process and is essential to one's understanding of how foreign Security Policy is developed within the Executive Branch.

B. Objectives

- Describe the general interagency structures and processes of the federal government.

- Identify the authorities and roles of the key federal departments and agencies with respect to national security policy making.

C. Guidance

1. The Interagency System originates from the National Security Act of 1947 in response to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. How do the actions of our government after this intelligence and security failure compare with those following the fall of the Soviet Union and September 11, 2001?

2. As the reading points out, all of the members of the National Security Council are also members of the Homeland Security Council. What are the implications of this redundancy?

3. The Interagency Process has continued to evolve since its conception in 1947. In addition to the National Security Council, the National Economic Council and the Homeland Security Council now assist the President with the formulation of national policy. What are the pros and cons of continuing this expansion to address other pressing world problems such as health and the environment?

4. While the NSC Staff assists with monitoring the execution of policy decisions by other agencies and departments within the Executive Branch, it does not implement foreign policy. Is this a necessary restriction?

5. If required to participate as a member of a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), what are some actions that can increase your potential for success? How should that success be ultimately measured?

D. Required Reading. Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*. Edited by Robert L. Carney. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2004.

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Each of the government agencies has an official website on the internet. A good site with links to many of these is: http://www.firstgov.gov/.

2.   Linden, Russell, M. *Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Work in Government and NonProfit Organizations.* New York: Jossey Bass, 2002. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

3.   Mandall, Myrna. *Getting Results Through Collaborative Networks and Network Structures for Public Policy and Management*. Quorum Books, 2001. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

PMP-15 THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)

A. Focus. As the principal military advisor to the president and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) shoulders a significant portion of the responsibility to develop strategic direction, strategic plans, and resource requirements for our national defense. JSPS is the planning system used by CJCS to achieve these objectives. This session focuses on JSPS and provides the opportunity to examine how JSPS works to shape the National Military Strategy (NMS), operational plans, and provide programming advice to the Secretary of Defense's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

B. Objectives

- Understand the contribution of JSPS to the development of national security strategy and military strategy

- Comprehend the purpose of JSPS and how it contributes to the resource allocation process.

C. Guidance

1. The resource allocation lecture described the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) in broad functional terms. Using this background information, this session provides a more detailed discussion of the major components of the formal defense planning process. In the first reading, the Chairman's Title 10 responsibilities are delineated. The Chairman is required to perform **strategic assessments**, provide **strategic direction**, prepare **strategic plans**, and provide **programming advice**. The people and organizations that participate, the documents produced, and the procedures and events that occur in JSPS, function together to assist the Chairman in the execution of his Title 10 responsibilities. The session also describes how JSPS interacts with other systems within the formal process, specifically the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

2. The objective of the JSPS reading is to provide an understanding of this planning system and use this knowledge to discuss the system and its contribution to national security planning, strategy development, and Joint military operations. JSPS is intended to be a Rational Process where goals and objectives are linked to resources, courses of action are developed and risk is assessed. Consider these questions as you read about JSPS:

- Are the right people participating and do they have the appropriate level of influence on the decision maker?

- Does the process require more or less centralization?

- Are the documents relevant, tightly connected to the process, and timely?

- Are feasible alternatives assessed and compared on the basis of cost-benefit?

- Are risks assessed and prudently distributed?

- Is feedback provided and considered in subsequent planning?

- How effectively do the various aspects of the system interact?

- Is the process well-directed? Does the decision maker provide appropriate guidance?

- Can the process anticipate change and respond appropriately?

3.   The second reading, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), describes a new Department of Defense process developed to identify joint capability requirements and to then provide decision support for transforming the current military force to the force of the future. JCIDS is based on the concept that national defense and military challenges can be solved not only by the development and procurement of platforms, systems and equipment but also through changes in doctrine, training, and innovative leadership and organizations. Consider these issues as you read about JCIDS:

- How are strategic planning documents used in the JCIDS process?

- How are strategic assessments used in the JCIDS process? Are these assessment conducted by the multiple sources?

- Is JCIDS effective in developing responses to strategic requirements?

- Does JCIDS provide the Chairman an effective means to input into the development and procurement of platforms, systems and equipment?

D. Required Readings

Sullivan, Sean C. "Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2005. (This paper describes the JSPS process.)

Sullivan, Sean C. "Capabilities Based Planning." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2005. (This paper describes the development of capabilities-based planning and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCDIS)).

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   National Defense University, "Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000." Norfolk, Va., 2000, http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu. (This document (also known as the "Purple Book") is the basic textbook used by the Joint Forces Staff College. It presents the "big picture" of the complex system of joint planning and execution used by the U.S. military. Additionally it describes Joint and combined organizations and their command relationships; outlines the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff; and provides reference to additional materials useful to a joint staff officer.)

2.   "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, D.C., 17 September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America provides a strategic assessment of the world and describes U.S.

national interests and objectives, threats to U.S. national interests, and provides a security strategy that protects U.S. interests and achieves U.S. national objectives.)

3. "The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." Washington, D.C., February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy .pdf.

4. Secretary of Defense. "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)." Washington, D.C., September 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. (The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 defined the requirement for the QDR. The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR Report is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.)

5. National Defense Panel. "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century." Washington, D.C., December 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf. (This report was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. In addition to conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense panel was required to submit an independent assessment of alternative force structures for U.S. armed forces. This report provides recommendations to SecDef and Congress regarding the optimal force structure to meet anticipated threats to U.S. national security through the year 2010 and beyond.)

6. CJCS. "Service Transformation Roadmaps." Washington, D.C., http:www.dtic.mil/ ointvision/service_transformation.htm. (This website contains the transformation roadmaps for all of the U.S. Armed Services.)

7. Secretary of Defense. "The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, D.C., March 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.

8. CJCS. "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004." Washington, D.C., 2004, http://www.ndu/library/docs/NatMilStrat2004.pdf. (This document provides the United States National Military Strategy.)

9. CJCS. "Joint Strategic Planning System," CJCSI 3100.01A. Washington, D.C., 1 September 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3100_01a.pdf. (This instruction provides joint policy and guidance for the function of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). It describes the process governing the operation of the JSPS and the documents that are a product of the system. The instruction assigns responsibility for preparation and promulgation of these documents.)

10. CJCS. "Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans," CJCSI 3113.01. Washington, D.C., 1 April 1998, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/ cjcsi/3113_01.pdf. (This instruction establishes responsibilities and procedures for the management and review of Theater Engagement Plans submitted by regional Combatant

Commanders to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for integration into the global family of engagement plans.)

11. DoD. "Joint Operations Concepts." Washington, D.C., November 2003, http://www .dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc. (Joint Operating Concepts (JopsC) describes how the Joint Force intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities.)

12. CJCS. "The Functional Capabilities Board Process," CJCSI 3137.01C. Washington, D.C., 12 November 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3137_01.pdf. (This instruction provides policy and guidance on the role, organization, process, interrelationships, management, and operation of the Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB)).

13. CJCS. "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," CJCSI 3170.01D. Washington, D.C., 12 March 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170_01 .pdf. (This instruction establishes the policies and procedures of JCIDS. JCIDS supports CJCS and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing Joint military capability needs. Validated and approved JCIDS documents provide the Chairman's advice and assessment in support of his statutory requirement.)

14. CJCS. "Chairman's Readiness System," CJCSI 3401.01C. Washington, D.C., 1 October, 2002. Contains Change I, 31 March 2004. http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/ unlimit/3401_01.pdf. (This instruction establishes uniform policy and procedures for assessing and reporting the current readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Joint Quarterly readiness Review.)

15. CJCS. "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council," CJCSI 5123.01A. Washington, D.C., 8 March 2001. http://www.dtic/mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123.01.pdf. (This instruction establishes the Joint requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It delineates JROC composition and responsibilities and further defines the JROC role in the requirements and acquisition process.)

16. CJCS. "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System," CJCSI 8501.01. Washington, D.C., 1 April 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/ unlimit/8501_01.pdf. (This instruction describes participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff in the DoD PPBE process.)

17. CJCS. Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations." Washington, D.C., 13 April 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. (This publication is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by U.S. armed forces in joint and multinational operations.)

18. U.S. Code. http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode. (This website lists the laws in force as of December 20, 2004. Those that pertain to the U.S. Armed Forces are found under Title 10 and those that pertain to National Defense are found under Title 50.)

PMP-16 THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. Government policy and behavior are often summarized as actions chosen by a unitary, rational decision maker. Governments, however, are not individuals but large and complex organizations that dominate the national security environment. Graham Allison describes governments as "a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own." Governments perceive issues through the sensors of component organizations, and those organizations define their alternatives on particular issues according to predetermined standard operating procedures and organizational biases. Government organizations tend to be bureaucratic and are characterized by hierarchical structure, formal lines of authority, degrees of specialization, and systems of standard operating procedures. Like all large organizations, government agencies develop their own unique culture. Culture has many positive influences including the development of a strong sense of mission among organization members. Yet, culture also presents significant challenges including selective attention towards tasks that are part of the culture at the expense of other tasks. Culture also causes organizations to employ informal and unofficial processes. Understanding how organizations behave in general, and how they respond to change and crises in their environment, is essential for the military executive. Translating that understanding to success in effective policy making will remain a continuous challenge for the organization's leadership.

B. Objectives

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and limitations of large national security organizations in formulating and implementing effective policies.

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and competing cultures inside the Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs, Joint Staff, the staffs of the service secretaries, and the individual services.

C. Guidance

1. Allison notes several reasons why the Rational Actor Model is insufficient to understand why governments make the national security decisions they make. What are the primary reasons for this lack according to Allison? How does the Organizational Behavior perspective differ from the Rational Actor Model? What are the implications of viewing government decisions from this perspective?

2. Organizational culture affects the performance of government agencies. How do these tendencies affect the national security decision making process?

3. What are the dynamics of the U.S. bureaucracy and the political executives (un-elected political appointees) who influence and carry out the Administration's policy? In general, how can these factors influence national security policies and decisions? When considered in concert with organizational culture, what are the implications for crisis response?

4. Do you have any personal insight into the culture of the organizations discussed in this session?

5.   What were the organizational impacts on President Bush's decision to impose a tariff on steel imports?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. "Model II: Organizational Behavior." Excerpt from Chapter Three in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999. (The authors provide an overview of organizational behavior and its impact on decision-making processes.)

2.   Mason, Douglas E. "Culture and Bureaucracy." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2005. (A compendium of themes from political scientists regarding the impact of organizational culture and the federal bureaucracy.)

3.   McCabe, Laurence, and Clemson Turregano. "The Steel Trap." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process.* 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005.

E.   Supplementary Readings

1.   Goodsell, Charles T. *The Case for Bureaucracy*. Third Edition. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1994. (Provides an interesting counter-argument to the negative views of public bureaucracies that are usually expressed. Available NWC library—JK421.G64 1994.)

2.   Bolman, Lee G., and Terrence E. Deal. *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997. (Presents a large complex body of theory, research, and practice on organizations and leadership. Available NWC Library—HD31 .B6135 2003.)

3.   U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, pp. 354–370. (The "Locher Report," which criticized organization and decision-making procedures of DoD. Cited pages highlight organizational problems seen during contingencies including USS *Pueblo*, Iran hostage rescue, and Grenada. Available NWC library—UA23.3.D42 1985.)

4.   Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. *The United States Government Manual 1999/2000*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. (The official handbook of the Federal Government. Provides comprehensive information on the agencies of he legislative, judicial and executive branches. Available NWC library—JK421.A3 1999–2000.)

PMP-17 PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION (PPBE)

A. Focus. The Secretary of Defense uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process to develop and integrate defense policy, military strategy, service programs, and the DoD budget through the allocation of resources to meet the near-term and future warfighting needs of the U.S. military. The products of the PPBE process include strategic plans, programs, and ultimately a budget input to the President. This session focuses on PPBE, and provides a systems understanding of this process.

B. Objectives

- Understand the purpose of PPBE and how it contributes to resource allocation.

- Assess opportunities where PPBE Actors, leaders, staff and organizations, have the ability to exert power and influence in the PPBE process.

C. Guidance

1.   The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process reading presents an executive-level overview of PPBE in the context of the resource allocation process. PPBE is SecDef's strategic planning and resource management system. In the Planning Phase, the process considers the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) and develops strategic planning guidance used as a frame of reference for the determination and development joint capabilities. In the programming phase, the process determines programs that meet the required and validated capability needs of U.S. military forces. Programming inputs into the Budgeting Phase of defense planning where the Services develop their Program Objective Memorandum (POM). DoD uses the PPBE process to develop the department's budget submission to the President. In the Execution Phase of the process, program performance and budget execution is evaluated and program or budget changes could result. PPBE is a complex and highly interactive process that is founded on extensive collaborative effort from numerous organizations and agency within DoD.

2.   PPBE is DoD's process where strategy capabilities and force structure are linked. Students will determine the objectives of each phase of the PPBE process and examine this system critically. Think beyond the details of the process and analyze the structure of the process regarding inputs and outputs. Evaluate the potential impacts of the Perspectives on this DoD system. Consider the following questions as you read about PPBE:

- Is strategy effectively used in the development of capabilities and programs?

- What time frame is defined as the future in PPBE process? Is strategy used to drive programming?

- Is the relationship between JSPS and the Joint Staff and PPBE and the DoD staff effective?

- Does DoD provide the services with sufficient input and information regarding capability needs and programming guidance?

- What impact does the time requirement of budget deadlines have on the process?

- Does the Budget and Programming Review process achieve the intended objective of increased efficiency?

- How do the sub-cultures, organizational structures, systems of SOPs of the services interact with the PPBE process?

D. Required Readings

1. Sullivan, Sean C. "Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process (PPBE)," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2005. (This paper describes the PPBE process.)

2. Sullivan, Sean C. "The Actors in the PPBE." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2005. (This paper introduces the students to the actors in the PPBE process.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. National Defense University. "Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000," Norfolk, Va., 2000, http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu. (This document (also known as the "Purple Book") is the basic textbook used by the Joint Forces Staff College. It presents the "big picture" of the complex system of joint planning and execution used by the U.S. military. It describes Joint and combined organizations and their command relationships; outlines the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff, and provides reference to additional materials useful to a joint staff officer.)

2. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, D.C., 17 September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America provides a strategic assessment of the world and describes U.S. national interests and objectives, threats to U.S. national interests, and provides a security strategy that protects U.S. interests and achieves U.S. national objectives.)

3. "The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." Washington, D.C., February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy .pdf.

4. Secretary of Defense. "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)." Washington, D.C., September 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. (The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 defined the requirement for the QDR. The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR Report is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.)

5. National Defense Panel. "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century." Washington, D.C., December 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf. (This

report was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. In addition to conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense panel was required to submit an independent assessment of alternative force structures for U.S. armed forces. This report provides recommendations to SecDef and Congress regarding the optimal force structure to meet anticipated threats to U.S. national security through the year 2010 and beyond.)

6. CJCS. "Service Transformation Roadmaps." Washington, D.C., http:www.dtic.mil/ointvision/service_transformation.htm. (This website contains the transformation roadmaps for all of the U.S. Armed Services.)

7. Secretary of Defense. "The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, D.C., March 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.

8. CJCS. "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004." Washington, D.C., 2004. http://www.ndu/library/docs/NatMilStrat2004.pdf. (This document provides the United States National Military Strategy.)

9. Department of Defense. *The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)*, DoDD 7045.14. Washington, D.C., 22 May 1984, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d704514wch1_052284/d704514p.pdf. (This DoD Directive establishes the basic policy, procedures, and responsibilities for PPBS).

10. Department of Defense. Control of Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Documents and Information. Washington, D.C., 27 March 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/memos/ppbe.pdf. (This DoD memorandum provides the policy for the disclosure of PPBE documents and information.)

11. CJCS. "Joint Strategic Planning System," CJCSI 3100.01A. Washington, D.C., 1 September 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3100_01a.pdf. (This instruction provides joint policy and guidance for the function of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). It describes the process governing the operation of the JSPS and the documents that are a product of the system. The instruction assigns responsibility for preparation and promulgation of these documents.)

12. CJCS. "Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans," CJCSI 3113.01. Washington, D.C., 1 April 1998, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3113_01.pdf. (This instruction establishes responsibilities and procedures for the management and review of Theater Engagement Plans submitted by regional Combatant Commanders to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for integration into the global family of engagement plans.)

13. DoD. "Joint Operations Concepts." Washington, D.C., November 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc. (Joint Operating Concepts (JopsC) describes how the Joint Force intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities.)

14. CJCS. "The Functional Capabilities Board Process," CJCSI 3137.01C. Washington, D.C., 12 November 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3137_01.pdf. (This instruction provides policy and guidance on the role, organization, process, interrelationships, management, and operation of the Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB)).

15. CJCS. "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," CJCSI 3170.01D. Washington, D.C., 12 March 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170_01 .pdf. (This instruction establishes the policies and procedures of JCIDS. JCIDS supports CJCS and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing Joint military capability needs. Validated and approved JCIDS documents provide the Chairman's advice and assessment in support of his statutory requirement.)

16. CJCS. "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council." CJCSI 5123.01A. Washington, D.C., 8 March 2001, http://www.dtic/mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123.01.pdf. (This instruction establishes the Joint requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It delineates JROC composition and responsibilities and further defines the JROC role in the requirements and acquisition process.)

17. CJCS. "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System," CJCSI 8501.01. Washington, D.C., 1 April 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/ unlimit/8501_01.pdf. (This instruction describes participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff in the DoD PPBE process.)

18. U.S. Code. http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode. (This website lists the laws in force as of December 20, 2004. Those that pertain to the U.S. Armed Forces are found under Title 10 and those that pertain to National Defense are found under Title 50.)

PMP-18 THE GOVERNMENTAL-POLITICS PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. In any environment where important decisions must be made and rigorous analytical solutions are difficult to obtain, politics will necessarily enter into selection of alternatives. Moreover, power and influence are the language in which political discourse takes place. The unique characteristics of the national security bureaucracy dictate that participants must understand and exercise personal power and influence to be effective. Power and influence are tools required by every successful leader or manager. In the policy arena, success usually depends upon the assistance or at least the cooperation of others. With many advocates competing for limited resources, formal authority alone is not always adequate to accomplish one's mission, and issues seldom have a course of action so clearly superior that reasonable people could not disagree upon actions to be taken. The most effective individuals in this environment are those who understand the tools of power and influence; how these tools are acquired, and how they are used effectively. In this session, we discuss the tools of power and influence and analyze their sources and use.

B. Objectives

- Describe the nature of power and illustrate the ways power and influence are applied on a situational basis to shape the national security decision making process.

- Contrast the governmental-politics perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.

C. Guidance

1. Turcotte provides several definitions of power and illustrates how such power may be applied. How can this knowledge be applied? Is there an ethical dimension to the application of such power?

2. Jefferies describes the play of governmental politics within the Pentagon. Do his "rules of the game" seem logical? What other "rules" can you imagine? How does political play within one organization affect organizational effectiveness in the interagency process?

3. In what ways do you see power and influence being used in the U.S. decision to use force against Serbia? Was there a dominant wielder of power and influence in the Clinton cabinet? How did shifting power bases and influence affect the decision? Were there winners and losers?

D. Required Readings

1. Turcotte, William. "Power and Influence." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2001. (Professor Turcotte identifies nine distinct sources of power and seven techniques to apply power effectively.)

2. Jefferies, Chris. "Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of Defense: A Practitioner's Perspective." Chapter 5.3 in *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice.* Edited by David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle. (Jefferies describes the players and rules of the

game within the DoD. He concludes that, regardless of the formal structure, decision making is driven by the realities of governmental politics.)

3. Garofano, John. "Governmental Politics and U.S. Decisions on Bosnia, 1991–1995." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2004**.**

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Smith, Perry M. *Assignment Pentagon*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1993. (A guide to the organizational culture and governmental politics of the Pentagon by an Air Force veteran of that institution. Available NWC library—UA26.A745.S55 1993.)

2.   Cohen, Allan R., and David L. Bradford. *Influence Without Authority*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990. (A detailed handbook on the application of personal power in everyday business situations. Available NWC library—HD58.9.C64 1990.)

3.   Powell, Colin L. *My American Journey*. New York: Random House, 1995. (An autobiography by the former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. Available NWC library— E840.5.P68.A3 1995.)

4.   Smith, Hedrick. *The Power Game: How Washington Works*. New York, Random House, 1988. (Available NWC Library—JK271 .S577 1988.)

PMP-19 CASE STUDY: KOSOVO

A. Focus. This session explores how the governmental-politics perspective can illuminate foreign policy decisions. The case study, Operation Allied Force, involved the use of NATO air power to convince Slobodan Milosevic to discontinue the Serbian military's attacks on the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. After deciding to use air power, the United States and NATO found that events did not play out in the fashion that they had expected, and the U.S. consider escalating to a ground war. In this seminar we examine two policy decisions related to the operation. The first is the initial decision to apply military force, and the second is the issue of whether NATO should escalate to a ground campaign. Both decisions that will be examined in this case involved complicated assessments of the stakes involved, what measures were appropriate, and whether these measures were likely to succeed. The roles of the key players in the National Security System, and the sources of their influence, should be a major focus of your examination of the case. In addition, look at the conduct of alliance decision-making, the caliber of U.S. predictions as to how the confrontation would unfold, and the respective roles of military force and diplomacy in bringing the conflict to a conclusion.

B. Objectives

- Explore the importance of the president and his advisors, and their interaction, in the formulation of foreign policy.

- Contrast the governmental-politics perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.

- Examine the role of outside influences (domestic and international) on politicians' perspectives.

C. Guidance

1. What were the arguments in favor of taking action in Kosovo in 1999? What was the NSS consensus? How did it emerge?

2. Was Clinton's policy successful?

3. What role did governmental politics play in the two decisions? Were other factors more important?

3. What role did NATO play?

4. Did a NATO ground threat play a role in the conclusion of the conflict?

D. Required Reading

1. Stigler, Andrew L. "Kosovo." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005.

E. Supplemental Reading. None.

PMP-20 THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. We have suggested that complex national security decisions may be fully understood only after viewing them from several different perspectives. One of those is the *cognitive* perspective, which includes the decision maker's beliefs, biases, values, emotions, personal experiences, and memories. These factors affect the decision making process. Sometimes the effect is obvious—as when the decision maker's emotions or impatience might short-circuit the evaluation of all options. In other instances the effect may be subtle—as when a decision maker's preconceptions or biases cause a personal predisposition towards one option or another; or excess skepticism about estimated costs and benefits of particular options. In still other cases a decision maker may be emotionally involved in a way that hinders clear thought and action. This lesson provides a closer examination of the cognitive perspective and expands the discussion to consider how individuals gather and evaluate data, deal with uncertainty and information overload, and make decisions that would not be predicted by the rational actor model.

B. Objectives

- Explain the impact of common patterns of information processing, emotional responses, personal values, beliefs, and other cognitive and emotive elements on national security decisions.

- Contrast the cognitive perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing major policy decisions.

C. Guidance

1. Norton and Teague provide an overview of common cognitive factors and their impact on decision making. What are "heuristics?" Are using such shortcuts harmful or beneficial? How can an increased awareness of cognitive factors be of value to decision makers and their staffs? What actions can be taken to reduce or eliminate potential problems associated with some cognitive factors that influence the decision-making process?

2. Garofano distinguishes between purely mental, or information-processing, functions and emotional, or "hot" processes that skew decisions. What is the difference? Which kind of cognitive experience best explains, for example, Washington's inability to acknowledge possible Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950, President George H. W. Bush's decisions to terminate the conflict in Iraq in 1991 and to send troops to Somalia in 1992, and the other cases discussed in the paper? Can you find examples of both types of cognitive behavior—informational vice emotional—in previous PMP cases? Finally, how could these harmful dynamics have been avoided, if at all?

3. The Janis reading describes the failed Bay of Pigs operation as a "perfect failure" resulting from "groupthink" among the key decision makers. What were the major miscalculations made by President Kennedy's advisors? What were the more general symptoms of groupthink in this case? What were the structural, cognitive, and other causes of groupthink? Can the causes and symptoms be addressed and corrected?

D. Required Readings

1.   Norton, Richard J., and George E. Teague. "Cognitive Factors in National Security Decision Making." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Describes cognitive factors that affect decision making and provides an overview of this increasingly recognized area of inquiry in studies of decision making.)

2.   Garofano, John. "Cognition, Motivation, and Prospect Theory in Foreign Policy Making." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

3.   Janis, Irving L. "A Perfect Failure: Group Think and the Bay of Pigs." Excerpts from *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, pp. 14–30, 35–47. (Explains a number of U.S. foreign policy successes and failures according to the groupthink syndrome).

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps In Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September–October 1998. (Discusses unconscious traps that mentally affect decision making and provides possible solutions to working around these traps. Available NWC library periodical collection—HD58.8 H369)

2.   Guilmartin, John F., Jr. *A Very Short War.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. (A concise and readable account of the military action involved in the recovery of the SS *Mayaguez* in 1975. Available NWC library—E865.G85 1995.)

3.   Hudson, Valerie M., and Eric Singer. *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992. (Psychological aspects of international relations and group decision making. Available NWC library—JX1255.P64 1992.)

4.   The National Security Archive of Georgetown University and the CIA have released internal probes by the administration and by the CIA Inspector General's following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. See http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB.

5.   Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990. (Text addresses the issues of information processing, cognition, and perception as related to international relations and decision making. Available NWC library—JX1291.V47 1990.)

6.   Wetterhahn, Ralph. "Left Behind on Koh Tang," *The Retired Officer Magazine*, August 1996. (In November 1995, a United States recovery team is allowed to search the waters and land of the island of Koh Tang, in Cambodian waters, as part of Joint Task Force for Full Accounting [JTF-FA] and write the final chapter on the *Mayaguez* incident of May 1975. Available NWC Library—E865 .W48 2001.)

8.   Goldgeier, James. "Psychology and Security." *Security Studies* 6 no. 4 (Summer 1997): pp. 137–166. (An overview survey of cognition and national security decisions and values. Available NWC Library through inter library loan.)

9.   Mullen, John D., and Byron M. Roth. "Psychological Impediments to Sound Decision-Making." Chapter 2 in *Decision-Making: Its Logic and Practice*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991, pp. 19–53. (Expands the discussion on cognitive traps that decision makers may fall into and various methods for recognizing and dealing with these factors. Available NWC library—BF 448.M84.)

10. Heuer, Richards J., Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html.

PMP-21 CASE STUDY: THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

A. Focus. In PMP-11 we examined the *cognitive* perspective, which concerns such things as the decision maker's own beliefs, biases, ethical values, emotions, personal experiences, and memories. This lesson provides a closer examination of the cognitive perspective and evaluates, for the first time, a case featuring non-U.S. decision makers.

B. Objectives

- Explain the impact of the decision maker's personal values, beliefs and other cognitive elements on national security decisions.

- Contrast the cognitive perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.

C. Guidance

1. Buckwalter provides case information on the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. How did cognitive factors affect decisions in the war? Could any of the "solutions" suggested in this lesson have been used by the leaders of either side to improve their understanding of the situation and thus improve their decisions?

D. Required Reading

1. Buckwalter, David T. "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 9th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Norton, Richard J., and George E. Teague. "Cognitive Factors in National Security Decision Making." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Describes cognitive factors that affect decision making and provides an overview of this increasingly recognized area of inquiry in studies of decision making. Available from Professor Richard Norton, PMP Course Director.)

2. Janis, Irving L. "A Perfect Failure: Group Think and the Bay of Pigs," excerpts from *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, pp. 14–30, 35–47. (Explains a number of U.S. foreign policy successes and failures according to the groupthink syndrome).

3. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps In Decision Making." *Harvard Business Review*, September–October 1998. (Discusses unconscious traps that mentally affect decision making and provides possible solutions to working around and with these traps. Available NWC library periodical collection—ISSN 0017-8012.)

4. Guilmartin, John F., Jr. *A Very Short War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. (A concise and readable account of the military action involved in the recovery of the SS *Mayaguez* in 1975. Available NWC library—E865.G85 1995.)

5. Hudson, Valerie M., and Eric Singer. *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. (Psychological aspects of international relations and group decision making. Available NWC library—JX1255.P64 1992.)

6. The National Security Archive of Georgetown University and the CIA have released internal probes by the administration and by the CIA Inspector General's following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. See http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB.

7. Keegan, Warren J. *Judgment, Choices, and Decisions: Effective Management Through Self-knowledge*. New York: Wiley, 1984. (Psychological aspects of management, problem solving, decision making, and strategic thinking. Available NWC library—HD58.7.K42 1984.)

8. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990. (Text addresses the issues of information processing, cognition, and perception as related to international relations and decision making. Available NWC library—JX1291.V47 1990.)

9. Wetterhahn, Ralph. "Left Behind on Koh Tang," *The Retired Officer Magazine*, August 1996. (In November 1995, a United States recovery team is allowed to search the waters and land of the island of Koh Tang, in Cambodian waters, as part of Joint Task Force for Full Accounting [JTF-FA] and write the final chapter on the Mayaguez incident of May 1975. Available NWC library periodical collection—ISSN 1061-3102.)

10. Zeckhauser, Richard. *Strategy and Choice*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. (A compendium on the strategy of choice, coping with common errors in rational decision making and the strategic and ethical issues in the valuation of life. Available NWC library—HD30.23.877 1991.)

11. Goldgeier, James. "Psychology and Security," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): pp. 137–166. (An overview survey of cognition and national security decisions and values. Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0963-6412.)

12. Mullen, John D., and Byron M. Roth. "Psychological Impediments to Sound Decision-Making." Chapter 2 in *Decision-Making: Its Logic and Practice*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991, pp. 19–53. (Expands the discussion on cognitive traps that decision makers may fall into and various methods for recognizing and dealing with these factors. Available NWC library—BF 448.M84.)

13. Heuer, Richards J., Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/ index.html.

PMP-22 CURRENT POLICY ANALYSIS

A. Focus. Previous PMP case studies demonstrated that it is possible to use PMP principles to answer historical policy making questions, such as why did President Reagan send Marines into Beirut the second time, or why did President Clinton decline to sign the Ottawa landmine treaty? The ability to perform such analysis is quite useful for gaining insight into the interactions among the elements of the input-output model, and also useful for determining recurring patterns, strengths and weaknesses in policy making. However, as has additionally been demonstrated, the principles of PMP allow national security practitioners to also more accurately understand the forces at work in *current* decision making issues and to better weigh the probability that a given course of action may be selected over others. Feedback from our graduates confirms that these skills are required by the national security practitioner to deal with current issues in follow-on assignments. This session will present a contemporary issue facing U.S. policy makers, and provide some techniques for organizing an analysis and determining likely courses of action and potential decisions. The current policy analysis seeks to provide an opportunity to discuss current actors and influences, and the relationships among them. The session also provides the opportunity to explore the genesis and context of contemporary influences and pressures. Related topics such as the difficulty of prioritizing national interests and developing realistic policy objectives may also be discussed. Students will apply fully developed course concepts to evaluate the issues and suggest possible policy choices and outcomes.

B. Objectives

- Identify and discuss the multiple and often competing influences that affect national security decision making on a contemporary policy issue.

- Identify realistic policy objectives and evaluate the likelihood of various policy decisions using the tools provided in the PMP course.

- Provide a final opportunity to apply PMP skills in the seminar environment prior to the PMP final exam.

C. Guidance

1. For this particular case, what are the most important domestic and international influences on U.S. national security leaders? Why are these influences important?

2. Do the international and domestic pressures affect all the actors in the national security system equally? What evidence do you find when you apply each of the four perspectives on national security decision making?

3. What insights do you gain from each of the perspectives?

4. Having identified several possible alternative decisions that could be reached in the case, which do you think are the most likely to be selected? Be prepared to defend your answer in terms of the tools, techniques and concepts we have examined in PMP.

D. Required Reading

  1. A case will be distributed in class prior to this session.

E. Supplementary Readings. None.

PMP-23 FINAL EXAM

A. Focus. This four-hour session provides an opportunity for students to demonstrate their comprehension of the material presented in the PMP course. Students are provided a current policy case involving a pending U.S. Government national security decision.

B. Objective

- Synthesize the various concepts and theories presented in PMP Part I and Part II into a current policy analysis of U.S. national security decision making.

C. Required Reading

1. A case will be distributed to the class prior to the final exam.

ANNEX D
SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES
STUDY GUIDE

1. **Scope.** The Security, Strategy, and Forces course focuses on gaining a wider grasp of the various levels and aspects of security, developing coherent guidelines for the formulation of national and military strategy, and examining the dynamic challenges that affect the selection of future defense forces. Before anything else, understanding the complex meanings of security and the environment in which we do and will operate is essential to making strategy. As such, linking understanding to the instruments and limitations of power is essential to what we do. Finally, and before we begin the Final Exercise, students should appreciate, if not fully comprehend, operational challenges, operational concepts, and necessary capabilities while looking strategically to the future. Strategy serves many purposes: it is the key to shaping the future security environment, it is the application of available means to achieve desired ends, and it is the indispensable guide to planning future forces.

The Security, Strategy, and Forces course concentrates on:

- Foundations of Strategy

- Grand Strategy

- Strategic Choices and Tools of Statecraft

- Geostrategic Challenges

- Foundations of Military Strategy and Force Planning

- Research, analysis, and clear writing

The course begins by introducing basic security concepts, offers alternative frameworks for strategic planning, and emphasizes the necessity to systematically link viable means to achievable ends in uncertain environments. We continue to rely on these fundamental concepts and frameworks throughout the course. We then examine the principal perspectives generally used to organize thinking about international relations. These perspectives influence not only assessments of the international security environment, but also how decision makers react to and shape that environment as they attempt to safeguard and advance U.S. national interests and objectives. Our concepts of national security, national interests, objectives, and specific goals provide the foundation for strategic and force planning decisions. With this background in mind, we next look at the sources and causes of conflict in the world as we attempt to assess the overall security environment and alternative responses to it. This examination occurs within the context of a thorough understanding of power in all its forms, and how a nation-state, particularly the United States, wields those forms of power in international relations. As we continue to focus on future threats, challenges, opportunities, and vulnerabilities, we grapple with the broader context of transnational trends and the challenges of globalization.

Next, we focus on grand strategy and the U.S. National Security Strategy. Strategy can be viewed as a game plan or a roadmap that links means and ends. Given competing international

goals, an uncertain security environment, and limited resources, a proper grand strategy protects and advances national interests. Though there are many possibilities, we systematically explore five strategies: cooperative security, selective engagement, primacy, neo-isolationism, and forward containment. By examining the purposes, premises, and preferred political and military implications of each strategy, one can develop guidelines for future military force requirements.

We then consider strategic choices and tools of statecraft. A stage presentation on diplomacy introduces the broad range of practices and processes involved in statecraft, including normal, preventive, and coercive diplomacy, followed by a review of the arrangements and institutions by which we relate to the international community, including institutions such as the United Nations, alliances such as NATO, and a variety of coalitions and alignments. In addition to diplomacy, we also examine the increasingly important instrument of information and its use in international relations, then the ever-present international economic framework, as we assess the economic instrument of national power. We examine the strengths and weaknesses of free trade and neo-mercantilism, the increasing importance of the international financial system in a rapidly globalizing world, and the tools of economic statecraft in the context of international economic relations among advanced and developing nations. As a transition to the Geostrategic Challenges portion of the curriculum, the international officers present their views of the global security environment.

Building on the foundation of our study of international relations, national security, and the instruments of national power, we turn to an assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. We examine regions of the world—the Greater Near East, Central and South Asia, the People's Republic of China and the two Koreas, our Pacific Partners, Europe and Russia, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa—with a view to both U.S. and allied concerns. Throughout all the sessions, particular emphasis will be placed on national and allied interests, current and future threats to those interests, and strategic alternatives to advance and protect those interests. Risks and force planning options will also be examined within the context of regional issues. Throughout the block, transnational threats and vulnerabilities, including terrorism, crime, health concerns, the environment, economics, and governance issues will be discussed. The block will serve as both an application of strategic thought to the various regions of the world, and a transition to the development of force planning alternatives in the context of those same regions.

The Security, Strategy, and Forces course culminates in the final section, "Foundations of Military Strategy and Force Planning." We begin with assessments of the future of war, followed by a review of the current United States National Defense and Military Strategies. Drawing upon the foundational material in the preceding sessions, students then address the logic of force planning, and apply that logic in a maritime-centric force planning exercise. The emphasis throughout is on the role of strategy as a guide to planning future joint and combined forces, and the translation of that strategy into effective defense forces.

The preceding five blocks prepare students to transition directly to the culminating event of the National Security Decision Making curriculum, the Final Exercise. This exercise provides an opportunity to both synthesize and apply NSDM course concepts to the complex problems of developing national strategy and determining the size and mix of future forces.

2. **Course Objectives.** The overall objectives of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course are to:

- Assess complex factors critical to making strategy and selecting future forces.

- Comprehend the geostrategic landscape and international security environment and their impact on the development of strategy.

- Apply frameworks to guide the development of strategy, the sizing and structuring of future forces, and the allocation of scarce defense resources.

3. **Course Guidance.** Annex D is the primary planning document for the Security, Strategy, and Forces course. It provides the focus, objectives, general guidance for student preparation, and the required readings for each session. The diversity of the Security, Strategy, and Forces readings and cases provides not only an opportunity to examine concepts, but also an overview of current issues and alternative perspectives. Readings should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid to drawing out the desired session objectives.

4. **Course Requirements.** Each student will prepare a thoughtful, well-developed, and well-written paper that applies course concepts to a major strategy and/or force planning issue. For detailed guidance, see the Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper Instruction distributed during the early part of the course. The paper is due 13 October 2005. It should be of publishable quality, suitable for a professional journal.

5. **Course Materials (textbooks/publications will be found in the back of the NSDM box)**

Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed., 2004.

Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper Instruction (issued in class during NSDM-2.)

Selected readings in Security, Strategy, and Forces.

Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001.

Myers, Richard B. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Transformation Planning Guidance*, April 2003.

Cebrowski, Arthur. *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, December 2003

Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

Joint Staff. *Joint Operations Concepts,* Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Vision and Transformation Division, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., November 2003.

SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/NAVAL COLLEGE COLLEGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SSF-1   INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES

A.   Focus. The Security, Strategy, and Forces course focuses on gaining a wider grasp of the various levels and aspects of security, developing coherent guidelines for the formulation of national and military strategy, and examining the dynamic challenges that affect the selection of future defense forces. Before anything else, understanding the complex meanings of security and the environment in which we do and will operate is essential to making strategy. As such, linking understanding to the instruments and limitations of power is essential to what we do. Finally, and before we begin the Final Exercise, students should appreciate, if not fully comprehend, operational challenges, operational concepts, and necessary capabilities while looking strategically to the future. Strategy serves many purposes: it is the key to shaping the future security environment, it is the application of available means to achieve desired ends, and it is the indispensable guide to planning future forces. Because gathering information, analyzing data, and writing a clear articulation of one's ideas are critical skills for the successful leader, the graded event for this course will be a 15 page research and analysis paper.

B.   Objectives

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course.

- Examine alternative frameworks for developing strategies and future forces.

- Understand the relationships and tradeoffs among interests, objectives, strategies, forces, and risks.

- Understand the purpose and procedures for the research and writing of the Security, Strategy, and Forces paper.

C.   Guidance

1.   Liotta and Lloyd present a conceptual framework for organizing and evaluating the essential factors involved in making future strategy and force planning decisions. The framework begins with national interests and objectives and proceeds through national security strategy to detailed assessments and choices. They suggest that the framework can be used as (1) a guide to developing alternative strategies and future forces, (2) an aid to evaluating the arguments of strategists or force planners, and (3) a starting point for developing alternative approaches to structuring major force planning decisions. Some people prefer to use the framework to ensure that important factors are considered in the planning process. Others like its step-by-step approach, beginning with higher order concepts and moving through progressive levels of strategy. Still others prefer to adjust or rearrange it. What are the most important factors? How are they interrelated? What is your evaluation of the framework? What would you change?

2.   Bartlett, Holman, and Somes describe a simple model which can help strategists and force planners make decisions. It includes ends, strategy, means, the security environment, resource constraints, and risks. What are the important relationships highlighted by their model? What are the possible mismatches that can occur? How would you modify Bartlett's model to help you formulate strategy and plan future forces? Note: The second half of this article, which deals with alternative approaches to force planning, will be read for SSF-24.

3. Owens suggests that the "*levels* of strategy . . . can be understood to apply not only to the application of force in wartime . . . but also to the steps taken during peacetime to enhance national power in order to prevent war or win, should war become necessary." How does strategy serve as a guide for force planning? What are the distinctions among the levels of strategy? What purposes do they serve? What factors influence strategic choices? The second half of this article, which deals with the logic of force planning, will be read in SSF-24.

4. The Naval War College *Writing Guide* provides clear guidance on the development and writing of a successful SSF paper. "Good writing facilitates the expression of powerful thoughts. The true depth and breadth of learning cannot be revealed unless one can write well. Unquestionably, constructing a cogent, relevant, and persuasive essay stands as a touchstone of academic achievement and excellence." SSF faculty will work closely with each student to develop a research topic, bibliographic support, and supportable thesis.

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H., and Richmond M. Lloyd. "The Strategy and Force Planning Framework." Chapter 1 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

2. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning." Chapter 2 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Only read pp. 17–23, ending at "Alternative Approaches to Force Planning."

3. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning." Chapter 33 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read only pp. 483–487.

4. Naval War College. *Writing Guide*. Newport, R.I., 2000, pp. 1–9.

SSF-2   THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A.   Focus. The culminating exercise of the National Security Decision Making course is for seminars to collectively determine a grand strategy designed to drive all elements of American foreign policy a generation hence. The first foundational step that students must address is the fundamental question: How does the world work? There is an extensive body of writing and thinking on this subject done by International Relations theorists. A theory purports to do three things: to describe the world, to predict how it might change, and to prescribe a response to the world. Thus, policymakers and practitioners of grand strategy must be familiar with how the abstract world of theory can work together with strategy and policy making. The three theoretical perspectives—realism, liberalism and constructivism (idealism)—influence the ways in which policy makers look at the evolving international security environment as well as their efforts to develop an overall U.S. grand strategy prescription. The significance of such phenomena as international anarchy, system structure, balance of power, and the spread of democracy as well as proposals for how the U.S. should react to and attempt to shape such international phenomena are largely determined by the analytical perspective of the strategist. It is important, therefore, to develop an understanding of and appreciation for the way you view the world at the outset of our effort to grapple with alternative grand strategies.

B.   Objectives

- Assess alternative theories of international relations. Determine how you think the world works.

- Examine linkages among the theories of international relations and begin to determine the implications for the development of U.S. grand strategy.

C.   Guidance

1.   Jack Snyder believes firmly that international relations theory is supposed to tell us how the world works. His article describes the three theories of international relations that most experts feel have the most explanatory power in today's world: realism, liberalism, and constructivism (idealism). He discusses briefly where these theories are useful and where they are deficient. He challenges the reader to determine whether and how the world's rules have changed as a result of 9/11. His illustrations and charts are simple but clear. This is a great stepping off point to think harder about each of these theories.

2.   John Mearsheimer is perhaps today's most consistent advocate of international relations "realism." He begins his piece with a description (some would say a caricature) of liberalism. He then lays out four fundamental tenets of realism: 1) states are the principal actors in world politics; 2) the behavior of states is determined primarily by the external environment, not the characteristics of the regime or domestic politics; 3) states act according to rational calculations about the relative balance of powers; and 4) international politics is a zero-sum game. Mearsheimer goes on to distinguish between two forms of realism, "human nature (or classical) realism" and "defensive (or structural) realism." Against these forms of realism he posits "offensive realism," which is based on the idea that the international political system provides powerful incentives for states to gain power at the expense of rivals in a quest for hegemony. He

contends that states, especially democracies, seek to obscure this unpleasant truth by employing liberal rhetoric. Leaders "tend to portray war as a moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power." What do you make of Mearsheimer's argument? What would offensive realism say about Hitler or communism? Is understanding the "balance of power" sufficient to predict the international conduct of nations?

3.   G. John Ikenberry describes a set of liberal assumptions about how the world works. The cornerstones of the liberal paradigm he lays out are: 1) that democracies tend not to fight among themselves; 2) that free trade leads to free countries; 3) that interdependence underpins a peaceful liberal world order; 4) that international institutions have an important role in maintaining a peaceful world order and that they are actually a useful tool for U.S. foreign policy; and 5) that there can be a liberal international society in the absence of world government. How do you assess the validity of these assumptions? Does the liberal theory of the "democratic peace" make sense to you?

4.   Constructivism (sometimes called idealism) is the most difficult of the theories to get your arms around because it is not driven by one assumption: constructivists believe that *ideas* (of many shapes and sizes) can change the way collectives act in the international system. Constructivism's leading proponents suggest that world politics is "socially constructed," rejecting the realist claim that material power is the sole driver of international politics. That is, international change can be driven by ideas that can affect the accepted standards of international behavior. Proponents defy the pessimism of the "balance of power" as a good predictor of behavior, suggesting that nations can just as likely see the benefit of accepting international law and conducting reassuring, rather than threatening, behavior. Instead, they emphasize the important role of transnational forces in the spreading of international norms, human rights and international justice. Alternatively, the theory helps understand the spread of *illiberal* transformational ideas, such as Islamist extremism. Does this make sense? How seriously can you take a theory that does not see the nation-state as a central actor? Do these three theories acting in combination provide us all the explanatory power we need? Is it possible to see the world operating completely in accordance with only one of these theories?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Snyder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2004.

2.   Mearsheimer, John. "Liberal Talk, Realist Thinking." Chapter 5 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I: Naval War College Press, 2004.

3.   Ikenberry, G. John. "Why Export Democracy?" Chapter 6 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

SSF-3   SECURITY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

A.   Focus. The national interests of the United States—to provide for the security, liberty and prosperity of its citizens, territory, and way of life—set the foundation for national strategy. In theory, all strategists would agree that if interests are in jeopardy, a response that employs the appropriate instruments of power is necessary. In reality, the complex interdependence of competing interests, objectives, and priorities can often make decision making and strategic planning extraordinarily complicated. This lesson offers ways to think about strategic interests, objectives, priorities and the evolving nature of security.

B.   Objectives

- Consider how U.S. interests and objectives are fundamental to strategic planning.

- Introduce and begin examining the central concept of security.

C.   Guidance

1.   Liotta proposes that, at their most abstract level, U.S. national interests are simple: to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people in the global environment. But distinguishing core strategic interests—those which Americans would be willing to die for—from significant interests that *might* require commitment of treasure, blood, time, and energy is almost never easy. Moreover, the evolving nature of security, a concept understood a century ago as meaning territorial integrity and preservation of government, and one that today must encompass challenges of population growth, resource scarcity, and disease, to name only a few, is creating a critical need for a "fundamental rethinking of interests." Do you agree with Liotta's position that, on a basic level "national interests are enduring and unlikely to change" in the future? Is it important to understand the hierarchy of interests and their relationship to values and objectives? What challenges can the U.S. anticipate in communicating national interests as a basis for action, whether diplomatic, economic, or military, on the world scene?

2.   In the President's Second Inaugural Speech, President Bush states: "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one." He links liberty and security at home to liberty and security abroad. Democracy promotion and encouragement of reform in other governments are key priorities in the President's strategy. Is it in the U.S. national interest to actively promote democracy and internal reform in other countries? Is promotion of values a vital interest or lesser interest?

3.   Over the last several decades, several new concepts of security have emerged. Traditional concepts of security are concerned mainly with the state's ability to counter external threats. Other concepts of security take into consideration nontraditional threats and vulnerabilities. Professor Foster argues that our Cold War security paradigm has "hijacked us intellectually" and prevents the nation from properly addressing modern security threats. Is the traditional state-centric meaning of security sufficient for the "12 September Era," as some would call it? Are there transnational threats that are nonmilitary that impact U.S. security? What implications does the broadening requirement of security have on the hierarchy of U.S. national security interests and related strategies? (For a good definition of threat and vulnerability see: Liotta, P. H. "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security."

Chapter 30 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004, p. 451.)

    4.   The Commission on Human Security's 2003 report, *Human Security Now*, argues the best response to the challenges of today's world is the concept of human security. Human security broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those borders. The idea is for people to be secure, not just for territories within borders to be secure against external aggression. And unlike traditional approaches that vest the state with full responsibility for state security, the process of human security involves a much broader spectrum of actors and institutions—especially people themselves. Is the concept of human security more appropriate in today's security environment? Does the concept of human security complement state security? If human security is not the right security concept, what is?

D.   Required Readings

    1.   Liotta, P. H. "To Die For: National Interests and the Nature of Strategy." Chapter 8 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

    2.   Bush, George W. *Inaugural Address (President Sworn in to Second Term).* Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 2005.

    3.   Foster, Gregory D. "A New Security Paradigm." *World Watch,* January/February 2005.

    4.   United Nations Commission on Human Security. "Outline of the Report of the Commission on Human Security," United Nations Publications, May 2003.

SSF-4   SOURCES OF CONFLICT

A.   Focus. Before a strategist can adequately employ the instruments of power necessary for the execution of strategy, one must make a security assessment. Yet today's security environment, is pervaded by uncertainty, risk, and complexity. Decision makers demand flexible strategies to achieve their objectives in the real world of risk, threats, vulnerabilities, and resource constraints. Sharply contrasting perspectives on what future security storylines are plausible, not to mention probable, have entered the calculus of security environment assessment. The challenge for the strategist is to provide the policymaker with a coherent way to understand the changing conditions that could generate the need to revise strategy, policy, methods of operation, and force structure.

B.   Objectives

- Consider global forces and factors that have the potential to be sources of conflict.

- Assess the strategic implications and challenges that these sources of conflict foreshadow, to include recognizing specific levels of risk, threat, vulnerability, and uncertainty inherent in each alternative.

C.   Guidance

1.   Huntington argues that future conflicts will occur primarily along cultural fault lines separating seven or eight major civilizations. Are his scenarios plausible? What level of risk and uncertainty do you assign to your assessment of Huntington's analysis? What are the strategic implications and challenges for the future suggested in this scenario?

2.   A major strategic challenge facing the United States is how to deal with globalization. Globalization describes a process of growing cross-border flows in many areas that draw countries and regions closer together, creating networks of expanded ties. Whereas many observers initially saw globalization as wholly positive, its effects are mixed and uneven across different regions and within various countries, yielding both beneficial and detrimental changes in the international system. Moreover, globalization will continue to interact with old and new geopolitics to help lessen some tensions but aggravate others. The key challenge is shaping the interplay of globalization, old geopolitics, and new transnational threats so that the 21st century is both peaceful and productive. Might globalization be a source of conflict in the future?

3.   The basic thesis of Barnett's "Pentagon's New Map" is simple: *"A country's potential to warrant a U.S. military response is inversely related to its globalization connectivity"* [emphases in the original] (p. 228). Thus, drawing on themes and concepts Thomas Friedman developed in his book on globalization, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree,* Barnett's brief essay purports to offer "an operating theory of the world." Is Barnett correct? If so, what new emphases must be made for strategy and action? If not, what better alternatives exist? What, specifically, do his arguments mean for the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and the so-called "developing" world?

4.   Klare challenges the fundamental premises of most of the authors that precede him in this session. He contends that competition over resources will provide a guide to the likely zones

of conflict rather than political, ideological, or cultural fault lines. Do you agree with Klare's general assessment? If so, what does that mean for future strategic implications and challenges, for alliances, for wars, and for aspirations to achieve future security for major powers, "pivotal states," and those in the so-called "developing" world? If not, what levels of risk, threat, vulnerability, and uncertainty must you still acknowledge for a valid assessment of the security environment? Do you agree that people are willing to die for physical geography and natural resources?

5.   Dr. Lani Kass, Professor of Military Strategy at National Defense University, appeared before a House subcommittee assessing the extent to which U.S. strategies to combat terrorism articulate clear vision statements, goals, and objectives to protect the country from terrorist attacks. Kass draws lessons from Clausewitz in suggesting overarching strategies for dealing with terrorism. She describes "pansurgency," as a networked, transnational movement, aimed at overthrowing values, cultures, and societies by means of terrorism, subversion, and armed conflict.

D.   Required Readings

1.   Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Chapter 26 in *Strategy and Force Planning.* 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read pp. 389–399, up to the section titled "Civilization Rallying: The Kin-Country Syndrome." The remainder of the essay is optional reading.

2.   National Intelligence Council. "Mapping the Global Future." December 2004.

3.   Barnett, Thomas P. "The Pentagon's New Map." *Esquire,* March 2003, pp. 174–178, 227–228.

4.   Klare, Michael T. "The New Geography of Conflict." Chapter 28 in *Strategy and Force Planning.* 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 419–426.

5.   Kass, Lani. Statement to House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 3 February 2004.

SSF-5 CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

A. Focus. In order to understand the current and projected national security threats to the United States, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence solicits annual testimony from key leaders of the intelligence community—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR). These testimonies are key to Congressional understanding of the security environment and future capabilities necessary to advance and defend national interests. While each official presents his organizational view of pressing national security issues, there is much commonality across agencies. For example, the threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation dominated the prepared statements. However, not everyone agreed about the severity or the nature of the threat.

B. Objectives

- Understand current and projected national security threats to the United States.

- Analyze the implications of these threats for the national security strategy.

- Analyze the implications of these threats for force planning decisions.

C. Guidance

1. The State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) is the smallest member of the intelligence community with about 200 analysts. In spite of its size, INR, like other State Department offices, successfully leverages its small resources by relying on the community for collection but on its own personnel for good analysis. Assistant Secretary Fingar agrees with the community assessment regarding the threat of terrorism, but sees the United States less vulnerable to a spectacular attack today. According to Fingar, "[T]he United States is a 'harder target' for the terrorist." But, "[t]errorism remains the most immediate, dangerous, and difficult security challenge facing our country and the international community and is likely to remain so for a long time." This is largely a result of normalizing relations with China and the disappearance of the Soviet conventional threat. Related to the issue of a WMD attack, INR has "seen no persuasive evidence that al-Qa'ida has obtained fissile material or ever has had a serious and sustained program to do so." This statement not only alleviates immediate concerns about nuclear terrorism but also underscores the importance of securing fissile material. Without it, a nuclear device is impossible to create. Consequently, arms control programs like Nunn-Lugar can go a long way to reducing the threat of a WMD terrorist attack.

2. CIA Director Porter Goss assumed his position during a contentious time. He was the immediate successor of George Tenet, whose controversial role in the Iraqi WMD assessment was the impetus for several investigations of intelligence failure. During his testimony, Goss underscored the threat of terrorism. He stated that "al Qaeda is intent on finding ways to circumvent U.S. security enhancements to strike Americans and the homeland." And CIA analysis suggests that "it may be only a matter of time before al-Qa'ida or another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons." In addition to concerns about terrorism and proliferation, the familiar countries made the list of national-security

threats—including North Korea's pursuit of a uranium-enrichment program and selling ballistic missiles around the world.

3.   DIA Director Vice Admiral Jacoby testified that, "the most dangerous and immediate threat is Sunni Islamic terrorists that form the al Qaeda-associated movement." And DIA narrowed down the WMD threat to a biological attack. "Because they are easier to employ [than other WMD], we believe terrorists are more likely to use biological agents." In addition to concerns about terrorism, military intelligence concerns were brought forward. The insurgency in Iraq and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were highlighted. Additionally, the nuclear programs of China, North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Iran were also discussed.

D.   Required Readings

1.   Fingar, Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. "Security Threats to the United States." February 16, 2005.

2.   Goss, Porter, Director, Central Intelligence Agency. "Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy." February 16, 2005.

3.   Jacoby, Lowell E., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States." February 16, 2005.

SSF-6 POWER AND THE AMERICAN PROJECT

A. Focus. Power is the ability to shape the outcomes you want and change the behavior of others. In the context of military power, unipolarity dominates thinking about the U.S. position in the world, but recent foreign policy frustration highlights the limits of American power. As Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and current Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard argues, military power is not enough to solve global problems like terrorism, environmental degradation, and weapons proliferation. An array of power, from "soft" to "hard," is needed to address such complex problems successfully. Inherent in this observation is an alterative view to unipolarity—power relations are stratified. At the military level, U.S. power is unparalleled and unprecedented. At the economic level, the U.S. is checked by other great economic powers such as Japan, the European Union, and the People's Republic of China through institutions like the World Trade Organization. And, at the transnational level, the U.S. is but one of many state and non-state actors that influence global events. According to senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Walter Russell Mead, the changing nature of power and the global nature of American interests require the U.S. to use all its tools of national power to achieve its national security objectives.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate the various forms of national power and how they are used to promote the "American Project."

- Analyze the goals of the "American Project" and how they may reduce or exacerbate traditional balance of power struggles.

C. Guidance

Rooted in its past, the U.S. seeks to build a world that protects domestic security while building a "peaceful world order of democratic states linked by common values and sharing a common prosperity." To do this, Walter Russell Mead refines Joseph Nye's distinction between soft and hard power. Hard power is coercive includes "sharp" (military) and "sticky" (economic) power, while soft power co-opts and comprises "sweet" (cultural) and "hegemonic" (the totality of America's agenda-setting power). Mead argues that by using all tools of national power, the U.S. can construct a safer global order, which is a fundamental national interest.

D. Required Reading

Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, Introduction and Chapters 1–3.

SSF-7   COMPETING GRAND STRATEGIES I

A.   Focus. Strategy can be viewed as a game plan or a roadmap. Given competing international goals, an uncertain security environment, and limited resources, at its best, strategy links ends and means by establishing priorities. Though there are many possibilities, SSF-7 and SSF-8 explore five strategies: cooperative security, selective engagement, primacy, neo-isolationism, and forward containment. If followed, each strategy assists decisionmakers in identifying threats to the national interest and opportunities to further it. Finally, strategy provides a framework for military force planning.

B.   Objectives

- Understand and assess the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of cooperative security, selective engagement, primacy, and neo-isolationism.

- Understand the role of assessing the security environment in developing a successful strategy.

- Evaluate the utility of each strategy in determining force requirements.

C.   Guidance

Posen and Ross critique four basic alternatives for U.S. grand strategy that now compete to guide U.S. foreign policy. Though the strategies may be named differently, Posen and Ross adopt the labels neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each strategy is presented and examined in terms of national interests, threats to those interests, and the force planning implications of each strategy. By examining the purposes, premises, and preferred political and military implications of each strategy, Posen and Ross present rationales for future force structures. Though it may be tempting to draw the "best" elements from each strategy, they caution, "one cannot indiscriminately mix and match across strategies . . . without running into trouble. They contain fundamental disagreements about strategic objectives and priorities, the extent to which the United States should be engaged in international affairs, the form that engagement should assume [military or otherwise], the degree of autonomy that must be maintained, and when and under what conditions military force should be employed."

D.   Required Reading

Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." Chapter 11 in *Strategy and Force Planning.* 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004,.

SSF-8   COMPETING GRAND STRATEGIES II

A.   Focus. This session focuses on "forward containment" as a grand strategy. Walter Russell Mead describes this strategy but it is rooted in the ideas developed by George F. Kennan, which was the basis for the Truman administration's containment policy for fighting the Cold War. As Kennan wrote anonymously in a 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." To that end, he called for countering "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world" through the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Mead takes Kennan's ideas and argues for their application in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

B.   Objectives

- Assess the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of forward containment.

- Evaluate the utility of forward containment in determining force requirements in the GWOT.

- Compare and contrast all five competing strategies to uncover their strengths and weaknesses used to guide U.S. grand strategy.

C.   Guidance

1.   Walter Russell Mead argues that the terrorist threat the United States faces today is comparable to the Communist threat the U.S. faced during the Cold War. Mead argues that containment should be revived to guide the United States in the global war on terrorism and offers "forward containment" as the strategic principle that should underlie U.S. foreign policy. "On the one hand, we must deal with the challenge of fanatical terrorists prepared to wage total war against us with weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we must repair the damage to the American system." By promoting development, strengthening failing states, and articulating an alternative to terrorism, U.S. foreign policy would contain and negate the threat of terrorism. Is this strategy appropriate for the GWOT?

2.   NCIS Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Jeffrey Norwitz expands Mead's ideas on combating terrorism and argues for a more vigorous role for the Defense Department. For Norwitz, the *Posse Comitatus Act* is misinterpreted today and the DoD must become more involved in homeland security. Drawing from a former FEMA associate director and OSD senior executive's understanding of *Posse Comitatus*, he argues "an erroneous interpretation has resulted from a general Pentagon desire to avoid domestic unrest quagmires." For Norwitz, DoD must not only be involved in consequence management planning, but must use its superb military investigation, intelligence analysis and fact-finding capabilities to augment state and local authorities. "This may need to include questioning of civilians and perhaps collection of information relevant to tracking terrorists." How has 9/11 transformed understanding of threats to national security? Does this change how the President thinks about employing military forces?

D. Required Readings

   1.   Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, Chapters 10–11.

   2.   Norwitz, Jeffrey H. "Combating Terrorism: With a Helmet or a Badge?" August 2005 [originally published August 2002 at www.homelandsecurity.org/journal].

SSF-9   NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

A. Focus. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires each administration to produce a National Security Strategy (NSS) by June 15 of the first year it takes office and "regularly" thereafter. The NSS signals U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals. This lesson will explore aspects of the 2002 NSS, flag contending views of the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy, and provide a forum for seminar analysis and critique.

B. Objectives

- Understand the major elements of the NSS of the United States and contending viewpoints.

- Analyze the NSS critically and discuss possible changes.

C. Guidance

1.   The 2002 NSS outlines "a distinctly American internationalism" with goals of political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The NSS proposes to champion aspirations for human dignity, strengthen alliances, help defuse regional conflicts, protect against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), ignite economic growth through free markets and free trade, encourage democracy, develop cooperative agendas with other global powers, and transform America's national security institutions for the 21st century. Do these aims capture completely the security goals of the U.S.? Does the NSS list priorities in order? If not, is prioritizing required? If so, what should be the priorities? Are roadmaps for each goal clear and achievable? Is sufficient attention given to finding ways to bring international players on board? Would you change aspects of the NSS, perhaps to increase or decrease focus? Would you add or delete elements?

2.   Gaddis offers a thoughtful critique of the Bush NSS, noting that second terms open the way for second thoughts. While Gaddis accepts that September 11 forced a major rethinking of U.S. national strategy, particularly regarding the concepts of "pre-emption" and "prevention," he observes that the U.S. has come to appear to much of the world as a clear and present danger because of complaints that "great power was being wielded without great responsibility." Could the U.S. do a better job of "lubricating" its strategy? Does that mean only better utilizing "soft power," or might it mean taking greater care with "hard power," too? Gaddis advocates a greater U.S. emphasis on multilateralism and suggests U.N. roles regarding Iraq sanctions and Iran nuclear issues are encouraging developments. What do you think? Gaddis sees the outcomes for both Iraq and Afghanistan as still unpredictable, but he also believes that events in those places need to be kept in perspective. Other places "may well be as important for the future of the international system as what transpires in the Middle East." As you proceed into the regional-studies portion of the SSF curriculum, keep that in mind. Gaddis worries that states like Iran and North Korea have drawn their own lessons regarding possession of WMD from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. "Grand strategies always have multiple audiences." How then should the U.S. NSS deal with emerging nuclear threats? Gaddis notes continuing uncertainty about the success of "democracy" in the Middle East. What do you think of his suggestion that "the historical winds have been blowing" in the direction of "democracy," and "grand strategies, like the most

efficient navigators, keep the winds behind them"? If you were a great strategist like Otto von Bismarck, in the position to advise the Bush Administration, what course corrections would you pose to help U.S. policy "shift from shock and awe to the reassurance . . . that is necessary to sustain any new system"?

3. In chapters seven through nine of "Power, Terror, Peace, and War," Walter Russell Mead discusses the pros and cons of the Bush Administration foreign policy. Chapter seven provides an overview; eight provides some pats on the back; nine raises concerns. While only chapter seven is required reading, eight and nine provide much food for thought. In reading Mead's analysis of how Bush Administration policy has succeeded at times and found difficulty "on the ground" at other times, consider how well the various NSS goals have been met thus far. Is it possible for the U.S. to make progress across the board? Or is it inevitable that progress on some goals will cause complexities in achieving others? Mead notes that in many ways recent U.S. foreign policy has "worked within the traditional concerns of American grand strategy." Even the NSS language about "pre-emptive war" is, in essence, long-standing U.S. policy. Do you agree? Mead says the decisions to embark on the "war on terror" and to invade Iraq are the most significant Bush Administration strategic choices. He sees both as sensible manifestations of U.S. strategy and discusses a number of motives which have not received much public comment. At the same time, he challenges a number of the means regarding Iraq, including the planning for post-invasion scenarios and the efforts to explain U.S. motivations to the rest of the world. Does Mead have a point? How able are we to function as sole hegemon? How much do we need to rely on allies and/or attract coalitions of the willing? How might the USG have done better? Mead discusses at length the health of current U.S. relationships with important nations and regions of the world. Do NSS priorities jibe with Mead's depictions?

D. Required Readings

1. Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.

2. Gaddis, John Lewis. "Grand Strategy in the Second Term." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2005.

3. Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace, and War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Read Chapter 7. Chapters 8–9 elaborate on the discussion for those who care to explore further.

SSF-10 DIPLOMACY

A. Focus. Corollary to the Clausewitzian proposition that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" is the idea that the strategist first should consider non-lethal means to achieve important national-security goals. The "Strategic Choices and Tools of Statecraft" portion of SSF will consider a variety of non-military tools that states use in an attempt to implement grand strategy. Those tools include diplomacy, informational power, formal and informal alliances, international institutions, and economic means. In this lecture, followed by question and answer period, the session provides an overview of the attributes and capabilities, both strengths and weaknesses, of the Department of State (DOS) and American Embassies as diplomatic practitioners on the national security stage. A central theme is that American diplomats are dedicated, risk-taking public servants, on the front lines but with very limited resources.

B. Objectives

- Understand the Department of State: whom it employs; how it functions internally, in the inter-agency process, and abroad and how it relates to DOD

- Provide an overview of various forms of diplomatic activity, how and when they are best utilized

- Consider how the Department of State's role and abilities might be improved

C. Guidance

1. Fedyszyn addresses the evolution of the diplomatic art and the many forms that diplomacy can take. In reality, policymakers do sort through their tool boxes to try to match appropriate diplomatic means, whether labeled "soft" or "hard," "preventive," "coercive," "sharp," "sticky," etc. to the ends to be achieved. Fedyszyn sees "a tendency for American diplomats to be guided by the realist logic of the zero-sum game." If so, is that tendency more likely driven by internal factors at DOS or by political considerations from the White House and/or Capital Hill? Note Fedyszyn's concluding analysis that NGOs, particularly terrorist groups, now affect international stability and that traditional diplomacy has limited ability to influence such groups.

2. In the second reading, former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich offered a harsh assessment of the State Department. In the third set of readings, several former American Ambassadors and a representative of the Foreign Service Association responded; then Gingrich offers a rebuttal. Have those arguments and counter-arguments in mind as you listen to a lecture by the State Department senior advisor to the NWC describing how the State Department and American Embassies function and why they function the way they do. Pay attention to how the State Department interacts with DOD in Washington, regionally with the COCOMs, and in the Embassy setting. Gingrich argues that DOS has failed to support Bush Administration foreign-policy priorities. Do you think that is true? Should Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) tailor their reporting and analysis activities to the views of the Administration in power? How about their efforts to explain U.S. policy to foreign audiences? Gingrich proposes a "transformation" of the State Department bureaucracy. Is DOS broken? Or is its complicated

bureaucratic process useful in the making of good foreign policy? Is there sufficient productive interaction among DOS, DOD, and the intelligence agencies about important strategic issues? If not, how might the system be made to work better? Do DOS Political Advisors (POLADs) to COCOMs contribute? Will the appointment of Dr. Rice as Secretary of State have an impact on these questions?

3. Wrage discusses COCOMs as diplomatic players on the regional stage. Do they play an appropriate role in the civilian-military relationship? Do they integrate sufficiently with other elements in the U.S. foreign policy team? Wrage wonders if a "Goldwater-Nichols"–type process might impose a COCOM-like regional structure at the Department of State. Is that worth exploring for all or some aspects of the DOS roles? Wrage suggests COCOMs can be threatening to Ambassadors because of their funding and multilateral focus. Might Ambassadors not see such funding and multilateralism as useful "arrows in the quiver" in Gen. Franks' term, rather than threats? To what sorts of diplomatic purposes is a COCOM's funding best applied? Wrage suggests that the GWOT is increasingly militarizing foreign policy? If true, is that a problem?

D. Required Readings

1. Fedyszyn, Thomas R. "Implementing Strategy: Diplomatic Tools." Chapter 20 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read pp. 311–315 and 318–323.

2. Gingrich, Newt. "Rogue State Department." *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2003.

3. Eizenstat, Stuart, Jack F. Matlock, Bruce Laingan, Thomas D. Boyatt, Joseph J. Sisco, Robert L. Gallucci, and Newt Gingrich, "Debating U.S. Diplomacy." *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2003.

4. Wrage, Stephen D. "U.S. Combatant Commander: The Man in the Middle." In *America's Viceroys*. Edited by Derek Reveron. Read pp. 185–193.

SSF-11 ALIGNMENTS, COALITIONS, AND ALLIANCES

A. Focus. Nation-states use a variety of tools to implement their grand strategies. Ranging across the diplomatic spectrum, these include supranational international institutions such as the United Nations, formal alliances such as NATO, and ad hoc coalitions such as those developed during the 1991 Gulf War.

In this session we examine alignments, coalitions and alliances. Knowing their strengths and weaknesses is fundamental to understanding how they can support a nation's grand strategy and influence our choice of other tools of statecraft and future military forces. This session considers the trend toward "coalitions of the willing" as well as examining why alliances tend to end or persist. We also consider the implications of more informal coalitions and their importance in dealing with the Global War on Terror.

B. Objectives

- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of alignments, coalitions, and alliances.

- Comprehend the role of alignments, coalitions, and alliances in the evolving U.S. defense structure.

- Examine how different aims (nationalist, internationalist, and cosmopolitan) influence the strategy (unilateral or multilateral) and the means (alignment, coalitions, and formal alliances) selected in order to achieve national objectives.

C. Guidance

1. Stephen Walt provides insights on the rise and fall of alliances. In the context of examining why they endure or collapse, he examines the purposes of alliances, their varying levels of institutionalization, the functions they perform, and how they differ from other forms of security cooperation, particularly collective security arrangements. Walt argues that alliances tend to disintegrate in response to changing threat perceptions, declining credibility, and domestic politics. Alliances endure when they are based on hegemonic leadership and shared values and are highly institutionalized. Is his analysis informed primarily by realism or liberalism? What implications does Walt's analysis have on the future of NATO? How does the emergence of non-national threats in the terror war affect the future of the U.S. system of alliances?

2. Stewart Patrick provides an overview of aims and goals from the nationalist, internationalist, and cosmopolitan perspectives. He then examines the role of multilateralism and unilateralism within each of these perspectives. With which perspective do you most agree? Nationalism—that the highest duty of a statesman is to ensure the physical security and well-being of the nation and its citizens—or internationalism—when one seeks to advance objectives that are sought not only by the nation and its citizens but more broadly by all states? Or cosmopolitanism—where human beings are the fundamental agents and holders of rights in world politics?

3.   Campbell claims that since 9/11, the U.S. sees alliances differently than it has in the past. He argues that the current system of U.S. alliances is neither dead nor in decline, but rather, changing in response to challenges of a new era. He states that new trends suggest greater reliance on ad hoc coalitions ("of the willing") that can be assembled rapidly and on countries that might possess greater enthusiasm for U.S. aims but have less capability and experience than traditional U.S. partners. Yet, the added flexibility afforded by ad hoc coalitions is likely to be offset by the burdens of greater U.S. military responsibility and less-able partners. In the post 9-11 era are new security structures called for? If so, how do alliances work or not work in this new structure? Is NATO still viable? How do China and Russia fit into our alliance structure?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Walt, Stephen M. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse." Chapter 21 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

2.   Patrick, Stewart. "Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism." Chapter 43 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read only from p. 589 to p. 594 (stop at "Better to be Feared").

3.   Campbell, Kurt M. "The End of the Alliances? Not so Fast." *The Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (Spring 2004).

SSF-12 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONS

A. Focus. International community and institutions are important but often controversial instruments in the conduct of diplomacy, as evidenced by the difficulties faced by the Bush Administration in the months preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom. The important role of international institutions is evident in the various ways and varying degrees these institutions (such as the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations) are involved in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation-building. The recent tsunami-related disaster in Asia further underscores their importance. Questions arise frequently over the relationship between the use of diplomatic tools, the role of the approval or disapproval by the International Community through the UN and regional institutions, and the use of military forces in executing U.S. foreign policy. This session provides various perspectives on the international community suggesting that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent due to globalization. The benefits and shortfalls of multilateral organizations as they relate to decision-making and consensus maintenance is another theme. Further examined are the issues of peacekeeping, nation-building, and the United States role in this international community. What is evident is that the importance of the international community and international institutions demands the continued attention of an America's strategists and military planners.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate various descriptions of the international community and this community's potential for impact on a nation's grand strategy.

- Consider the importance of international organizations and institutions as instruments of diplomacy and their impact on a nation's strategy formulation and execution.

- Comprehend the relationship between the United States and institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization.

- Examine the role of international institutions and communities in humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation building.

C. Guidance

1. Annan discusses the role of the "international community" in the 21st century. He states we face a world of extraordinary challenges—and of extraordinary interconnectedness. In such an interconnected world threats can no longer be viewed in isolation and are in fact interconnected. Given the interconnectedness of today's threats, the world needs to be far more committed to prevention. He also states that because prevention or peaceful dispute resolution sometimes fail, force must be used. Referring to a December 2004 high level advisory report, he lists five basic guidelines that all states and the Security Council should consider when deciding on the use of force. Lastly he discusses the need for reform of the UN. Can the international community respond to the threats he discusses? How do a nation's perceptions of the international community impact its strategy and military force planning?

2.   Ikenberry argues the durability of the American liberal hegemonic order is anchored in the international institutions the U.S. has created since World War II. The peace and stability of this order has been a result of the bargain the U.S. offers other countries that agree to participate in the system. The durability of this bargain comes from its underlying logic and the phenomenon of increasing returns. He argues that the overall system, organized around principles of openness, reciprocity, and multilateralism, has become increasingly connected to the wider and deeper institutions of politics and society within the advanced industrial world. Does the open and penetrated character of the American hegemonic order invite participation and creates assurances of steady commitment? Has America's decision to invade Iraq impacted the durability of the order Ikenberry advocates? Is it in the U.S. national interest to perpetuate the post–World War II system?

3.   Mead sees the international system as an outgrowth of U.S. strategy and essential to U.S. security. Yet, "setting up and working within international institutions is one of the most important but also one of the most problematic ways in which the United States has tried to manage the tensions between the imperial and cooperative aspects of its world role." International institutions facilitate coalition creation to attack transnational problems such as terrorism, proliferation, and human suffering. But Mead recognizes that inclusive international institutions composed of countries that do not share America's values can also constrain the United States. At bottom, Mead sees countries divided into two camps—the party of hell (countries cynical about the ability of international institutions to manage conflicts) and the party of heaven (countries that have a deep belief in multilateral institutions to solve international problems). Both camps, Mead argues, equally frustrate the United States and balance American power through international institutions. Mead discusses the role of institutions and American foreign policy in the post–Cold War era. Can Western institutions serve the U.S. national interest (creation of a favorable world order)? Can institutions serve to mitigate fears of domination and abandonment between the U.S. and its partners? What are the positive and negative aspects of using institutions to advance U.S. interests? Have Western institutions become so deeply ingrained in the structures of states participating in the current international system resulted in a situation which makes it increasingly difficult for alternative institutions or alternative leadership to seriously emerge? Can institutions provide legitimacy?

4.   Etzioni examines the evolving role of global civil society (GCS) to play a role in dealing with transnational challenges. He argues a thriving civil society is needed and does perform several useful functions; however, there are limits to what it can do. What is the role of GCS with respect the state? What is the role of the GCS in promoting norms and values? Can the U.S. leverage GCS to advance its interests (freedom, democracy, etc.)?

5.   One of the key challenges for the international community and the United States is the challenge of nation-building. Between 1945 and 2003, 16 major nation-building missions were conducted. In some cases they were led by the U.S.; in others the international community under the guise of the UN, EU or NATO led the effort. Dobbins argues each has "very distinctive natures and capabilities." Is it in the U.S. national interest to conduct or support nation-building efforts? Under what conditions should the U.S. rely on the international community to conduct nation-building operations? If the U.S. does not support nation-building efforts through direct or indirect support, can the international community adequately deal with state failure and the need to rebuild failed states?

D. Required Readings

1.   Annan, Kofi. "Courage to Fulfill our Responsibilities." *The Economist*, December 2, 2004.

2.   Ikenberry, G. John. "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint." In *America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power*. Cornell University Press, 2002. Read only pp. 231–238, scan preceding pages.

3.   Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace, and War*. Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, Chapter 4.

4.   Etzioni, Amitai. "The Capabilities and Limits of the Global Civil Society." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (2004).

5.   Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina. "The U.S. and UN Ways of Nation-Building." Chapter 13 in *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From Congo to Iraq*. Rand, 2005.

SSF-13 INTERNATIONAL OFFICER SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

A. Focus. The International Officers (IOs) enrolled in the course are an invaluable resource. They bring fresh perspectives which should be of value to American students. This session is intended to encourage the IOs to relate their views on the most important international-strategic challenges facing the world and to discuss those views with the entire student body. A few days before, SSF faculty will have worked with the IOs to encourage preparation of presentations.

B. Objectives

- Ensure the IOs become deeply involved in an important aspect of SSF study.

- Provide the American students fresh perspectives from their international-military colleagues on the major challenges for the future of the world.

- Segue to the series of regional SSF sessions which follow.

C. Guidance

1. A few days prior to this session, the international officers in SSF will have met in small groups under guidance from faculty members to prepare briefings on their views of the most significant security issues that affect the world today and are of importance for the future.

2. This session is an opportunity to hear those briefings and to engage in Q&A. How do the views of International Students compare to the views expressed in the NSS? How do they compare with the views of American military officers? If you observe significant differences, what might motivate those differences? Would it be useful, in seeking to build coalitions and alliances, for the U.S. to attempt to positively address any apparent differences? If so, which ones? Are some U.S. values so important that no variance is possible?

D. Required Readings

No readings are planned for this group session. Students are expected to engage actively in discussion with the IOs in the question and answer period after the presentations take place.

SSF-14 INFORMATIONAL POWER

A. Focus. The United States invests extraordinary amounts of energy and resources in collecting information in many different forms. However, only through communication does information translate to power. Moreover, how a state communicates and controls information has more to do with achieving strategic objectives or national interests than it does with the act of collecting information. Globalization and rapid advancements in technology have increased our ability to accumulate information at a staggering pace and have a profound impact on the manner and speed with which information is communicated throughout the world. Global perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes are formed based on photographic images, newspaper headlines or controversial cultural exports. Nation states have always attempted to control the flow of information in order to shape domestic and international perceptions. Recently however, controlling the flow of information has becomes much more difficult. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are using technology to communicate information in ways the state can no longer control. The extent to which governments adapt to this phenomenon will in part determine the international political power structure well into the 21st century. In this session we look closely at the strategic information collection and communication process, as well as the tension between nation states and NGOs, as both struggle to control the flow of information in order to achieve their respective interests and strategic objectives.

B. Objectives

- Assess different forms of information and technology and the impact of each on shaping global opinion and perceptions.

- Assess ways in which states and NGOs communicate (controlled and uncontrolled) and how each might be used by an organization to best achieve their strategic interests.

- Comprehend challenges to the United States in developing a strategic communication plan and the most effective way(s) to control and/or shape the flow of information to achieve our strategic objectives and national interests.

C. Guidance

1. In the post-9/11 world, the United States needs to communicate in a more efficient and credible way with the international community if it expects the world to accept American leadership on issues of U.S. national security. The challenge to diplomats, politicians, and policy makers has been to identify the most efficient and effective way to improve strategic communications. The Defense Science Board defined the challenge and provided a new vision for an effective strategic communication program in September 2004. How important are government funded public diplomacy programs to United States diplomacy? Are there inherent drawbacks to government sponsored information programs? Should the Department of Defense actively pursue information operations programs to influence attitudes and opinions in the international community? What should the relationship be between the government policy making process and government controlled communication processes?

2. One of the most important aspects in the ongoing war on terrorism is the importance of winning the hearts and minds of those in the Islamic community. Kaplan believes the effort to

change the way the Islamic community thinks about the United States should be a global vice regional effort. Kaplan believes the effort to influence the attitudes and perspectives of the world in general and the Islamic community in particular should be spread across the spectrum engagement opportunities to include education, culture, and all aspects of electronic communication. Kaplan believes the United States should develop long term, institutionalized programs to communicate positive information about the U.S. and Western culture to the global community. Is this approach necessary? Do you believe it is worth the enormous amount of resources required to establish and maintain these information-based programs? How should theses programs be integrated into the military's hard power approach to the war on terror?

3.   States occasionally find it useful to block or withhold information for strategic reasons or to misrepresent information to cause an adversary to believe something that is not true. Godson and Wirtz believe democracies, authoritarian regimes, as well as non-state actors, use denial and deception (D&D) techniques to mislead adversaries or "buy time" in an asymmetric conflict. States must guard against the intentional misrepresentation or manipulation of information by allies as well as adversaries in order for national security policy to be effective. Would a U.S. ally ever engage in D&D with the United States? In what way? How can the Department of Defense best protect itself from an adversary intent on using a strategic D&D program to create a false strategic reality? Would the United States benefit from a strategic D&D program? Is strategic D&D possible in a globalized world rife with instantaneous electronic communication systems?

D.   Required Readings

1.   The Defense Science Board. "Strategic Communication: The Case for a New Vision." Chapter 1 in *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, Report to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, September 2004, pp. 11–20.

2.   Kaplan, David E. "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." *US News and World Report*, April 25, 2005.

3.   Godson, Roy, and James J. Wirtz. "Strategic Denial and Deception," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 13, no. 4 (2000).

SSF-15 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Focus. Economic objectives always have been an important part of the U.S. national security strategy. At the end of World War II, the United States and its allies set out to restructure the international economy in the wake of the war and the Great Depression. In international finance, trade, and development, U.S. leadership and the institutions it helped create were responsible for unparalleled growth and transformation. With the end of the Cold War, the concept of "economic security," harnessing America's international efforts to the creation of domestic jobs, has gained prominence. Many believe the key to global security lies with global economic development. Although progress has been uneven, many countries have experienced greater economic prosperity as they moved toward greater reliance on free trade and market-based economies. Globalization, open international trade, rapidly increasing capital flows, and new technologies have benefited many but have also created new challenges. Groups resisting the forces of economic globalization have become more common place. These include radical, disparate groups associated with anarchy, isolationism, imperialism and fundamentalism, as well as more main stream groups and organizations believing the current economic globalization process is fatally flawed and skewed in a manner that benefits already wealthy nations. For its part, the United States has recently implemented a radically different approach to distributing foreign economic aid to the developing world. The new Millennium Change Account (MCA) alters significantly the way the United States distributes foreign aid to developing countries. Despite significant economic assistance, the collapse of developing economies in the 1990s such as the meltdown of Asian financial markets provided a severe shock to the world economy and raised serious concerns about the adequacy of existing economic policies, institutions, and governance. This session looks at the full range of trade, investment, and development issues facing the nations of the world and explores alternative policy objectives and international economic strategies.

B. Objectives

- Understand the impact of globalization on both domestic and international economic policy and performance.

- Examine the efficacy of the various tools of economic strategy available to the United States and other countries: international trade and trade policies, investment (both private and public), and foreign aid, as well as the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

- Evaluate alternative economic strategies for developing nations and the role of developed economies in promoting global economic growth.

C. Guidance

1. Economic growth provides the engine for global development. Ownership generates wealth and investment which in turn helps create an educated, upwardly mobile middle class with strong personal interests in state security, political stability, government institutions and economic systems. Economic globalization has been the catalyst for this process throughout the world. Sachs suggests globalization is "a dynamic process of the economic integration of virtually the entire world." He examines globalization in terms of four aspects: increased

international trade, increased capital flows, globalization of economic production, and increased harmonization of national and international institutions. What lessons have we learned? Why is it that openness to trade has led to increased productivity and economic growth? What are the strengths and weaknesses of trade strategies based upon free trade versus mercantilism? Why have some nations prospered so well while others have failed? What is your overall evaluation of the different strategies that nations have followed in the past? What are the implications for the domestic and international economic components of the National Security Strategy? Keep these themes in mind as you review the follow-on readings.

2.   Developed in 1989 by the Institute for International Economics, the World Bank, and the IMF, the "Washington Consensus" provided economic policy remedies for failing Latin American economies to help create economic growth and wealth for the state by encouraging open, transparent economic systems and opening—some say exposing—developing economies to the global markets. Generally speaking, the Washington Consensus requires developing economies to lower tariffs, increase transparency and reduce government spending. After fifteen years, the jury is still out as to whether the prescriptive economic policy has hurt or helped those states that elected to implement the restrictive policy. William Finnegan believes the policies dictated by the IMF and the World Bank are fatally flawed and only serve to keep the powerful, industrialized states in a dominant position over developing states. Is Finnegan correct in his view on free trade? What responsibility, if any, do industrialized economies have to assist less developed economies grow and prosper? What affect will global free trade and lower tariffs have on the U.S. domestic economy? Will global free trade impact the national security of the United States? If so, how?

3.   While there is much disagreement on how the United States and the developed world can best promote and support global economic development, there is little disagreement with former Secretary of State Colin Powell's assertion that the health of the global economy is a core national security issue for the United States. Secretary Powell believes the United States must act in a significant yet responsible way to promote sound economic policies in the world's poorest nations and promote efficient programs and policies that reduce poverty and corruption while improving a country's education, government and political systems. Global shifts in technology, immigration, trade, and climate all impact the ability of countries to adjust to the new economic patterns and demands of globalization. Secretary Powell believes it is critically important that the United States assumes a global leadership role in assisting the many poor, less developed countries adapt to the changing environment. What should be the role of the United States in promoting global economic development? Can the European Union and the United States cooperate in this effort or will global market competition inevitably drive the two economic powers apart? What tensions exist in developing countries when domestic economic policy collides with the demands of international economic development policy? Can these tensions be overcome?

4.   Economic tools such as foreign aid, World Bank/IMF loans, favorable trade policies, and foreign direct investment all serve as "carrots" to entice and encourage governments of developing states to modify policies and behaviors in support of open, free market economies and subsequent integration with the already developed industrialized economies (e.g. U.S., EU, and Japan). Normally these carrots are offered to states that have demonstrated an appreciation for democracy and the policies necessary to support democratic institutions. What if a state

chooses not to accept fundamental democratic concepts and continues to support an authoritative regime that does not respect certain international norms generally accepted with responsible state behavior (i.e., human rights, WMD proliferation)? What if a state chooses to adopt an economic or trade policy so egregious that its trading partners feel action must be taken to persuade the state to cancel the offending policy? Short of military action, what courses of action does a state have to change the perceived bad behavior of an adversary or an ally? Elliot and Hufbauer propose economic sanctions as a "stick" alternative as one option short of military conflict available to a state to influence the behavior of an offending state. Economic sanctions are not always successful but have—under the right circumstances—proved both efficient and effective. Are economic sanctions still a useful alternative in the new globalized economy? Are unilateral sanctions (U.S./Cuba) economically practical or are they more often implemented for domestic political consumption? What role should economic sanctions play in the U.S. national security policy?

5.   India is a growing power that the United States cannot afford to ignore. Pakistan, by contrast, is a state on the edge of economic collapse, governed by a military leader, and vulnerable to negative Islamist influences. Yet, in the wake of both the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and the 1998 nuclear tests, as well as simmering tensions over Kashmir, both nations have become crucial—not only in the Greater Near East, but also in the world. Huang and Khanna suggest the vast, untapped potential of India has yet to be realized, and examine economic and security implications. What are the implications of these issues regarding interests, objectives, and strategy? Is India truly an emerging major power?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Sachs, Jeffrey. "The Geography of Economic Development." Chapter 18 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Strategy and Force Planning Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

2.   Finnegan, William. "The Economics of Empire." *Harper's Magazine*, May 2003.

3.   Powell, Colin L. "No Country Left Behind." *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2005.

4.   Elliot, Kimberly Ann and Gary Clyde Hufbauer. "Sanctions." *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*. Library of Economics and Liberty, 2002. Read pp. 1–7.

5.   Huang, Yasheng, and Tarun Khanna. "Can India Overtake China?" *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2003.

SSF-16 GREATER NEAR EAST

A. Focus. The Greater Near East comprises the Arab world, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt. This is a broad and diverse region where religion, culture, and changing demographics intersect in geographic space. This volatile region is also home to vast deposits of oil and natural gas. In the near term, U.S. security concerns remain focused on the war on terrorism, access to oil and gas, and furthering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This vital area demands the strategist's closest attention to the interaction between policy objectives on the one hand and strategy and forces on the other.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in the Greater Near East.

- Identify threats to those interests in the Greater Near East.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in the Greater Near East.

C. Guidance

1. In his CRS report "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment," Kenneth Katzman outlines the essential information on Al Qaeda: its origins, structure, and strategy. He also briefly covers the actions of the United States to counter the terrorist network's threat. Is U.S. policy in the war on terrorism successful? What changes would you recommend?

2. Joffe examines the claim that the state of Israel is the source of conflict in the Middle East and finds it less than convincing. He concludes that problems in this region would exist even if Israel didn't. Indeed, he concludes that Israel contains more antagonisms than it causes. What is the source of the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. Can it be resolved? What is the role of the United States? What are the benefits and costs of the relationship between the United States and Israel?

3. Since the Iran hostage crisis some two decades ago, Americans have been accustomed to equating the Shia branch of Islam with Islamic radicalism. Schwartz argues that this is not the case: the theological basis of the campaign against the United States in Iraq and elsewhere is only part of a larger conflict between a particular sect of Sunni Islam—the Wahhabi—and other branches of Islam, including both Shia and Sufi. According to Schwartz, the Wahhabi see not only Jews and Christians but also other Moslems as infidels who deserve death. Followers of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an adherent of Wahhabism, assert that Islam as practiced by most Moslems is in fact apostasy. What is the implication of this schism for peace in Iraq and the Greater Near East as a whole, especially since Wahhabism is the state religion of our nominal ally, Saudi Arabia?

4. Journalist Christopher de Bellaigue challenges much of the "conventional wisdom" regarding Iran in his article "Think Again – Iran." The author focuses on Iran's nuclear ambitions and the possibility of an emerging political opposition to the ruling party, along with possible U.S. and international policy responses. Do you agree with de Bellaigue's assessments

of Iranian intentions and capabilities? Why or why not? What changes to current U.S. policies would you recommend? Is there a role for European nations to play in curbing Iranian nuclear capabilities and setting the conditions for the emergence of a more democratic form of government in this pivotal state?

5.   In this United Nations Development Programme–sponsored study, Arab scholars and opinion leaders review the state of the Arab world and consider the region's most important development challenges. The authors then discuss what they believe are the most important impediments to closing the knowledge gap between the Arab and non-Arab world. These factors include the conceptual basis of an Arab knowledge society and the cultural, economic, societal, and political issues that influence knowledge acquisition. The report concludes by suggesting a strategic vision for the successful transition of the Arab world to a knowledge-based society. What are the consequences for U.S. security and regional stability if the Arab world remains "disconnected" from the rapidly developing information-based world? Can the Arab world accept and undertake the report's recommendations for social and cultural change? What specific benefits would such change have on the role of women in the Arab world?

6.   In the follow-up to his earlier Foreign Affairs article, Michael Scott Doran contends that his assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian situation was right—that the road to peace in the Middle East runs through Baghdad, not Tel Aviv. He believes that in the Middle East, local issues—not a "monolithic pan-Arab public opinion driven by an obsessive concern with the Palestinians and their supposed Israeli and American oppressors"—are the root cause of conflict in the region. What do you think? How critical is the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue to the inter-Arab conflicts in the region? How does the situation in Iraq affect the Palestinian question? What is the way forward for peace in this troubled part of the world?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Katzman, Kenneth. "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment." Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, February 10, 2005.

2.   Joffe, Josef. "A World Without Israel." *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2005.

3.   Schwartz, Stephen. "Murderous Monotheists." *The Weekly Standard*, October 11, 2004.

4.   de Bellaigue, Christopher. "Think Again – Iran." *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2005.

5.   United Nations Development Programme. Arab Human Development Report 2003. Building a Knowledge Society. Executive Summary, http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/ahdr2/ presskit/6_AHDR03ExSum_E.pdf

6.   Doran, Michael Scott. "Is Palestine the Pivot?" http:www.foreignaffairs.org, March 16, 2005.

SSF-17 CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA

A. Focus. American policy makers contemplating the global geopolitical landscape over the last decade have increasingly recognized the critical importance of Central and South Asia. There are a number of reasons for this development. The first reason is the need to deal with instability in the region arising from the collapse of the Soviet empire and the rise of Islamic terrorism. For instance, Afghanistan under the Taliban provided a sanctuary for al Qaeda as it planned and executed the attacks of September 11, 2001 and Pakistan constitutes a central front in the war against Islamic terror, although there has long been concern that important elements of the Pakistani government sympathize with al Qaeda and other similar organizations. The second reason for the elevation in importance of this region is the energy potential of Central Asia, which some claim has led to the emergence of a new "Great Game." The third reason is the rise of India and the potential benefits to the United States that would result from U.S.-Indian cooperation. Balancing our interests in this region will take a great deal of thought and skill.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in Central and South Asia.

- Identify threats to those interests in Central and South Asia.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in Central and South Asia.

C. Guidance

1.   The Caspian basin (located both in the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia) is a tempting future energy source. With huge potential reserves of oil (with some value estimates as high as $4 trillion) and among the world's largest natural gas deposits, the region is an acknowledged resource-rich environment. Yet the region is torn by ethnic and civil unrest; further, standards of living for individual citizens have plummeted in the region since the end of the Soviet empire. Repressive and authoritarian rulers in each Central Asian state, as well as the struggle for control of and access to water resources, suggest little improvement in the near- to long-term future. Each of these states faces difficult choices in the next ten years, and even the most optimistic estimates suggest that economic benefits from oil and gas resources will not be realized until 2010. By insisting on the reality of a "Greater Central Asia"—one which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China—Menon effectively illustrates the vast dynamics of the Greater Near East. How do you view the region and its significance for the future of the Greater Near East? What strategic choices and force planning considerations would you make?

2.   Starr draws heavily on extensive interviews with persons directly involved in the coalition effort in Afghanistan: senior Afghan officials, U.S. policymakers, open sources and published Congressional hearings. His article challenges much of the criticism directed toward U.S. policymakers in Afghanistan and offers insight into the process of establishing good governance and stability in Afghanistan. Can American and allied interests be realized in Afghanistan?

3.   Tillis argues that the Bush administration is attempting an innovative approach to South Asia by simultaneously assisting Pakistan in becoming a successful state while enabling India to secure a trouble free ascent to great-power status. This approach makes sense, he contends, because both countries represent different kinds of strategic opportunities. What are the obstacles to an American balancing act on the sub-continent? What are the risks associated with this approach?

4.   The Australian reports that the Bush administration seeks a strategic partnership with India that goes well beyond the one described in the previous article. The thrust of the piece is that the administration has come to believe that the U.S. must transcend the view that defines India strictly in terms of its rivalry with Pakistan. Instead, it recognizes that a strong, democratic India is a U.S. asset in the region and the world, balancing the rise of authoritarian China. What are the pros and cons of this approach? What are the risks? Is it possible that U.S. effort to accommodate India's ambitions, regarding say nuclear power, will come into conflict with global ones, e.g. non-proliferation?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Menon, Rajan. "The New Great Game in Central Asia." *Survival* 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003): pp. 187–204. This reading also includes a map of the region from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, http://www.lib.Utexas.edu/maps/index.html

2.   Starr, Frederick S. "U.S. Afghanistan Policy: It's Working." Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, October 2004.

3.   Tellis, Ashley J. "South Asian See-Saw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 38, May 2005.

4.   "Bush's Indian Gambit." *The Australian*, May 21, 2005.

SSF-18   ASIA AND THE PACIFIC I (THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE TWO KOREAS)

A.   Focus. The People's Republic of China (PRC), which in recent years has been at odds with the U.S. over, e.g., the 1999 accidental American air attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 air-air mishap between a Chinese fighter and a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft, has surely sensed the post-9/11 security sea change. So, too, the U.S. has moved toward a more cooperative relationship with mainland China. "The United States relationship with China," states the 2002 National Security Strategy, "is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region." Underscoring this new era was the October 2003 visit to Washington, D.C., by Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, who held talks in the Pentagon with Secretary Rumsfeld. Aside from the purely military aspects of the relationship, China's economic power continues to show incredible growth. China is booming—with the world's sixth largest GDP of around $1.4 trillion—and recently rising to become the "world's third-most-active trading nation."

North Korea, a nearly failed state labeled by President George W. Bush in January 2002 as part of the "axis of evil," continues to confound the outside world with outrageous behavior. North Korea created a crisis in March 1993, by announcing its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, pushing the U.S. into an "Agreed Framework" whereby the North Koreans would receive considerable international assistance in return for dismantling their nuclear program. Following years of deceit by the North Koreans, the Bush administration in 2002 called a halt to the aid program. Thereupon, the North Koreans began to broadly suggest they possessed nuclear weapons and mentioned the possibility of testing one of the devices. The U.S., along with Russia, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, and Japan, is currently attempting to restart talks with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the South Korean government continues to be one of America's staunchest allies—sending more than 3,000 troops to Iraq in support of U.S. objectives. Nonetheless, polling indicates many South Koreans are not favorably disposed toward the United States. Moreover, the Bush administration has made it clear that transformational change in the American military will bring about significant U.S. military adjustments in South Korea. According to press accounts, this could mean a one-third reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea. The scope and speed of these changes is the subject of considerable discussion in Seoul and Washington and, doubtless, in Moscow, Tokyo, and Beijing.

B.   Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in China and the two Koreas.

- Identify threats to those interests in China and the two Koreas.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in China and the two Koreas.

C.   Guidance

1.   Fishman examines the "China Factor" and observes that the PRC is America's third largest trading partner. With a population of nearly 1.5 billion, China represents an enormous

market for domestic and foreign goods. This incredible population also provides a labor pool which allows the PRC to focus on low-technology, low-cost manufacturing. And, while pay is still considered low by western standards, Chinese buying power is now nearly five times that of an American. Indeed, China has more than 300 million mobile-phone users and the numbers grow by some five million new subscribers a month. Technology is on the march, as projections indicate that this year China's colleges and universities will produce 325,000 engineering graduates. All of this adds up to a formidable economic power which American business calls the "China Price," that is, "the price American suppliers to other American businesses have to match to keep their customers." How should the U.S. view China, as a partner or competitor? Does China's growing economic strength threaten U.S. security?

2.   Under the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2000, the Secretary of Defense is required to submit a report "on the current and future military strategy of the People's Republic of China" projected out over the next 20 years. This excerpt from the DOD report provides a detailed list of recent "Key Developments," including comments on political, economic, military, and technology issues. While we begin 2005 with U.S.-Chinese relations at a high point of good feeling, what trends in Chinese military development and spending bear close watching? Do China's force modernization efforts signal increased risk for the United States and its allies?

3.   North Korea, by any measure, is an extraordinary enigma. In recent years ten percent of the country's population—some 2–3 million people—have perished from lack of food and proper shelter. Meanwhile, a million North Korean troops are deployed for an attack on South Korea and President Kim Jong Il pursues the development and production of nuclear weapons. Oh and Hassig argue that rational discussions with the North Korean leadership are extraordinarily difficult since "the ultimate goal of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is to keep Kim in power, not to assure the security of the North Korean state or improve the welfare of the North Korean people." What are the U.S. options in dealing with such a "failing state?" How does the U.S. relationship with China figure into a positive resolution of North Korea's nuclear weapon's program? Given the virtual collapse of North Korea, what are the security and economic implications for a reunified North and South Korea? Hwang makes a forceful case for improved communication between South Korean and American policymakers. What steps should the U.S. undertake to improve the image of America in South Korea?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Fishman, Ted C. "The Chinese Century." *New York Times Magazine*, July 4, 2004.

2.   U.S. Department of Defense. "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China: Key Developments and The Role of National Security," pp. 4–16.

3.   Oh, Kongdan, and Ralph C. Hassig. "North Korea's Nuclear Politics." *Current History*, Spring 2004.

4.   Hwang, Balbina Y. "Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.–ROK Relations." *Backgrounder*, no. 1814, The Heritage Foundation, December 21, 2004.

SSF-19 ASIA AND THE PACIFIC II (PACIFIC PARTNERS)

A. Focus. This second session on Asia emphasizes America's longstanding security concerns and responsibilities outside of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Korean peninsula. Notably, five of the seven U.S. mutual defense treaties are rooted in the Asia-Pacific region. (This includes the U.S.-South Korea mutual defense treaty). Following a number of devastating wars, with considerable loss of American lives and treasure, Asia-Pacific has seen remarkable change and today abounds with economic and human potential and the promise of greater political freedoms. Yet, America continues to be rightly concerned with a number of security and economic issues which could spell danger for U.S. interests. The recent tsunami disaster underscores the potential for U.S. forces to be called into service in a variety of roles. Moreover, this tragedy makes clear the necessity for flexible forces and capabilities which allow immediate response to all forms of emergency. America's ability and willingness to provide aid, especially in countries where U.S. policies have recently been strongly criticized, is a critical factor in successful confidence building strategies. These efforts also assist in the fight against terrorism, which continues to plague Southeast Asia, threaten neighboring states, and menace the rest of the world. While there remain a number of potential security flashpoints throughout Asia, America's economic and security partnerships make clear that Washington is committed to being a major participant in what many describe as the "Pacific Century."

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

- Identify threats to those interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

C. Guidance

1.   Since the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the United States has been the primary security guarantor for free Asia. Fukuyama believes that during its second term, the Bush administration must recognize the region's changed security needs and devise a "proper security architecture" for Asia. The Japanese Diet recently passed legislation allowing the deployment of Japanese military forces to Iraq and Tokyo has taken an increasingly hard line toward North Korean belligerence. Domestic pressure for Japan to adopt a "normal" military posture, however, has raised concerns among Asian neighbors who painfully recall past Japanese militarism. The establishment of meaningful multilateral security frameworks, Fukuyama believes, would be very helpful in resolving regional concerns. Should the U.S. support these efforts and place greater emphasis on multilateral relations in Asia?

2.   Continuing the discussion on the importance of security partnerships in Asia, Searle and Kamae detail a recent high-level workshop in Brisbane where Japanese and Australian specialists debated "how their own security relations should develop in conjunction with or independent of their US affiliations." This international perspective provides unique detail on the challenges faced by two of America's most important security partners. In the post-9/11 world, where "the

regional and international security outlooks of all three allies have been challenged and transformed," how should Australia, Japan, and the U.S. craft their future security strategies?

3. The barbarism of September 11, 2001 had its roots in Asia and the region continues to be a hotbed for religious extremism and anti-U.S. and Western feelings. Al Qaeda has strong connections to a number of terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, including the radical Islamic group Jemaah Islamiya (JI), believed responsible for the deadly September 2002 bombing of a Bali nightclub. Kuala Lumpur was the meeting place in January 2000 for two of the September 11 hijackers and the planner of the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*. Tay explores the post–9/11 realities of Asian regionalism and the reaction to American primacy. "The debate over Iraq," he writes, "did not lend itself to concerns about the sentiment of the international community, the principals of international law, or the preference for peace." Nonetheless, "Asian leaders have responded quite promptly, whether as true allies or opportunistic ambulance chasers, to align their own agenda with America's." How can Washington assure Asia-Pacific that American primacy does not threaten their interests?

4. America's treaty commitments in Asia have long provided a security umbrella for one of the world's most important regions. Reveron provides an overview of these agreements: U.S.-Republic of the Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, 1952; ANZUS Treaty (Australia-New Zealand-U.S.), 1952; U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, 1954; South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty (U.S.-France-Australia-New Zealand-Thailand-Philippines), 1955; and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, 1960. Given current world realities, are these treaties still helpful to U.S. security interests?

D. Required Readings

1. Fukuyama, Francis. "Re-Envisioning Asia." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2004).

2. Searle, Anna, and Ippei Kamae. "Anchoring trilateralism: can Australia-Japan-U.S. security relations work?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 4 (December 2004). Read pp. 464–470.

3. Tay, Simon S. C. "Asia and the United States after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Winter 2004.

4. Reveron, Derek. "U.S. Mutual Defense Commitments in Asia-Pacific." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, December 2004.

SSF-20 EUROPE AND RUSSIA

A. Focus. Europe and Russia are critically important to the United States. As allies and partners, the nations of Europe and Russia present both advantages and challenges. Within the region, the enlarging EU and Russia represent both a counterbalance to the ascendancy of China and India and areas of vital interest for security strategists and force planners. This session focuses on constants, trends, and shifts—both common and divergent—among various regional actors, as well as the critical uncertainties that will define and link this most vital of regions to the United States.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in Europe and Russia.

- Identify threats to those interests in Europe and Russia.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in Europe and Russia.

C. Guidance

1.   The European Security Strategy outlines the European view of the world—global challenges, key threats, and policy objectives. While there are similarities with the National Security Strategy of the United States, there are certainly differences as well. What is your assessment of this strategy? Can it be implemented? If so, at what cost? How does it compare to and contrast with the U.S. strategy?

2.   Lindberg offers a contrarian thesis in his article entitled "We"—that despite recent disagreements between the United States and the nations of the European Union, there is no fundamental disagreement among the members of the "Atlantic Community." Drawing his evidence from a variety of situations, including Operation Iraqi Freedom and the controversy over capital punishment, Lindberg argues that the disagreements that do exist are, in fact, indicative of a deeper, more significant consensus about the basic issues of freedom, human rights, and the importance of democracy. Do you agree with Lindberg's thesis? Why or why not? What is the future strategic significance of Europe for the United States and vice versa?

3.   McFaul warns U.S. leaders that the possibility exists for tensions to arise once again between the United States and Russia. The author outlines U.S. concerns and interests with regard to continued Russian democratization, economic stability and growth, and further non-proliferation efforts, all within the political and economic context of greater Europe. Finally, McFaul offers his perspective on the correct policies for U.S. officials to take to ensure a stable, democratic, and prosperous future for Russia. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Russian relationship today? What steps should the United States take to enhance that relationship? What is the greatest threat we face from Russia?

4.   Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO has undergone unprecedented organizational and structural change. Many observers expected NATO to crumble as the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact collapsed, but despite those expectations, the

Alliance has not only survived, but enlarged and broadened its scope and mission. Cimbalo writes that the greatest threat to the continued survival of NATO now comes from within Europe itself. He sees the integration of Europe, particularly the ratification of the existing draft European Constitution, as an irreconcilable issue that threatens to divide the transatlantic community. He outlines steps for the United States and European allies to take to force changes to the Constitution that will allow for both a common EU security policy and apparatus, and NATO, to coexist. Should the U.S. attempt these steps? Is that the only way to save NATO? Should NATO be saved at all, or should the U.S. encourage the EU in their efforts to integrate foreign and defense policy, work within that context, and let NATO fade away? What do you think?

D.   Required Readings

1.   European Union. "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy." December 12, 2003.

2.   Lindberg, Tod. "We." *Policy Review*, December 2004/January 2005.

3.   McFaul, Michael. "Reengaging Russia: A New Agenda." *Current History*, October 2004.

4.   Cimbalo, Jeffrey L. "Saving NATO from Europe." *Foreign Affairs*, November/ December 2004.

SSF-21 THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A. Focus. With the first step of European explorers on the tropical beaches of San Salvador in 1492, the people and lands of the western hemisphere began a long and often violent evolution toward the vibrant, rich, and complex group of nation states we now call the Americas. In recent history, world events have often diverted the attention of the United States to the east and to the west as monumental struggles of the twentieth century understandably occupied our nation's attention. Almost unnoticed, however, while the United States was preoccupied with Europe and Asia, our neighbors in Canada, in Mexico, the Caribbean, Central and South America have become very important to the economic as well as physical security of the United States. It is likely for example that Brazil, a growing regional nuclear and economic power, will soon acquire significant influence in some form on the UN Security Council. Moreover, Canada has recently assumed a very different and independent foreign policy that is not necessarily in line with U.S. national security interests. While there are many factors uniting the Americas, there are some recent disturbing developments that are now threatening the stability of the hemisphere. Economic problems affect many countries and threaten the possibility of enacting free trade agreements within the hemisphere. More traditional, transnational challenges such as trafficking of illegal drugs, political corruption, illegal immigration and money laundering become even more relevant—and dangerous— in the U.S. war against global terrorism. The political stability of the region is in flux with recent presidential elections in Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia—where many candidates built their (successful) campaigns on anti–United States and anti-globalization platforms. Adding to the complexity of U.S. hemisphere engagement is China's aggressive economic activity combined with its strong pursuit of oil contracts with Venezuela and Canada. It remains to be seen how the political rhetoric and regional interests will ultimately impact U.S. foreign policy in the hemisphere. What is certain is that the United States must work harder to better understand the extraordinary people and culture that make up the complex region of the world known as the Americas.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in the Western Hemisphere.

- Identify threats to those interests in the Western Hemisphere.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in the Western Hemisphere.

C. Guidance

1.   General Henry Medina Uribe of the Colombian Army has extensive experience not only in his country's "war on drugs" but also in dealing with the many additional security issues he says threatens the underlying security of Latin America. He feels security cannot be seen as a variable, independent and isolated from political, economic, and social sectors—sectors where so many of the regions challenges lie. General Medina proposes the region works together with the United States to strengthen weak institutions, develop a fair and balanced economic trade policy, reform out-dated militaries, and develop regional collective security cooperation. He argues that only by taking a holistic and collective approach to hemispheric challenges will real progress be

made. Does the United States view hemispheric security only through the lenses of terrorism and illegal drugs? How best can the United States strengthen weak hemispheric democracies? Does a bilateral, regional or hemispheric approach to foreign policy best suit U.S. interests?

2.   Brazil is undoubtedly an emerging power within the western hemisphere. While Brazil is suspected of having aspirations of becoming a nuclear power, it is a fact that Brazil is actively seeking—and might receive—a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Approximately 25 percent of Brazilian exports ship to the United States. Almost 28 percent of Brazilian imports arrive from the United States. Clearly the two countries are important to each other. Peter Hakim believes U.S. influence in Latin America must originate with Brazil. From important hemispheric trade agreements to cooperation in the war on terror, Hakim says the United States must have Brazil's support for any progress to occur. According to Hakim, the best way to guarantee Brazil's support for the U.S. international agenda is to ensure the success of Brazil's domestic economy. How best can the U.S. act to strengthen the Brazilian economy? Should the U.S. support Brazil's quest for a seat on the UN Security Council? What should the U.S. expect from Brazil in return for support on regional and global trade and security issues? Is it possible for the U.S. to isolate Brazil through bi-lateral engagement in the hemisphere?

3.   Often lost in the rush to define security relationships in the Americas is the question of the role of Canada. Though Canada's foreign policy, economy, culture, and security interests are inextricably linked to those of the United States, many Canadians have expressed concern with the close relationship, particularly in a post–Cold War environment with the United States as the lone global superpower. Dwight Mason believes U.S.-Canadian relations should be based on several key "big ideas." These include the idea that both country's security depends on the cooperation of the other, that this idea should be institutionalized, that cooperation should be "operational." Mason points out however that there are obstacles to this cooperation. In Mason's second article, he proposes close cooperation between Canada and the United States with respect to NORAD and suggests a renewal of the NORAD agreement will strengthen defense ties between traditional allies. Is it realistic to view Canada and the United States as a common area for defensive purposes? How significant a problem is asymmetry in the two country's military capabilities? What might be the impact on Canadian-U.S. relations if Canada decides to de-link its foreign policy and national security from that of the United States? Should the United States assume all security responsibility for Canada and develop a policy of "fortress North America?" Has this already been done? If so, at what cost?

4.   The United States has strong economic interests in Latin America and Canada. Going back to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has considered the Western hemisphere to be its "back yard" and for the most part has been successful in dominating the hemisphere's economic and political agenda. All this is about to change. Two articles from the *New York Times* and one from *The Economist* highlight a perhaps troubling economic trend: the encroachment of a rising China on the economic affairs of Canada and Latin America. If China is viewed as a peer competitor, then its efforts to secure large energy and trade contracts with heretofore somewhat exclusive economic partners of the United States must be viewed with concern. This raises larger issues of how the United States should conduct hemispheric economic policy and to what extent regional trade agreements should be pursued to counter Chinese economic influence in the region. Is Chinese interest in Latin American and Canadian resources a concern for U.S. policy makers? How should the U.S. respond to Chinese economic competition in its "back yard?"

D. Required Readings

1.   Medina Uribe, General Henry, Colombian Army. "Ideas for Constructing A New Framework of Hemispheric Security." The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2003.

2.   Hakim, Peter. "The Reluctant Partner." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004.

3.   Where Does Canada Fit? Mason, Dwight N. "Trade and Security in North America," *Hemisphere Focus* 12, no. 9 (July 2, 2004): pp 1–4; and "Canada and the U.S. Missile Defense System," *Hemisphere Focus* 12, no. 1 (January 9, 2004): pp 1–2.

4.   The China Challenge. Rohter, Larry. "China Widens Economic Role in Latin America." *New York Time*s, November 20, 2004, pp. 1–4. Romero, Simon. "China Emerging as U.S. Rival for Canada's Oil." *New York Times*, December 23, 2004, pp. 1–4. "Magic, or Realism?" *The Economist*, December 29, 2004, pp. 1–3.

SSF-22 AFRICA

A. Focus. As stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy, "In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty." Africa is an increasingly important region to U.S. strategists and policymakers. There are a multitude of challenges facing leaders of African nations, ranging from pandemics such as AIDS to environmental disasters. Armed conflict, both intrastate and interstate, is common, often fueled by quarrels over resources and religious differences. Terrorism is also a growing concern as radical Islam finds fertile soil in many countries. While fragile democracies are emerging, governance issues remain for many on the African continent. Evolving demographic issues, coupled with high mortality rates in a number of nations, present daunting challenges for local leaders attempting to foster enduring economic and social development. Whether the concern is future basing rights or averting humanitarian disasters, Africa is becoming more significant to both American and European foreign and defense policy makers.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and allied interests in Africa.

- Identify threats to those interests in Africa.

- Analyze and evaluate alternative strategies to protect and advance U.S. and allied interests in Africa.

C. Guidance

1. The African Union (AU), founded in 1999, is the follow-on institution to the Organization for African Unity (OAU). One of the principal organs of the AU is the Peace and Security Council. This Solemn Declaration is the Council's 2004 statement regarding the importance and development of a common African policy regarding important issues of defense and security. In it, the Council seeks to define the nature of security, common threats to that security, inter- and intra-state conflicts, and the objectives and goals of the Policy. This Declaration stands as the most comprehensive statement to date on the topic, and is complemented by a number of subsequent, additional Protocols and Declarations. However, the AU has faced many challenges in bringing this Policy to bear on the numerous ongoing conflicts across the continent, stating in May 2004 that "unfortunately, some of these (protocols and declarations) have not been fully implemented." What is your assessment of this Policy? Can the political institutions of the African Union, and the heads of state and government of the member states, actually implement it? If the states can bring full implementation to pass, how would life in Africa change?

2. Carson, a former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, offers his view of what United States policy should be in Africa. His prescription includes a broad range of initiatives, including deepening democratization efforts across the continent, encouraging economic reform, and playing an enhanced role in conflict resolution. Do you agree with Ambassador Carson's assessment? How would you prioritize the seven pillars he advocates? Should the U.S. pursue this policy, or another policy, in a unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral way? What role, if any, should the African Union or the United Nations play with regard to U.S. policy in Africa?

3.   Lyman and Morrison examine the state of the terrorist threat in Africa today. Advocating "a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism in Africa," the authors describe recent terrorist attacks, and focus on terrorist cells and locations on the continent. Like Klare and Volman, the authors also recommend U.S. policy changes to more effectively fight terrorism in Africa, particularly the greater Horn of Africa, by addressing political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of the U.S.-African relationship. Do you agree with their arguments? What is the best approach for the United States to take in the war on terror in Africa?

4.   Africa is rich in natural resources, many of which are of great economic and strategic importance to the United States. Klare and Volman focus on oil as a critical commodity for the U.S., and examine the consequences of African oil for both the producing nations and the United States. Calling such production "a perennial source of instability," the authors describe possible U.S. policy changes that could enhance stability, and the negative impacts of continued U.S. dependency on petroleum. What do you think of Klare and Volman's assertions? Do their policy prescriptions make sense? Do you see any threats to continued oil production in Africa? If so, how will those threats affect the United States or our allies?

5.   In his article, Collier draws his conclusions from a groundbreaking study of civil conflict over the last forty years that reveals that economic forces such as chronic poverty and the destabilizing effects of the trade in natural resources such as "conflict diamonds" are more directly responsible for civil wars than ethnic tensions and old political feuds. According to the author, democracy does not necessarily reduce the risk of civil war, especially in low-income countries. Do you agree? Can you think of any examples to the contrary? Can the international community do anything to stabilize the process of extracting resources from politically and socially fragile regions without triggering civil conflict? Can sanctions be effectively employed in this context as a punitive measure?

D.   Required Readings

1.   African Union, Peace and Security Council. "Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy." African Union website, February 2004, pp. 1–10.

2.   Carson, Johnnie. "Shaping U.S. Policy on Africa: Pillars of a New Strategy." INSS/NDU Strategic Forum, Sept 2004.

3.   Lyman, Princeton N., and J. Stephen Morrison. "The Terrorist Threat in Africa." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004.

4.   Klare, Michael T., and Daniel Volman. "Africa's Oil and American National Security." *Current History*, May 2004.

5.   Collier, Paul. "The Market for Civil War." Chapter 31 in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

SSF-23 THE FUTURE OF WAR

A. Focus. Section E of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course concentrates on concepts, issues, and methodologies related to the development of future military strategy and force structure. This lesson seeks to explore, through vigorous debate, the nature and style of future warfare—to examine contrasting notions of conflict that might cause the U.S. to rethink its military strategy and force structure. Key elements of this debate include technology and conflict trends, that many argue help characterize future war; recent operational lessons, which others proclaim definitive when examining views of future war; and the evolving nature of threats likely to challenge U.S. interests across the globe. What will future war look like? What parts of war and conflict have changed and what have remained the same? Are there new demands in warfare that require us to change the way we do business? What are the implications for how we plan forces and employ them in conjunction with other instruments of power?

B. Objectives

- Consider the alternative views of the future of war and examine their strategic assumptions.

- Assess the relevance of these views to strategy.

- Evaluate how these views should determine the selection of future military forces.

C. Guidance

1. Max Boot addresses the evolution of "The American Way of War" from one of the grinding strategy of attrition that U.S. generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat to an emerging method of quickness and versatility. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like. Is this characterization correct? Why or why not?

2. Kagan critiques what he argues is a "target-set" mentality in the new American way of war. He contends that stabilization operations will be more important in the future, and emphasizes the requirement for the human element to ensure success in future war. Accordingly, "War and Aftermath" is a pointed critique of the transformation efforts. Kagan examines the tension of trying to transform the military while it is "stretched," by ongoing operations. Is he correct that war can not be solely about target sets and omnipotent intelligence systems? Compare and contrast the arguments made by Boot and Kagan. What does the divergence of these perspectives say about perceptions of future war? Is information warfare the central challenge of future war? Do you agree with Kagan that ignoring the human element will continue to threaten ability to gain success in war?

3. Nadia Schadlow argues that the establishment of political and economic order is integral to war, not adjunct to it. Military and political leaders need to distinguish between governance operations and activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur independently of war. Schadlow argues that labeling political and economic reconstruction as a

postwar problem muddles the fact that central to strategic victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the creation of a favorable political order which can only be overseen and administered by U.S. military forces. Schadlow points out that while the United States has historically been wary of the military conducting governance operations, no other organization has the capability to succeed at these operations. Finally, Schadlow challenges the U.S. Army to reconsider its doctrine and organization with respect to political and economic reconstruction efforts and she looks to Joint Forces Command to revaluate the way the Joint Force approaches conflict termination. What are the implications for force planning if Schadlow is correct? Should the United States have standing forces to conduct governance operations and what are the implications of this approach? What are the roles of the State Department and the Department of Defense and how should these roles be assigned and supervised?

4. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes argues that practitioners of fourth-generation warfare ("4GW") seek to bypass an opposing (and often overwhelming) military force and strike directly at cultural, political, or population targets. Have recent events proven this reasoning accurate? What is the relevance of these arguments to the selection and employment of future military forces? Is this really anything new?

5. Stephen Biddle, in the introduction to his book *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, makes the case that analytical estimates of military capability are both flawed and misleading when they are used to predict the outcomes of military conflict. He contends that the most reliable indicator of success is not the relative balance of military weapons or manpower, but instead the methods used by nation-states to employ those forces in battle. He suggests that the victors in future conflicts will be those who employ forces according to the "modern system." This thesis strikes at the heart of the administration's efforts to transform the U.S. armed forces through the "revolution in military affairs." Do you agree with Biddle that success in future wars belongs to those who are more effective at employing their forces, or to those who possess the most daunting firepower, people, and technology? Why or why not?

D. Required Readings

1. Boot, Max. "The New American Way of War." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003.

2. Kagan, Frederick W. "War and Aftermath." Chapter 46 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read only the first two pages, pp. 623–624, and the last two sections, "Long Distance Strategy" and "Back to Clausewitz," pp. 644–645.

3. Schadlow, Nadia. "War and the Art of Governance." Chapter 47 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

4. Hammes, Thomas X. "4th Generation Warfare." *Armed Forces Journal*, May 2004.

5. Biddle, Stephen. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 1–5.

SSF-24   APPROACHES TO FORCE PLANNING

A.   Focus. This part of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course concentrates on concepts, issues, and methodologies related to the development of future military strategy and force structure. Force planning is the inter-temporal art of translating strategy into force structure. The objective of force planning is to create a force of the size and mix in necessary to achieve the ends of strategy across the spectrum of conflict. Force planning must answer, at a minimum, three questions: 1) What characteristics should the force possess? 2) How much is enough? 3) What risks are associated with the force and how can we manage them?

This session reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches or methodologies for planning future military capabilities. We begin with an overview of the competing force planning approaches. We then offer several specific methodologies, illustrated by specific planning cases, for defining and sizing military forces. These include threat-based scenarios, capabilities-based planning, a force planning methodology focused on the demanding peacetime presence requirements, and finally a way of blending the approaches.

B.   Objectives

- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to force planning.

- Evaluate specific force planning methodologies and illustrative cases.

C.   Guidance

1.   In the second part of "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," Bartlett, Holman, and Somes discuss various approaches to force planning. These approaches range from capabilities-based planning to fiscally-based planning. For most of the past decade the U.S. Department of Defense has emphasized the use of scenarios and potential threats as the basis for planning. The Bush administration has shifted from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. The emphasis on transformation suggests that technology may also be a significant driver. The services have long stressed core competencies and missions as major force planning drivers. Cynics invariably argue that, in the end, all force planning is fiscally driven. Based on your military experience, do you believe that a single approach tends to dominate the others? Are sound force planning decisions most often the result of incorporating more than one approach?

2.   Davis provides a methodology for capabilities-based force planning, the approach favored by the current Secretary of Defense and his team. While pointing out that capabilities-based planning is not new and includes elements evident in threat-based planning, he offers a conceptual framework that he argues goes beyond the constraints of that approach. His methodology includes an approach to assessing the challenging security environment that he suggests offers a more relevant set of operational challenges that future forces will face. His approach includes looking at attributes within the design space of different scenarios to establish the validity of various requirements. Among other conclusions he states that many capabilities need to be specified in "continuous spaces" in terms of capability "envelopes." Do you agree with the analogy he uses between the designer of a building working with a customer to determine the general attributes of the building, and what force planners must do to assess

general broad needs for the future military? Will his approach lead to forces that are characterized by increased levels of flexibility, robustness, and adaptability as he suggests?

3.   Owens outlines an overall "logic" for generating a future force structure that attempts to answer the two central questions of force planning: what capabilities are necessary to ensure that our force structure can do what we ask it to in the future; and "how much is enough"? Does the "logic of force planning" that Owens describes here make sense? Is Owens correct in suggesting that the range of desired capabilities should be determined first, and only then should scenarios be used to decide how much of each capability is needed? Is there a danger with this approach that the military will be always looking for more capabilities than it can afford?

4.   In preparation for the 2001 QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a QDR working group at National Defense University, the purpose of which was to build intellectual capital for the forthcoming review. In its preliminary report, this working group under the direction of Michele Flournoy developed four defense strategies that illustrated a methodology for prioritizing strategic requirements in order to properly size a force structure. Although written before 9/11, the methodology remains relevant. The chapter demonstrates that different prioritizations of requirements among, e.g. Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Major Theater Wars (MTWs), and Homeland Security (HLS), results in different force structures. By establishing relative priorities among strategic requirements, the force planner can see that "lesser included missions" may not be adequately funded especially if they are part of the lowest priority categories.

5.   Flournoy et al. outline a methodology for assessing risk. In general, strategic military risk is the overall probability that a state's military forces will be unable to achieve the objectives of its defense strategy. Measuring risk is a function of assessing two variables: the likelihood that an event will occur; and the magnitude of the undesired consequences. As the consequences of failure increase, the degree of risk that can be tolerated decreases. Strategic risk comprises 1) operational risk (which includes force performance risk and sustainability risk), 2) force preparation risk (do planners hedge or transform), and 3) affordability risk. How does the strategist and force planner assess trade-offs among these categories?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning." Chapter 2 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read only second half of chapter, pp. 23–33 (starting at "Alternative Approaches to Force Planning").

2.   Davis, Paul K. "Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation." Chapter 36 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

3.   Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning." Chapter 33 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004. Read the second part of the chapter, pp. 488–496.

4.   Flournoy, Michèle A. "Alternative Approaches to Force Sizing." Chapter 35 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

5.   Flournoy, Michèle A. "Assessing Risk in the QDR." Chapter 40 in *Strategy and Force Planning*. 4th ed. Edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004.

SSF-25   THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

A.   Focus. Congress requires the president to regularly publish an unclassified *National Security Strategy*. There is no corresponding statutory requirement for either the *National Defense Strategy* or the *National Military Strategy*, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has issued the latter since the early 1990s and the Secretary of Defense has now begun to publish the former. These documents, as well as those dealing with transformation and joint operational concepts, are intended to help translate national policy into military strategy and forces.

B.   Objectives

- Understand the major elements of the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), and Joint Operations Concepts.

- Critically analyze these documents, ascertaining their strengths and weaknesses.

- Evaluate the effectiveness of these documents in determining the proper size and mix of future military forces.

C.   Guidance

1.   The National Defense Strategy is a new addition to the list of DoD documents. It is intended to provide a more direct link between the National Security Strategy and the NMS. It lays out America's strategic objectives, articulates the ways by which the United States will achieve those objectives, and discusses implementation of the strategy. A major NDS innovation is to establish categories of challenges: traditional state vs. state warfare; irregular—unconventional warfare, e.g. insurgency; catastrophic—an adversary's acquisition of WMD or the like; and disruptive—an adversary that develops a breakthrough technology to negate current U.S. advantages. The NDS also points the way ahead to force planning by describing the desired capabilities and attributes of a future joint force. Given the publication of the NSS and the NMS, is this document necessary? What does it add that can't be found in the other documents?

2.   The National Military Strategy outlines the strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States. Highlights include: an increased emphasis on homeland defense; a shift from "threat-based" to "capabilities-based" planning; replacing the requirement to prevail in two "nearly-simultaneous" major theater wars with the requirement to "decisively [defeat] an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations;" and an enhanced focus on transforming the U.S. military to a twenty-first century force capable of responding to a variety of threats across the spectrum of conflict. Is this document useful to the strategist and force planner? Why or why not? Does it flow logically from the NSS and NDS?

3.   The Department of Defense Office of Transformation, until recently headed by retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, published Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach in order to provide a more detailed analysis in support of the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG). The document lays out what Cebrowski sees as the critical underpinnings to successful modernization of the Armed Forces. How useful is the recently released National Military

Strategy as an additional guide for transforming the U.S. military into a more flexible and capable force?

4.   In Joint Operations Concepts, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlines the attributes for our future forces. All forces are to be fully integrated in the Joint Force, expeditionary, networked, able to operate in a decentralized environment, adaptable to the changing threat and missions, gains and maintains decision superiority over its opponents, and retains its lethality. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have identified four broad initial joint operations categories: major combat operations, stability operations, homeland security, and strategic deterrence. Will adoption of these categories for future operating concepts and the building of forces with the above listed attributes better enable U.S. forces to prevail in future conflicts? Will these be effective across the spectrum of conflict or are these attributes better suited for one end of the spectrum or another? One of the categories of Joint Operations Concepts is stability operations. Has DoD invested enough in this category given ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Rumsfeld, The Honorable Donald H. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, March 2005.

2.   Myers, General Richard B. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004.

3.   Cebrowski, VADM Arthur (USN, Ret.). *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, December 2003. Read only the Executive Summary, pp. 2–3. Scan remainder.

4.   Rumsfeld, The Honorable Donald H. *Joint Operations Concept*s. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 2003. Read only sections 3B–4A, pp. 14–19. Scan remainder.

SSF-26 FUTURE FORCE PLANNING EXERCISE

A. Focus. This Future Forces Planning Exercise is designed to make us think about the forces that might be available a generation from now. The force structure that will be fielded in the mid-term future must be the product of a carefully developed strategic vision and a systematic process that delivers the correct mix of military capability. Changes in warfare are inevitable. Future commanders will require tools to deal with challenges that do not exist today. The nature of this future force, fielded *after* the next decade's military, will depend on decisions made during this next decade. The security environment may be radically altered. Innovation in technology, platforms and systems will be major issues. Operational concepts and military organizations will change, perhaps radically. This session is a group exercise devoted to the development of future forces which result from using the tools provided by SSF, based on the logic of force planning.

B. Objectives

- Examine how challenges, concepts and capabilities influence the development of future forces within a predetermined scenario.

- Understand the logic behind the incorporation of new technologies into the future force.

- Appreciate what constitutes good strategic guidance as you proceed to generate future forces.

- Conduct realistic preparation for the immediately forthcoming National Security Decision Making Final Exercise (FX).

C. Guidance

1.   The future force planning exercise provides a speculative, maritime-oriented scenario in the year 2015 in which the United States faces the nation of LPC (Large Peer Competitor). LPC, having put in place a regional, comprehensive, maritime anti-access system, has moved to take control of the island nation of Islandia. The U.S. leadership has directed military action to counter this hostile move. Players are divided into teams and are asked to pick new weapons from "baskets" containing several systems. The intent is to illustrate one approach to deciding on selective systems to invest in today in order to provide the capabilities necessary for tomorrow. By focusing on a demanding future, but realistic, scenario, is it possible to pick "best" systems in which to invest a generation in advance? Do you have a better approach to offer military force planners who must determine in the next few years, which, and how much of various very expensive capabilities to invest in to ensure the U.S. military remains preeminent for the next 10 to 20 years? Is there a logic to the process that enables us to make the best possible choices, even if we can't predict the precise future security environment?

2.   Robert Kaplan adds some realism to the force planning exercise you will perform in this session by suggesting that China could be that "large peer competitor." His article in the *Atlantic Monthly* attempts to depict the strategic thought process one might encounter in PACOM Headquarters as the staff puts together a regional grand strategy and develops force structure requirements to meet the security challenges of the Pacific Theater. His intent is to suggest that

strategists must not get transfixed on today's military operations in the Middle East as they build the military after next. While the article clearly does not answer its own titular question and has been criticized as biased toward the Pacific region and U.S. Navy interests, it does offer insights into the workings of a Combatant Commander Headquarters and puts this session's exercise into a realistic context.

D.   Required Reading

1.   Somes, Timothy E. "The Future Forces Planning Exercise." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2002 edition. Read pp. 1–22. This is <u>must reading</u> before class, because there is not enough time available once the class begins to develop a good appreciation for the goals of the game or the respective orders of battle.

2.   Kaplan, Robert D. "How We Would Fight China." *Atlantic Monthly,* June 2005, as it appeared in the *Early Bird*, May 4, 2005.

ANNEX E
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING FINAL EXERCISE (FX)
STUDY GUIDE

A. Focus. The National Security Decision Making Final Exercise (FX) is the culminating event of your trimester with the National Security Decision Making Department. This event builds upon the concepts and issues examined in the three sub courses you have taken this trimester and attempts to integrate them into a whole, preparing you for the next half of your career in government service. Its intent is to generate a creative and wide-ranging strategic conversation among the members of your seminar on the subject of future U.S. Strategy and force structure in the context of the future security environment.

- **Planning Phase.** While still taking the three NSDM sub courses, seminars will be asked to begin their collective consideration of national strategy. They will be given two full days to develop a grand, or security, strategy, then a supportive and complementary national military strategy. Upon completion of the formal sub courses, the seminars will then be immersed full-time in the development of their of strategies. This Planning Phase of the FX is designed to integrate the concepts mastered in the three sub-courses and to provide the seminars a good understanding of the tools that strategists use as they put together grand strategies. Not only do the expert briefings in this phase of the exercise provide resources to the seminars, they will also highlight the principal issues and challenges faced by strategists in every element of grand strategy. Clearly, this includes an initial appreciation of the types of forces and weapons systems best suited to address requisite operational challenges, operational concepts and required capabilities. Additionally, students will be expected to possess a good understanding of how organizational cultures and ways of doing business, governmental politics, domestic and international environments, budgetary constraints, professional experience, and analytical thinking shape national security decisions and their implementation.

    The Planning Phase of the FX will examine areas that must be understood when fashioning grand strategies and supporting military force structures: intelligence, special operations forces, space, nuclear, air, land, maritime, reserves, strategic mobility, and diplomacy. In each area, subject area experts will provide presentations that address pertinent facts, including current capabilities, resource constraints, and future requirements. They will also address the complexities of interagency coordination, the friction within the decision making milieu and the challenges of fashioning realistic implementation plans. Each expert briefing will be complemented by seminar discussion designed to use the briefing material in the development of the seminar FX presentation.

    The expert briefings supporting the Planning Phase of the FX will be conducted over five days, with most sessions in the mornings. These expository sessions, normally held in either Pringle or Spruance Auditorium, are designed to provide a knowledge base on the subject area as well as an introduction to the principal challenges facing national security decision makers in each area. These faculty-led sessions will be followed directly by seminar meetings designed to incorporate this knowledge into the seminar's nascent grand strategies.

Upon completion of Planning Phase of the FX, seminars will have been exposed to the factors and forces shaping the national security decision making process in the major components of the Department of Defense. They will have been expected to apply this knowledge to their own seminar's national security and military strategy, at least in its embryonic stage.

- **Execution Phase**. During the execution phase of the FX, the seminar begins the process of building a military force structure to support the national security and military strategy developed during the planning phase of the FX. Using information and concepts provided from the DMI, PMP, and SSF curriculum combined with information presented during the nine planning phase lectures, each seminar designs a unique military force structure sufficient in size and capability to support the military requirements of the seminar's national security strategy and military strategy.

  Following the planning phase lectures, the seminar is provided three days to define its force structure and build a professional PowerPoint presentation that clearly and succinctly presents the chosen national security strategy, national military strategy, and supporting force structure. Although the seminar will work as a group to build the "seminar's strategy," all members of the seminar are expected to contribute to this process. The seminar will then present the brief to a panel of three NSDM faculty members for evaluation and grade assignment. The brief should be between 40 and 45 minutes in length allowing sufficient time for a thirty minute period of Q&A and general discussion between the seminar members and the faculty panel. More detailed guidance, including seminar deliverables and grading criteria, will be provided in two FX planning documents distributed prior to the planning phase and the execution phase.

  Following the seminar presentations, each faculty team will select one seminar to brief the next day to the NSDM Executive Panel. The Executive Panel will then select two seminar presentations to brief a panel of senior Defense and State department officials from Washington D.C. These presentations are normally given in Spruance auditorium to all students and faculty and represent the culminating event of the NSDM course.

B. Objectives of the FX

- Assess the security environment the U.S. will likely encounter in the Twenty-First century and develop a National Security Strategy to achieve and promote United States national interests as defined by the seminar.

- Develop a complementary National Military Strategy, including a corresponding force structure, to implement this strategy.

- Develop a professional presentation reflecting the above analysis, designed to persuade high-level national security decision makers of the logic and executability of this strategy.

C. Guidance

This is your chance to personally assess global threats, opportunities, and driving forces and develop a strategy you believe the United States should adapt to best achieve and promote our national interests. Your security assessment should reflect a coherent vision of the security environment that the U.S. will most likely encounter in the next ten years or through the year 2016 and the risks, threats, vulnerabilities, opportunities, driving forces, pre-determined elements, and critical uncertainties likely to confront the United States in that environment. As you work this problem, it is important to remember that resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed.

Your seminar's decisions should be in consonance with the planning considerations assigned to it in a Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum entitled "National Security Decision Making Final Exercise Guidance" distributed to you on or about 16 Sep 2005. This document will provide a schedule to guide your seminar through the NSDMEX and provide general guidance all seminars must consider as they develop their unique National Security Strategies.

This is an exercise in clear thinking. As such, we expect that you will draw on the concepts and techniques from SSF, PMP, and DMI in thinking through the various issues we ask you to address. We expect you to use the planning phase lectures as well as your personal experience to assist in building a seminar force structure to support your chosen NSS and NMS. The challenge to build a complex brief—as a group effort—is given to you by design. Your future operational assignment will almost certainly require you to formulate policy and/or resolve disputes as part of a working group, to include joint service and interagency deliberations. This exercise will require you to develop critical skills necessary to successfully contribute to and excel in a work group or team effort environment.

During your seminar's presentation, we expect you to be able to address the explicit alternatives you considered, and the criteria you used to assess those alternatives. While not all seminar ideas, concepts and decisions can realistically be presented in a 45-minute PowerPoint presentation, the seminar should be ready to defend its decisions if asked to do so. In briefing your implementation plan, we want you to identify major stakeholders inside and outside of DoD and to describe their interests and likely positions. Your ability to do so along with the logic, realism, persuasiveness, creativity, compliance with fiscal guidance, innovative use of all elements of national power, and overall professionalism of the briefings will determine the quality and grade of your seminar's presentation.

D. FX Grade

The FX is a graded event and constitutes 10% of the student's NSDM grade. All seminar members will receive the same grade as assigned by the faculty team with special consideration given to a select number of students deemed by their peers to have contributed in a more significant way. The criteria used to grade the presentation include the seminar's ability to synthesize the three subcourse concepts and demonstrate their application during the formal presentation and during the Q&A session following the brief. Additional grading criteria includes the extent to which the three parts (NSS, NMS, force structure) are in alignment and the

extent to which the seminar is successful in presenting a coherent, complete, professional, and defensible brief to the faculty team. Additional guidance and detailed grade assignment procedures will be distributed with the first required reading listed in section E below.

E. Required Readings

1. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum (Subject: National Security Decision Making Final Exercise Initial Planning Guidance). To be distributed to your mailboxes on or about 16 Sep 2005—provides basic guidance for the Planning Phase of the exercise.

2. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department Memorandum (Subject: National Security Decision Making Final Exercise PR Guidance). To be distributed to your mailboxes on or about 21 Oct 2005—provides NWC "PR-07" with notional platform and funding streams for FY 07-11 for seminar baseline force structure considerations.

FX-1   SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT, NATIONAL INTERESTS & STRATEGIC CHOICES

A.   Focus. This session begins the FX process and asks the seminar to conduct an assessment of the global security environment and reach consensus on a seminar grand strategy, U.S. national interests and key elements of a supporting national security strategy. The seminar should assess global challenges, threats, opportunities, and driving forces and determine the relationship between the various geographic regions and the national interests of the United States. By the end of this session, the seminar should have defined what the seminar believes to be the U.S. national interests, completed a general security assessment of the global environment and defined the critical elements of the seminar national security strategy.

The FX-1 session offers the seminar the first of five dedicated classroom days to reach consensus on a National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and military force structure and to build a succinct, supporting PowerPoint presentation reflecting the seminar's strategy. This session and the FX-2 session are scheduled several weeks before the planning phase lectures (FX 4–12) to allow the seminar time to complete an assessment of the security environment and begin building the seminar's NSS and NMS. While there is no required deliverable for FX-1, keep in mind the seminar is required to present a "status" brief to the faculty teaching team during the afternoon of the FX-2 session. It is important for the seminar to reach a general consensus on a NSS and a NMS prior to beginning the Planning Phase lecture series.

While no two seminars will end the day at exactly the same place, experience indicates those seminars ending the day with these three above objectives near completion are better positioned to build a corresponding NMS during FX-2 and a matching force structure during the dedicated exercise week (FX 13–15). Seminars are encouraged to consult their faculty teaching teams during the exercise to ensure interim exercise goals are being met.

B.   Objectives

- Assess the security environment the U.S. will likely encounter in the next 10 years (2006–2016).

- Reach consensus on the national interests of the United States.

- Determine the seminar's grand strategy and build a National Security Strategy to advance and, when necessary, defend our nation's interests and objectives.

C.   Guidance

1.   During FX-1, the seminar should organize itself in a way to most efficiently complete the desired objectives. While no two seminars will organize the same way, it is common for the seminar to distribute tasks to subgroups (geographic region assessments, national interests, NSS) for analysis and then regroup at some point to brief results and begin group discussions in order to reach consensus on major issues.

2. As issues are discussed and consensus obtained, the seminar should capture the concepts either on the classroom board or in PowerPoint format on the classroom computer. There is no deliverable required following FX-1; however the seminar is required to present a status brief to the faculty team during the afternoon of FX-2.

D. Required Reading

1. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum of 16 Sep 2005 (Subject: National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance). To be distributed to your mailboxes on or about 16 Sep 2005. This document provides basic guidance for the Final Exercise.

FX-2   NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus. This session builds on FX-1 where the seminar assessed the global security environment, determined U.S. national interests and began the development of a seminar National Security Strategy. This session requires the seminar to continue to build a National Military Strategy defining the military's role in the seminar's unique NSS already developed in FX-1. It is imperative for the seminar to reach general consensus on a NSS and NMS by the end of this session as the Planning Phase lectures (FX 4–12) will build on these two important seminar visions of the strategic future of the United States. The seminar is required to present a status brief to the faculty teaching team during the afternoon of the FX-2 session. The status briefing schedule should be determined by the faculty team and the seminar leader.

A. Objectives

- Review the assessment of the global security environment, national interests and the seminar's NSS developed in session FX-1.

- Develop a NMS to support the goals and objectives of the NSS.

- Begin/Continue building a PowerPoint presentation to document the NSS and NMS.

- Present a NSS/NMS status brief to faculty teaching team.

B. Guidance

1.   Continue seminar discussion in order to reach consensus on a National Military Strategy. If time permits, begin preparation for the Planning Phase lecture series by building initial force structure concepts to include specific military capabilities your seminar requires to effectively support your NSS and NMS. The seminar should make every effort to agree on a general National Military Strategy by the end of this session.

2.   Present a status brief to the seminar faculty team at a time determined by the faculty and the seminar leader. The format for the status brief is left to the seminar to decide, however it is recommended that a PowerPoint shell brief be developed to support the remaining concept development phases of the FX.

C. Required Readings

Review initial Guidance Memorandum of 16 Sep 2005 to ensure all required issues are addressed as well as any issues provided in PR supplemental guidance (if provided by faculty team).

FX-3   OSD GUEST SPEAKER; PENTAGON PR PROCESS & ISSUES

A. Focus. A senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense will discuss major resource and program issues the OSD Staff is currently addressing for the Secretary and provide an up to date assessment of the current fiscal environment.

B. Objectives

- Understand the major challenges facing OSD Program and Budget personnel. Assess the briefing in light of the frameworks and analytical decision-making techniques you have studied this trimester.

- Integrate, if applicable, those challenges addressed by the OSD representative into the seminar's debate and analytical process.

C. Guidance

1. As you listen to the speaker, also consider: How well has OSD defined the problem? Does the OSD staff appear to have considered a wide range of alternatives? What criteria does OSD appear to have used in evaluating alternatives?

2. As you listen to the discussion of the major issues, think about the reconciliation challenges the Secretary faces in the context of the U.S. political economy.

3. With respect to each issue, ask yourself: Who are the internal and external stakeholders? What are their interests?

4. Because you and your seminar have by now developed your own NSS and NMS, contrast the approaches you envision that your seminar will use with what you hear from the OSD representative.

5. This is an opportunity to use the SSF, PMP, and DMI frameworks as the basis for assessment of ongoing resource allocation and transformation issues in the Pentagon. How will your seminar approach these and other issues like them in the context of your assessment of the future geostrategic environment and the NSS and NMS your seminar develops?

D. Required Readings. None.

FX-4   INTELLIGENCE

A. Focus

> "Victory is an elusive prize, bought with blood rather than brains. Intelligence is
> the handmaiden, not the mistress, of the warrior."
> —John Keegan, *Intelligence in War* (2003)

Strategy cannot be produced without a proper assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, challenges, and opportunities. The U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is charged with assessing the security environment and providing warriors and policymakers the information they need to defend and advance national interests. Composed of fifteen different government entities, the USIC focuses almost exclusively on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents. While each entity focuses on issues and areas of its own expertise, national centers such as the National Counter Terrorism Center, and virtual communities attempt to link managers, analysts, and collectors to produce finished intelligence products. Recent changes in the law have attempted to harmonize the intelligence community by empowering a single cabinet-level official to oversee the large USIC and rationalize the intelligence cycle.

Fundamentally, the intelligence cycle includes five interrelated parts: planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Planning is a management effort that translates consumers' needs into intelligence targeting, often referred to as intelligence requirements. Collection is the process by which data are gathered either through technical or human means. Processing makes the intelligence data usable for analysts (e.g., decrypting, translating, etc). Analysis enriches the basic information with all that is known about a particular subject to produce finished intelligence products. And dissemination is the process by which intelligence products are shared with and directed to the end users with a need to know that information.

Each step in the intelligence cycle presents its own unique challenge that requires concepts and capabilities to overcome. For example, the value of signals intelligence (SIGINT) is based on the ability to decrypt a target's transmission. Yet the future of quantum cryptography might make SIGINT collection obsolete or prohibitively expensive. The means to overcome the challenge might involve an increased human intelligence (HUMINT) effort. Or in the case of SIGINT, the challenge is translating the high volume of collection, which limits material to be analyzed. The capability to overcome this challenge is increasing the number of translators or automating the process. Finally, in the case of dissemination, a contemporary challenge is disseminating classified information to law enforcement officers in the United States. One solution is through the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) concept that co-locates defense, federal, and local law enforcement in a particular location to facilitate sharing.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend America's current intelligence capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security Strategy.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities in intelligence as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategy for the FX. Develop elements of a strategy for evaluating progress towards improving homeland security.

C. Guidance

1. Martin Petersen sees two certainties within the intelligence community. First, the consequences for drawing wrong conclusions from intelligence grow every day. Second, sooner or later intelligence will be wrong. By beginning with a flawed understanding of intelligence capabilities, Petersen challenges consumers and producers of intelligence to understand the limits of it. Further, he offers a more nuanced standard for evaluating intelligence then simply it is right or wrong. Finally, he poses the classic national security question, "how much is enough?"

D. Required Reading

1. Petersen, Martin. "What We Should Demand from Intelligence." In *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges*. Edited by Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004.

E. Reference Readings

1. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities." December 4, 1981. (This Presidential order establishes the basic goals, duties, and responsibilities with respect to the national intelligence effort, describes the conduct of intelligence activities, and provides general provisions for the intelligence community. Part 1.1 defines the role for intelligence: "The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of the United States national interests from foreign security threats." Central to this mission, the EO emphasizes "analytical competition" among elements of the intelligence community. It is available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/eo12333.htm.)

2. DoD Directive 5240.1 "DoD Intelligence Activities." (This directive is the implementation of EO 12333 and is foundational for all DoD intelligence matters. It is available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d52401_042588/d52401p.pdf.)

3. Executive Order "Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community," August 27, 2004. (Updating the 23-year old EO 12333 and responding to the 9/11 Commission Report, the amendment strengthens the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in an effort to unify the national intelligence effort to "ensure that U.S. intelligence collection activities are integrated." Among the many changes, the new authority authorizes the DCI to translate intelligence objectives into specific guidance for the intelligence community, establish national centers to integrate intelligence efforts across departments, and grants the DCI access "to all foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, and national intelligence . . . that is relevant to transnational terrorist threats and weapons of mass destruction." It is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-6.html.)

4.   Summary of S. 2845, "Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," 17 December 2004. (Signed into law on December 17, 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 implements the core recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The comprehensive bill highlights the range of changes made to existing law such as establishing a Director of National Intelligence, promoting economic development in the Near East, and improving the standard for transliterating Arabic into a Roman alphabet. It is available at http://www.c-span.org/pdf/s2845confrept.pdf.)

5.   Congressional Research Service, "The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch," April 18, 2002. (The *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act* or the USA PATRIOT Act was signed into law 45 days after the 9/11 attack. The act gives federal law enforcement greater authority to intercept and exploit communications, new regulatory powers to combat money laundering, and establishes new crimes for use against domestic and international terrorists. To promote greater integration of counterterrorist activities, the Act eases restrictions on foreign intelligence and criminal intelligence sharing. It is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.)

FX-5   SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A. Focus. American Special Operations Forces (SOF) can trace their lineage to Rogers' Rangers during the French and Indian War and have long played a role in U.S. defense planning. After Vietnam however, U.S. SOF went into decline. While almost every other military in the world placed a premium on SOF experience for their leadership, a SOF background often became a hindrance to those rising to high command. U.S. SOF reached their nadir during Desert One, the 1980 debacle in the Iranian desert. After that disaster, Congress mandated changes in SOF that have rejuvenated America's special operations capability, creating a deputy secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict and more importantly, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which provides U.S. SOF with their own budget.

The extensive use of SOF in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the degree to which such forces have become a major source of combat power over the last decade. SOF are truly high demand/low density (HD/LD) forces. In addition, the Secretary of Defense recently expanded the authority of USSOCOM to conduct the ongoing war against worldwide terrorist networks. What is the role of SOF in the future? Will they need to expand? Will, as some have predicted, conventional forces become more SOF-like, operating as SOF did in Afghanistan—in small, mobile, dispersed teams that call in fires from out of theater. What are the implications of such changes?

B. Objectives

- Comprehend America's current special operations capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities in special operations forces as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX.

- Assess the practicality and affordability of these forces to meet the challenges of 21st century war, including the war against terrorist organizations.

C. Guidance

1.   The article by Gordon is an example of the emerging idea that SOF in conjunction with airpower and allies on the ground provide the model for future conflict. Is this model applicable across the spectrum of conflict? Will SOF displace conventional ground forces in the future? Some service innovations, e.g., the Marine Corps' "Hunter-Warrior" concept, envision a more SOF-like force. Is this a good idea? Why or why not?

2.   Stephen Biddle cautions against an over-reliance on precision weapons at the expense of a robust land force. Using what he describes as "the Afghan Model," Biddle discusses the issues still facing land forces in our time. What are the risks of relying on air-delivered, precision weapons? Was the war in Afghanistan a harbinger for the end of conventional ground forces as we know them? Why or why not?

3.   Rowan Scarborough outlines recent changes in Defense Department policy designed to enable U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to plan and fight the global war against

terrorist networks. One important change is to make USSOCOM a "supported" command under certain circumstances. What does this expansion of responsibility mean for U.S. forces in general and USSOCOM in particular? Is USSOCOM being stretched too thin? Are more SOF necessary?

4.   Breen addresses the issue of expanding the size of SOF and concludes that such a step is easier said than done. Because the training is so rigorous, time intensive, and focused on leaving no room for error, it takes at least two years to produce a SOF soldier. The difficulty of producing a SOF soldier is matched by the increasing difficulty of retaining him. Many SOF soldiers are leaving the service, enticed by the salaries they can command from contractors such as Black Water. What is the answer to this critical problem?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Gordon, Michael R. "'New' US War: Commandos, Airstrikes and Allies on the Ground." *New York Times*, December 29, 2001, p. 1.

2.   Biddle, Stephen. "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare." *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 2, (Mar/Apr 2003): pp. 31–39.

3.   Scarborough, Rowan. "Rumsfeld Bolsters Special Forces: Expands Powers in War on Terror." *Washington Times*, 6 January 2003.

4.   Breen, Tom. "The 'In-Demand' Force." *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 2005): pp. 26–28.

E.   Supplementary Reading

1.   U.S. Special Operations Command. "United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement 2003-2004," www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic.

FX-6   SPACE AND NUCLEAR

A.   Focus. This session will consider the planning challenges and opportunities posed by nuclear weapons and space. First, space systems are crucial for U.S. global military operations in terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command, control, and communications (C^3); ballistic missile launch warning and tracking; and the sensor-to-shooter kill chain that was used in Afghanistan and Iraq to destroy time-critical targets. On some levels, space is militarized and will become increasingly so in the future; and on other levels, commercial forces are playing an important role. Planning challenges for the future are likely to focus on how military and commercial systems improve the ability of space to support U.S. military capabilities as well as overcome potential threats and vulnerabilities. Critical developments today include the new strategy for space launch that was released by the White House in January 2005. In broad terms, the planning challenges involve three related considerations. The first are questions about how space supports U.S. military and commercial capabilities and the implications for future planning challenges. The second focuses on how international factors influence the use of space for military and commercial purposes. And the third examines how ongoing organizational reform (who is in charge for space planning, policy, and operations) affects U.S. space activity.

Second, U.S. nuclear strategy and force structures were shaped almost exclusively by the perceived need to deter Soviet aggression against the U.S. and its allies. Deterrence theory and nuclear strategy were based on the principle of "assured destruction" (threat of retaliation in kind) in which offensive capabilities dominated many aspects of U.S. defense policy. For the future, planning challenges are likely to focus on whether and how nuclear weapons contribute to U.S. military capabilities for managing potential threats and vulnerabilities given the proliferation and evolution of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Critical developments today include the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), renewed development of nuclear weapons (low-yield), withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, abrogation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. In broad terms, there are several critical planning challenges for nuclear weapons. The first is their relevance in the global war on terrorism. The second is whether the nature of deterrence has changed given the role of transnational actors. And the third is the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

B.   Objectives

- Comprehend America's current space and nuclear capabilities and how these can be employed in support of today's National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy

- Examine and critically assess current and possible future nuclear strategies, operational concepts, and force planning initiatives

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities in space and nuclear capabilities as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX

C. Guidance

1. The RAND study—*Strategic Appraisal* by Preston and Baker—discusses the issues related to decisions by the United States and other states to the activities that will be pursued in space over the next decade or longer. An important consideration is the general factors that influence U.S. decisions, the deliberations of the other states, and the extent to which the actions of other states influence the decision of the United States.

2. As discussed in the article by Wirtz and Russell ("A Quiet Revolution: Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century"), it is time to rethink the U.S. nuclear posture, which will be reduced substantially during the next several years. Nuclear planning, like conventional planning per the QDR, will shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach. The old offensive nuclear triad will be replaced with a new one, consisting of offensive, defensive, and infrastructure legs. In addition, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be augmented by missile defense and precision-guided conventional weapons. These developments raise several questions: Should the United States resume nuclear testing and develop new weapons? Are the proposed strategies politically sustainable? What is the effect of acquiring defensive capabilities on nuclear strategy? What are the strengths and weaknesses of alternative frameworks for nuclear weapons, and what are the risks?

D. Required Readings

1. Preston, Bob, and John Baker. "Space Challenges." In *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Edited by Zalmay Khalilzad and Jeremy Shapiro. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002, pp. 143–159. (Discusses the key issues and challenges that U.S. planners face over the issue of space activities in both the military and commercial sectors.)

2. Wirtz, James J., and James A. Russell. "A Quiet Revolution: Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 2002/2003): pp. 9–15. (Discusses the ongoing revolution in nuclear strategy given the global war on terrorism, homeland security, and uncertainty in international politics. It argues that there are new threats that must be managed and, accordingly, new opportunities to be considered in nuclear strategy.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Buchan, Glenn. "Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Strategy for a New Century." In *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Edited by Zalmay Khalilzad and Jeremy Shapiro. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002, pp. 225–274, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1314/. (Extracts from a study that reviews the history/evolution of nuclear strategies, arguments for and against nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy options, force reductions and de-alerting, changes in nuclear use options, proliferation, nuclear infrastructure, and strategy recommendations.)

FX-7   LAND

A.   Focus. In the search for a "peace-dividend" following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States dramatically reduced the size of the Army, and to a lesser extent, the Marine Corps. The active duty component of the Army fell from a 16 Division force to a 10 Division force, while the Marine Corps reduced from 200,000 to 172,000 Marines. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, America's ground forces have been increasingly stretched by combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as by maintaining traditional security arrangements in Korea, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Some members of Congress and retired Army officers have been extremely vocal in calling for an end-strength increase in the Army and Marine Corps to mitigate the increased operational tempo. The Bush administration, however, aware of the tremendous cost of military manpower, appears to have chosen to allocate scarce resources towards transformation initiatives that include a vision of smaller, more expeditionary, land forces that will have greater lethality through increased "networking" and situational awareness. What does the future hold for ground forces? The major end-items employed by the Army today (including the M1A1 Main Battle Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle), although designed in the 1970s and fielded in the 1980s, have proven to be useful and capable across the spectrum of conflict. Will current transformation efforts yield a similarly durable and multi-mission capable force? Both the Army and Marine Corps are capable of conducting ground combat operations. During the Cold War the Marine Corps was able to distinguish itself as an "expeditionary" force capable of responding to short fused contingencies while the preponderance of the Army was forward deployed to deter major war. Now it appears that the entire military establishment is seeking to acquire an expeditionary capability. How does one differentiate between the roles and missions of the Army and Marine Corps today?

B.   Objective

- Comprehend America's Land Force capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the current and future strategic challenges, concepts, and required capabilities of the Marine Corps and the Army as they relate to your seminar's National Security and Military Strategies for the FX.

C.   Guidance

1.   Col Douglas MacGregor believes that current Army transformation plans will reduce the lethality and combat power of the Army, while doing nothing to address the number and size of corps and division staffs. MacGregor offers a variation on a theme introduced in the Kagan reading in SSF. Are current transformation efforts for land forces reducing America's land combat capabilities, or do they offer the most affordable and realistic path into the 21st Century?

D.   Required Readings

1.   MacGregor, Col. Douglas, USA (ret). "Army Transformation: Implications for the Future." HASC Testimony, Congressional Record, 15 July 2004.

E.   Supplementary Readings

1.   Department of the Army. "Our Army at War: Relevant and Ready." http://www.army .mil/thewayahead/ (The new Army vision.)

2.   Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept." *Inside the Navy*, 10 December 2001, pp. 11–15. (The official description of the Marines' new operational concept.)

3.   Staff Article. "United States Marine Corps Organizations and Missions." *Sea Power*, January 2004, pp. 89–94. (A good overview of Marine Air Ground Task Force Organizations.)

4.   Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "America's Land Forces and the Requirement for an Expeditionary Capability." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2003. (A discussion of the respective roles and missions of the Marines and the Army in light of the requirement to provide an expeditionary capability.)

FX-8   AIR

A.   Focus. Airpower has become a progressively more important instrument of warfare from Desert Storm (Iraq), through Allied Force (Serbia/Kosovo), and most recently in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom). Combat airpower supports a maneuver and firepower-intensive style of warfare that may be well suited to winning conflicts with limited objectives. It is based on the concept that information and precision strike can defeat an enemy before the adversary can react to advanced technology and the speed of operational maneuver forces. The session considers the concept of using maneuver forces whenever possible to set up adversaries for timely, precise, persistent, and lethal engagement by air. Airpower has also taken the forefront in recent relief efforts for OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, aiding victims of the Tsunami disaster of December 2004, delivering supplies to locations only accessible by rotary wing and short field capable aircraft. This session also considers the role of airpower in overcoming evolving anti-access (AA) and area denial (AD) challenges that could preclude such precise and persistent fire support, as well as air refueling and re-supply operations. These considerations are used as a point of departure for analyzing future air capabilities and the role of operational, technical, and fiscal risk as well as opportunity costs.

B.   Objectives

- Comprehend America's current airpower capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities for airpower as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX.

- Assess current force structure initiatives and refine your thinking about future requirements to meet emerging operational challenges. Consider risks and opportunity costs.

C.   Guidance

1.   Scales suggests that the Air Force and Navy have perfected a firepower-focused doctrine tailored to fighting limited wars like Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom. He states that, "This new American way of war was born on the premise that technology could kill the enemy faster than the enemy could find the means to offset the overwhelming advantages of information and precision strike." Do you agree or disagree with his firepower intensive concept? Why? What are the force planning implications and how could land-based operational maneuver forces be structured and integrated to support the doctrine?

2.   Newman covers unmanned Predator operations during Iraqi Freedom. To what extent have unmanned air systems (UAV) changed air warfare and what are the force planning implications? As an example, should strike capabilities transition from manned fighters, bombers, and helicopters to unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs)? If so, how widely should they be used? What is your force planning rationale?

3. Paulsen addresses a number of issues related to aircraft carrier operations during Iraqi Freedom. They include area access and support by traditional allies/coalition members, air refueling requirements and support, close-air support and interdiction missions, suppression of enemy air defenses, airborne early warning support, and the role of aircraft carriers in the future. To what extent did maritime air operations in Iraqi Freedom support the concepts of maneuver and fire that were addressed in the Scale's article? How critical was air refueling for aircraft carrier operations and what options are available to force planners if a shortfall exists? How important were joint capabilities for suppressing enemy air defenses and should future capabilities be focused on stealth, active jamming and suppression, or combinations of the two? Did the account of air defenses over Baghdad reinforce or challenge ground-to-air threats covered by Watts?

4. Watts explains the USAF Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) concept of operations (CONOPS) for dealing with the evolving anti-access (AA) and area denial (AD) challenges. To what extent does the CONOPS support Scales' limited war doctrine and how is it related to maritime and land force CONOPS for dealing with the same AA/AD threats? Do you agree or disagree with the author's assessment concerning the political and military vulnerabilities of U.S. forward bases? Why? Also, what are the key operational, path, technical, and fiscal risks of the CONOPS and to what extent would they influence your choice of future joint air capabilities? As an example, would you shift the focus to long-range systems that integrate USAF, USN, USMC, USA capabilities for precise and persistent fire support, change the balance between manned and unmanned systems, accelerate the integration C4ISR systems, or enhance modernization of refueling and strategic airlift forces? What airpower capabilities do you think are most important for the future and where would you spend the next available dollar?

D. Required Readings

1. Scales, Robert L. "Checkmate By Operational Maneuver." *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 2001): pp. 38, 40–42. (Suggests a new American style of firepower and maneuver intensive warfare.)

2. Newman, Richard J. "The Joystick War." *U.S. News & World Report*, 19 May 2003, http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2003/e20030512184608.html. (Discusses Predator UAV operations during Iraqi Freedom.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Khalilzad, Zalmay, and Jeremy Shapiro, eds. *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002. Chapters 1–4. (Excellent reference source for future requirements of USAF airpower.)

2. Krepinevich, Andrew, Barry Watts, and Robert Work. *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003, pp. i–ii, 7–10, 11–17, 20–28. (Examines the USAF concept of operations and associated risk for dealing with the evolving Anti-Access (AA) and Area Denial (AD) challenge.)

3. Paulsen, James. "Naval Aviation Delivered in Iraq." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (June 2003): pp. 34–37. (Addresses maritime air issues in Operation Iraqi Freedom.)

4. Grier, Peter. "Follow the Money." *Air Force Magazine* (August 2004): pp. 74–76. (A review of 50 years of USAF spending.)

FX-9   MARITIME

A. Focus. *Is the United States Navy being marginalized?* Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.) examines that troubling question in our first reading. Conventional wisdom has held that as long as the United States remained committed to sustaining a position of global power it had to be engaged throughout the world, partly through the presence of the U.S. Navy. The challenges in providing that presence in the 21st century are growing as resource constraints threaten the size of the Navy, as well as changing capabilities among sister services that call into question the current mission set. In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, announced the Navy would address these challenges through Sea Power 21 (SP-21), which will enable the U.S. Navy to provide "credible, persistent combat power to the far corners of the earth without having to ask permission." Part vision, part strategy, SP-21 provides a blueprint for future capabilities and the platforms and systems need to meet the national security challenges presented in the maritime domain. In January 2005, Admiral Clark announced the U.S. Navy was not correctly balanced or optimized to meet the challenges it faces in the future. The threat of major naval engagements on the high seas has been supplanted by concerns over missile and submarine defense in the littorals of the world. To meet those changing priorities the Navy must decide whether it will build limited numbers of large, very capable, but very expensive ships, greater numbers of small, less capable, but far less expensive ships, or some mix of the two. It is also clear that the CNO's vision and operational transformation concept must be accepted and supported both internally by the Navy and externally by domestic and international partners, sponsors, and resource providers. Clearly, the U.S. Navy is changing. The questions now are how much, how fast, and in what ways?

B. Objectives

- Comprehend America's current maritime capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities of U.S. maritime forces as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX.

C. Guidance

1.   Admiral Turner states traditional navy missions are of declining importance to the national security. In the past, the Navy's role was to assure sea control, project power ashore through amphibious assault or with aircraft and guns, and contribute to the strategic nuclear retaliation triad. Admiral Turner those missions less relevant in today's security environment. Do you agree with his assessment? What are the implications for the Navy, the military, and the country if it abandons or becomes less capable of performing the missions it has in the past?

2.   Robert Work examines six key decisions facing the U.S. Navy transformation. What are the implications for the Navy as it adjusts to assure joint access in and from littoral waters? How will the Navy–Marine Corps team adjust to new ways of operating from "enhanced network sea bases"? What are the implications for Navy force structure as it builds the first-generation battle network combatants? Will the Navy embrace the concept of a force centered less on size and

capability and more on platforms that are "battle network capable" as it builds the Total Ship Battle Force of the future? What will the likely units of action be for the future Navy, will they be Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups (CSG and ESG), Surface Action Groups (SAG), and Submarine Strike Groups (SSGN's)? How will the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) influence the ways that the Navy operates and the forces used to accomplish its missions?

D. Required Readings

1.   Turner, Admiral Stansfield, USN (Retired). "Is The U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?" *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003): pp. 97–104.

2.   Work, Robert O. "Admiral Clark and Navy Transformation." In *Navy Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship.* Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004, pp. 73–84.

E. Supplementary Readings

1.   Clark, Vern. "Sea Power 21." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (October 2002): pp. 32–41. (Admiral Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, identifies the naval missions and capabilities that are critical to meeting future threats that challenge the United States in the 21st century.) Available online at http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm.

2.   "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations." January 2004. (The Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps explain how the Naval Team will enable the joint force and support the joint fight.) Available online at http://www.nwdc.navy .mil/Concepts/NOC.pdf.

3.   A comprehensive index of Navy websites, articles, and related issues can be accessed at:

http://www.navy.mil

http://www.ncts.navy.mil/nol

http://www.usni.org/magazines.html

http://www.insidedefense.com

FX-10   THE RESERVE COMPONENT

A.   Focus. The Reserve Component (RC) of the Armed Forces has always played an important role during periods of crisis and war, dating from the local militias of the American Revolution. Since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, however, the Reserve Forces and the National Guard have been an indispensable element in not only armed interventions, but normal peacetime operations as well. Today's increased reliance on the Reserve Components is a product of a number of factors: the Abrams Doctrine (inextricably linking Reserve and Active Force elements), evolving Total Force policies, the effects of force downsizing, and increasing mission demands. In fact, due to the requirements of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, NOBLE EAGLE, and IRAQI FREEDOM, there are more RC forces mobilized as a percentage of the total force than at any time since World War II. This session examines the RC's contribution to the nation's Total Force equation. In particular it considers the current administration's plans to balance the capabilities within and between the Active and Reserve Components and what changes are needed in how the Reserve Component is used. In this session we will also review the rationale behind the Abrams Doctrine and whether that doctrine is still valid in the post-Cold War security environment.

B.   Objectives

- Comprehend America's current Reserve Component capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities in the Reserve Component as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX.

- Evaluate the validity of the Abrams Doctrine to act as a "check-and-balance" in an administration's decision to go to war.

C.   Guidance

1.   Khalil and Rehberg review the rationale behind the creation of the Abrams Doctrine as well as the current administration's plans to possibly alter its effects by transformation and rebalancing of the Total Force. They conclude that elimination of the Abrams Doctrine does not appear to be warranted or justified, although it may need to be updated to address vital concerns of OSD. Is the Abrams Doctrine consistent with America's history? Is a policy that was adopted to preclude repeating mistakes made during the Vietnam conflict still valid in the current security environment? Is the Abrams Doctrine an impediment to the GWOT? Will the rebalancing of the RC, creating a force that is more involved in day-to-day operations, create a sustainable force or result in a force of decreased effectiveness?

2.   As the transformation of the DoD has progressed, it has become clear that the balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components may not be the best for the future. There is a perceived need for rebalancing to improve the responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and individuals with skills in high demand. The Global War on Terrorism has accelerated the need for change. What criteria should be used for assigning missions to the RC? Should current Federal Law be changed to make Reserve personnel less or more accessible via

involuntary mobilization? What is the proper role of the Reserve Component in Homeland Defense?

3.   It is increasingly apparent that the RC is already under considerable strain (especially in the case of the Army). Is there a danger that the RC will become a "broken" or "hollow" force? Would reconstitution and recovery be more difficult for the RC or AC? What impact would an ineffective RC have on homeland defense, disaster response, and other missions?

D.   Required Readings

1.   Khalil, Gary, and Carl Rehberg. "W(h)ither the Abrams Doctrine: Good or Bad Policy." Reserve Officers Association *The Officer* (December 2003): pp. 21–28, 55. (The authors examine the Abrams Doctrine and its evolution and analyze potential changes in the role, mix and employment of Active Component and Reserve Component Forces.)

2.   Bowman, Tom. "Army Reserve Fast Becoming 'Broken' Force." *Baltimore Sun*, January 5, 2005, and associated memo extracted from DoD *Current News Early Bird.* (In January 2005 a highly critical memo from the Commanding General of the Army Reserve was leaked to the press and initiated a bit of a firestorm over RC health.)

3.   Hoffman, Frank G. "The Future of The Guard and Reserve: Roles, Missions and Force Structure," 8 February 2005, electronic communication from Foreign Policy Research Institute, http://www.fpri.org.

E.   Supplementary Reading

1.   Defense Science Board. "Part 3: National Guard Roles and Missions." In DOD Roles and Missions for Homeland Security; Volume II—A Supporting Reports. Washington, D.C., May 2004, pp. 107–140. (Discusses novel ways the Reserve Component can support the homeland defense mission.)

F.   Other References (available on Web)

1.   Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve." Washington, D.C., 15 January 2004, http://www .defenselink.mil/ra/documents/annualreports/RebalancingForcesFinalFinalD1.pdf.   (Describes problem of current Reserve Component use and ways to ease the stress on the force.)

2.   Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "A Guide for Effective Peacetime Employment of Reserve Component Units and Individuals." Washington, D.C., November 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/annualreports/peacetimeemployment guideNOV12001.pdf. (Provides general DoD policy regarding use of the RC.)

3.   Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study." Washington, D.C., July 1999. (Report from ASD for Strategy and Threat Reduction highlighting Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies, and Major Theater Wars.)

FX-11   STRATEGIC MOBILITY

A.   Focus. A key strength of the U.S. military is the ability to project and sustain significant military power. This is supported by a robust, responsive and flexible strategic mobility system comprised of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. This session will look at the current planning challenges for the design of future strategic mobility forces. A key transformation goal of the QDR is "Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-denial environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats." Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Global War on Terrorism, on-going reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq, and a review of overseas basing posture all must be considered for their implications for future strategic mobility.

B.   Objectives

- Comprehend America's current strategic mobility capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities in strategic mobility as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX.

- Assess operational challenges to projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-denial environments and their implications for strategic mobility.

C.   Guidance

1.   Gen. John W. Handy, USAF, CDR USTRANSCOM, calls for a follow-on study to the Mobility Requirements Study-05 to determine mobility capabilities needed to support the defense strategy in the future. He suggests that lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Global War on Terrorism, among others, should be taken into account. What questions would you want addressed in this study?

2.   A year-long Mobility Capabilities Study is expected to be completed in Fall 2005. An Executive Summary of the study will be provided when available. What is your assessment of this study and its findings? Does it adequately address the operational challenges facing strategic mobility forces? What recommendations would you make with respect to new operational concepts and capabilities?

3.   Recent conflict has demonstrated the U.S. military's ability to project power on a global scale. Potential adversaries may have concluded that to oppose the U.S. they must use selected strengths against our perceived weaknesses. These vulnerabilities include the global distances U.S. forces must travel to engage anyone and the U.S. forces' near-absolute reliance on unimpeded access to and use of ports, airfields, bases, and littoral waters in the theater of conflict. In "Joint Staff Officials Order Changes to DOD-wide Seabasing Document," lessons learned at a November 2004 wargame are to be included in the "Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept." The original draft was considered lacking in terms of specifics. What is your view of operational concepts and capabilities to combat anti-access strategies?

4.   The Defense Science Board (DSB) concluded that the *Sea Power 21* Sea Basing concept represents a critical future national military capability. The Sea Base replaces or augments fixed, in-theater airports and seaports. It is an expeditionary capability that provides a maneuverable facility at sea from which tactical operations are conducted, controlled, sustained, and supplied. The study identifies capabilities and technology advances that require research and development. It states that the development of a Sea Basing capability use a spiral development process which incorporates existing current capabilities with experimentation, evaluation, and development of emerging technology and capabilities. The study emphasizes Joint participation in the development and operation of the Sea Base capability. What do you think of their proposals? What challenges does this potentially create for the individual services?

D. Required Readings

1.   Goodman, Glenn W., Jr. "For the record, Gen. John W. Handy, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and Military Airlift Command." *Armed Forces Journal* (October 2003): p. 28.

2.   "Executive Summary, Mobility Capabilities Study," forthcoming. Distributed when available.

3.   Bennett, John T. "Joint Staff Officials Order Changes to DOD-Wide Seabasing Document." *Inside Defense*, 13 January 2005, http://insidedefense.com/secure/insider _display.asp?f=defense_2002 (This article describes efforts to improve DoD's "Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept.")

4.   Department of Defense. *Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Sea Basing*. Washington, D.C., October 20, 2003. (The Defense Science Board conducted a study into the CNO's Sea Power 21 fundamental concept of sea basing. The DSB identified sea basing as a critical capability and discussed twelve issues in the development of this capability.)

E. Reference Readings

1.   Kassing, David. "Strategic Mobility: Overview of Current Issues and Future Requirements." Prepared for the Office of Naval Research sponsored research and education symposium on Joint Logistics in the 21st Century, held at the Naval War College, March 6–7, 1997. (The author provides an overview of strategic mobility with emphasis on the key questions that must be addressed to improve overall system performance.)

2.   Shlapak, David. "Providing Adequate Access for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces." Chapter Nine in *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Edited by Zalmay Khalilzad, and Jeremy Shapiro. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002, pp. 345–375, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1314/ (Assesses anti-access challenges and proposes alternative strategies to project aerospace power.)

3.   Military Sealift Command, http://www.msc.navy.mil. (This website contains information on current MSC force structure and capabilities: ships, organizations, and equipment.)

4. Secretary of the Air Force. Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets. (This Office of the Secretary of the Air Force website contains current Air Mobility Command force structure and capabilities information.)

Websites:

The following websites provide useful information about strategic mobility:

U.S. Transportation Command   http://www.transcom.mil

U.S. Central Command   http://www.centcom.mil

FX-12   DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER

A. Focus. Diplomacy is a sometimes overlooked but crucial tool in executing the nation's national security strategy. This is largely due to the fact that, while diplomatic successes are often invisible, diplomatic failures can lead to violent disasters. It is essential that those tasked with national defense responsibilities understand the role of diplomacy in national security; a failure to achieve synergistic cooperation between DoD, DoS and other agencies can hamper even the most straightforward diplomatic task. This Planning Phase will help prepare you to decide which challenges and opportunities can potentially be addressed with diplomatic and "soft power" tools. We will examine issues for which diplomacy could be an effective tool, while keeping alert to potential obstacles and challenges.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend America's current diplomatic capability and how it can be employed in support of today's National Security and National Military Strategies.

- Examine and critically assess the future challenges, concepts, and required capabilities relevant to diplomacy and soft power as they relate to your seminar's national security and military strategies for the FX.

C. Guidance

1.   Diplomacy and military force are very different tools for executing national security policy. The contributions of diplomats to national security are often understated. Even strategically crucial diplomatic victories (such as the Bush administration's successful effort in obtaining Pakistan's support in the struggle against al Qaeda and the Taliban) are often quietly achieved. Aside from high-stakes confrontations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, diplomacy does not capture the public eye. Military conflict, in contrast, usually draws considerable attention, and for understandable reasons. This makes comparisons between diplomatic and military achievements difficult.

2.   Similarly, diplomacy is not as resource-driven an enterprise as is military operations. Successful diplomacy revolves around policy positions and relationships, in addition to resources (foreign aid, military assistance, coercive threats, etc.). Tripling the budget of the State Department would not triple the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy.

3.   All diplomatic relationships involve opportunities and potential challenges. Both peacetime and crisis environments can offer opportunities to improve relations. Similarly, serious dangers can be camouflaged by what appear to be issue-free relationships. Often it is the unexpected crisis that poses the greatest danger, since this is the type of crisis that is most likely to catch one unprepared. Some of the quietest (and least costly) diplomatic successes are those that make unlikely conflicts even less likely.

4.   Soft power—convincing other states to alter their policies by attraction instead of coercion—is an important yet often overlooked aspect of national security. A nation's political values, culture, and domestic and foreign policy can assist efforts to line up allies, convince other nations to alter their policies, and achieve other international tasks. Soft power has a number of

liabilities as well. Regional cultures and biased media outlets can inhibit efforts to attract other nations. And soft power is susceptible to sudden turns of events. Despite these liabilities, it remains an important national security asset, one that can contribute to or hinder Untied States foreign policy.

D. Required Readings

1. General Accounting Office. "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges." September 2003. (excerpts) (Presents the difficulties that face U.S. public diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East.)

2. Stigler, Andrew. "Soft Power and National Security." Address at IPI World Congress, May 2, 2000. (Offers a conceptual grounding in soft power and its applications.)

E. Reference Readings

1. Peterson, Peter G. "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism." *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 2002. (Offers advice on how to reform U.S. public diplomacy. Summarizes the Council on Foreign Relations' 2002 report on the subject.)

2. Powell, Colin. "A Strategy of Partnerships." *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2004. (Lays out the administration's diplomatic achievements and its plans for the future.)

FX-13   FORCE STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT & BRIEF PREPARATION

A. Focus. This session provides time for your seminar to review its assessment of the security environment, NSS and NMS developed during FX-1 and FX-2, integrate information and concepts obtained from the Planning Phase lecture series and begin in earnest the process of creating a supporting force structure. In parallel, the seminar should continue developing the PowerPoint brief for presentation to a faculty panel during FX-16.

B. Objectives

- Review your seminar's assessment of the security environment, the National Security Strategy (NSS), and National Military Strategy developed in FX-1 and FX-2.

- Using information from the Planning Phase lecture series, develop appropriate operational concepts and a new force structure capable of addressing the operational challenges that you identify within the context of the fiscal guidance provided to you.

- If applicable to your force structure, create a transformation strategy to implement your decisions. This transformation strategy need only address those core capabilities (air, maritime, or land) designed into your unique force structure that will significantly change as you set in motion force adjustments over the next 10 years.

- Identify the most likely major centers of resistance to your chosen transformation strategy and identify potential allies.

- Develop and be prepared to discuss specific implementation steps to overcome resistance to your proposed changes to major force elements.

- Approach the tasks outlined above as rational decision makers.

  - Identify alternatives based on assessed risk associated with building and transitioning to your NSS, NMS and force structure.

  - Specify criteria you will use to choose among those alternatives, after first assessing candidate criteria with respect to validity, reliability, and practicality.

  - As you consider implementation issues, explicitly identify internal and external stakeholders, their interests, and their likely positions. Be prepared to discuss if asked to do so.

C. Guidance

1.   While this exercise is not intended to be an arithmetic drill, each seminar must meet certain specified resource constraints or be able to provide convincing justification for any proposed increase or decrease. Your seminar's decisions should be in consonance with the planning considerations and fiscal guidance assigned to it in a set of two Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memoranda entitled "National Security Decision Making Final Exercise Guidance." These memoranda will be distributed to you in your mailboxes on or about

16 Sep 2005 and 21 Oct 2005. These documents will provide a schedule to guide your seminar through the FX and will outline the fiscal guidance, planning considerations and any supplemental guidance that your seminar should address in the development of its strategies and force structure.

2. As you work this problem, it is once again important to remember that resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed. Accordingly, it is important that your seminar address any new operational concepts appropriate to its strategies and the organizational adaptation needed to implement them.

3. This is an exercise in clear thinking. As such, the faculty expects that you will draw on the concepts and techniques from SSF, PMP, DMI, and the Planning Phase lecture series in thinking through the various issues we ask you to address. We also expect you to give evidence of having done so in your briefing. For example, as you describe your seminar's choices and recommendations, we expect you to be prepared to explicitly identify the alternatives you considered, and the criteria you used to assess those alternatives. In briefing your implementation plan, we want you to be prepared to identify stakeholders inside and outside of DoD and to describe their interests and likely positions. Your ability to do so along with the logic, realism, persuasiveness, creativity, compliance with fiscal guidance, innovative use of all elements of national power, and overall professionalism of the briefings will determine the quality—and grade—of this strategic conversation.

4. The faculty expects your seminar to deliver a professional and thorough brief. As stated in the guidance memorandum, each seminar is required to write a 2-page executive summary of their seminar strategy to turn in to the faculty team during FX-16. Specific guidance as to the format will be provided by your faculty teaching team.

D. Required Readings

1. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum of 16 Sep 2005 (Subject: National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance.) To be distributed to your mailboxes on or about 16 Sep 2005—Provides basic guidance for the Exercise.

2. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum of 21 Oct 2005 (Subject: National Security Decision Making Exercise PR 06 Guidance) To be distributed to mailboxes on or about 21 Oct 2005—Provides general planning and programming guidance as well as any supplemental program guidance from the Chair and NWC Base Force and *notional* programming options.

FX-14   EXERCISE PREPARATION

A. Focus. This session provides time for your seminar to review its NSS and NMS and to continue developing a supporting force structure and PowerPoint presentation.

B. Objectives

- Review your seminar's National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).

- Continue to build a supporting force structure that allows your seminar to reach the goals of the NSS and execute the NMS.

C. Guidance

1. Continue using guidance provided in FX-13.

2. Continue preparing a 2-page executive summary of their seminar strategy to turn in to the faculty team during FX-16. Specific guidance as to the format will be provided by your faculty teaching team.

D. Required Readings. None.

FX-15   EXERCISE PREPARATION

A. Focus. Seminars complete PowerPoint briefings for presentation to NSDM faculty panel.

B. Objective

- Complete and rehearse presentation. (Pre-brief to faculty team optional)

C. Guidance

1. Prepare and practice your briefing. Make four paper copies (not color) and one floppy/ZIP/CD disk of your briefing materials for the faculty panel with which your seminar will have a strategic conversation during session FX-16. The seminar should prepare and submit a 2-page executive summary of your seminar strategy (as described by the faculty teaching team) to the faculty panel during FX-16.

2. The faculty strongly recommends a "murder board" to help the seminar review its decisions and give the briefer(s) an opportunity to practice their delivery.

3. All members of the seminar should be prepared to contribute during the seminar presentation and help answer the faculty panel's questions in their respective area of expertise.

D. Required Readings. None.

FX-16   SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO NSDM FACULTY AND STUDENTS

A.   Focus. Present your seminar's briefing IAW the schedule provided by the faculty.

B.   Objectives

- Brief a panel of three NSDM faculty members.

- Defend your strategy and force structure before that panel.

C.   Guidance

1.   Plan for your remarks not to exceed 45 minutes and prepare for 30 minutes of Q&A. Anticipate faculty questioning during and after your briefing. The briefer need not attempt to answer every question presented by the faculty. Any member of the seminar may reply to a question in an area of their expertise.

2.   At the completion of these briefs, the NSDM faculty members will schedule a feedback session with the seminar leader where the grade will be assigned and a *brief* rationale provided. A written summary of the rationale used to assign the grade will be provide to the seminar teaching team to discuss during the NSDM-4 session scheduled the day following the Senior Defense Panel presentations. The faculty will also select one of the presentations from the group to present the following day to the NSDM Executive Panel.

3.   Normally the NSDM class is divided into 18 seminars. Depending on the number of students, certain seminars will be selected to brief the NSDM Executive Panel the following day. Two of these presentations will be selected to brief the Senior Defense Panel in Spruance auditorium. Your faculty will provide you a briefing schedule prior to this session as well as for FX-17. Should the NSDM class make-up be more or less than 18 seminars, a different schedule will be provided.

D.   Required Readings. None.

FX-17   PRESENTATIONS TO NSDMFX EXECUTIVE PANEL

A. Focus. Normally, 6 seminars are selected by faculty panels during FX-17. These six seminars next brief the NSDMFX Executive Faculty Panel to select two seminar finalists. The NSDMFX Executive Panel is composed of the three Sub-course directors, and the two co-directors of the NSDMFX. The six selected seminars should present the same brief used during FX-17. The NSDMFX Executive Panel will select two seminars to present to the Defense Panel from Washington, D.C. during FX-18. This process will be adjusted if necessary to accommodate time constraints or if the class is divided into more than or fewer than 18 seminars.

B. Objectives

- Selected seminars brief NSDMFX Executive Panel on a schedule provided by the faculty

C. Guidance

1.   The NSDMFX Executive Panel, after observing the seminar presentations, will select two seminars to present briefings to a panel of senior current and former Department of Defense and Department of State officials. The two seminars selected will receive the Naval War College's James Forrestal Award for Excellence in Force Planning and lead the class discussion with the Washington Panel members during the FX-18 session.

D. Required Readings. None.

FX-18 PRESENTATION TO SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS

A. Focus. This is the culminating session of the strategic conversation that began in your seminars at the beginning of the trimester. A key element in the national security decision-making process is the presentation of joint and service views to higher levels of authority in the form of an oral briefing. This session gives two seminars the opportunity to present their briefings to a panel of senior current and former DoD and DoS officials. After the presentations, with time permitting, the panel members will provide their views on national security, strategies, resources, as well as the level and mix of future forces.

B. Objectives

- Gain additional insights from the panel and your classmates' presentations.

- Interact with panel members to explore their insights and seek further information during the question and answer period.

C. Guidance

1. All seminars will attend the presentations, normally in Spruance Hall, and should formulate questions to ask panel members about issues raised during the briefings. Note: Only the panel may ask questions during the seminar briefings. In the second half of the session, you will have the opportunity to explore future strategic and force choice issues that have emerged from the strategic conversation among the members of your seminar with the panel members.

2. This panel discussion completes the National Security Decision Making Final Exercise. In your judgment, how well did the seminars address future strategy and force structure? Were their recommendations realistic, considering both the future global environment and the likely constraints upon defense spending?

3. In the NSDM course we have described the complex processes by which resource allocation decisions are made and implemented. Frameworks have been developed for strategy and force planning, complex decision-making and policy implementation, and the challenge of managing large organizations. During this final session, what visions of the future have emerged? Which ends-strategy-force mismatches are of greatest concern to you? Why? What major controversies are still unresolved?

D. Required Readings. None.

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
1	2	3	4	5
8	9	10	11	12
15	16	17	18	19
CONVOCATION **1300-1330　　　Spruance Auditorium** NSDM-1 ODD/EVEN "Course Overview" **1345-1515　　　Seminar Rooms** NSDM-2 ODD "Introductory Seminar" **1530-1700　　　Seminar Rooms** NSDM-2 EVEN	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-1 ODD—"Intro to Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF)" DMI-1 EVEN—"Intro to Decision Making and Implementation (DMI)" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-1 EVEN DMI-1 ODD	**0800-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** PMP-1 EVEN—"Intro to Policy Making and Process (PMP)" **0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-2 ODD—"Theories of International Relations" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-2 EVEN **1015-1215　　　Seminar Rooms** PMP-1 ODD	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** DMI-2 ODD—"The Profession of Arms: Ethics, Stewardship and Civil Military Relations" PMP-2 EVEN—"Introductory Case Study: Lebanon Revisited" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** DMI-2 EVEN PMP-2 ODD	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-3 ODD—"Security and National Interest" DMI-3 EVEN—"Leading Large, Complex Organizations—What's Different" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-3 EVEN DMI-3 ODD *DMI Ungraded Reflection Papers Due*
22	23	24	25	26
0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms SSF-4 ODD—"Sources of Conflict" DMI-4 EVEN—"Leading Change in War: *The General*" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-4 EVEN DMI-4 ODD **1330-1530　　　Spruance Auditorium** DMI-5 ODD/EVEN Personality Type: The MBTI (Lecture)	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-5 ODD—"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the US" PMP-3 EVEN—"The International Political System—Part I" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-5 EVEN PMP-3 ODD	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** DMI-6 ODD—"Assessment" PMP-4 EVEN—"The International Political System—Part II" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** DMI-6 EVEN PMP-4 ODD 1330-1630　Electives	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-6 ODD—"Power and the American Project" PMP-5 EVEN—"Case: International Political System—Landmines" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-6 EVEN PMP-5 ODD 1330-1630　Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
29	30	31		
0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms SSF-7 ODD—"Competing Grand Strategies I" DMI-7 EVEN—"Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT)" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-7 EVEN DMI-7 ODD	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-8 ODD—"Competing Grand Strategies II" PMP-6 EVEN—"Congress, the Constitution, and the Federal Budget" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** SSF-8 EVEN PMP-6 ODD **1330-1500　　　Spruance Auditorium** PMP-7 ODD/EVEN (Lecture) Domestic Political System	**0830-1000　　　Seminar Rooms** DMI-8 ODD—"Issue Definition and Alternatives" PMP-8 EVEN—"Interest Groups, Public Opinion, and the News Media" **1015-1145　　　Seminar Rooms** PMP-8 ODD DMI-8 EVEN 1330-1630　Electives		

SEPTEMBER 2005

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
			1	**2**
			0830-1000 **Seminar Rooms** SSF-9 ODD—"National Security Strategy" DMI-9 EVEN—"Criteria" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-9 EVEN DMI-9 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
5	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
HOLIDAY	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-10 ODD—"Risk and Uncertainty" PMP-9 EVEN—"DPS Case Study: The KC-767 Tanker Lease" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-10 EVEN PMP-9 ODD **1330-1500** **Spruance Auditorium** SSF-10 ODD/EVEN (Lecture) "Diplomacy"	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-11 ODD—"Alignments, Coalitions, and Alliances" DMI-11 EVEN—"Decide and Set Future Direction" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-11 EVEN DMI-11 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0800-1100** **Seminar Rooms** PMP-10 ODD/EVEN **or on-line** PMP Midterm Exam	STUDENT PREPARATION
12	**13**	**14**	**15**	**16**
0830-1000 **Pringle Auditorium** SSF-13 ODD/EVEN—"International Officer Security Perspectives" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-12 ODD—"Strategy as a Guide" **1330-1500** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-12 EVEN—"Strategy as a Guide"	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-13 ODD—"Formulating Strategy" PMP-11 EVEN—"Analytical Perspectives" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-13 EVEN PMP-11 ODD **1330-1500** **Spruance Auditorium** NSDM-3 ODD/EVEN Ruger Chair Lecture—"Economic Power and National Security" **NCC IPV 13-15 September 2005**	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-12 ODD—"International Community and Institutions" PMP-12 EVEN—"The President and the Making of National Security Policy" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-12 EVEN PMP-12 ODD *****SSF Paper Topic Due***** ****DMI Exam Distributed**** 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-14 ODD—"Informational Power" PMP-14 EVEN—"The National Security Council and Interagency System" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-14 EVEN PMP-14 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**1600** **DMI Midterm Turned In**
19	**20**	**21**	**22**	**23**
0830-1000 **Seminar Rooms** SSF-15 ODD—"International Political Economy" DMI-14 EVEN—"Implementation" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-15 EVEN DMI-14 ODD **1330-1500** **Spruance Auditorium** PMP-13 ODD/EVEN (Lecture) Defense Resource Allocation Process	**0830-0845** **Spruance Auditorium** FX Introduction **0900-1600** **Seminar Rooms** FX-1 ODD/EVEN "Security Environment Assessment, National Interests, and Strategic Choices"	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-16 ODD—"Greater Near East" PMP-15 EVEN—"Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-16 EVEN PMP-15 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-17 ODD—"Central and South Asia" DMI-15 EVEN—"Principles of Reconciliation and Negotiation" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-17 EVEN DMI-15 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
26	**27**	**28**	**29**	**30**
0800-1000 **Seminar Rooms** DMI-16 EVEN—"Negotiation Exercise" **0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-18 ODD—"Asia and the Pacific I (The People's Republic of China and the two Koreas)" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-18 EVEN **1015-1215** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-16 ODD	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-17 ODD—"Implementation: Structural/Policy" PMP-16 EVEN—"The Organizational Behavior Perspective" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-17 EVEN PMP-16 ODD	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-19 ODD—"Asia and the Pacific II (Pacific Partners)" PMP-17 EVEN—"Planning, Program-ming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-19 EVEN PMP-17 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-20 ODD—"Europe and Russia" DMI-18 EVEN—"Implementation: Technology" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-20 EVEN DMI-18 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION

OCTOBER 2005

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
STUDENT PREPARATION **NCC IPV 3-7 October 2005**	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-21 ODD—"Western Hemisphere" PMP-18 EVEN—"The Governmental-Politics Perspective" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-21 EVEN PMP-18 ODD	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-19 ODD—"Implementation: Human Capital" PMP-19 EVEN—"Case Study: Kosovo" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-19 EVEN PMP-19 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-22 ODD—"Africa" DMI-20 EVEN—"Assuring Performance" **0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-22 EVEN DMI-20 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	PRESIDENT'S CUP
10	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
HOLIDAY	**0830-1600** **Seminar Rooms** FX-2 ODD/EVEN "National Military Strategy Development"	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-23 ODD—"The Future of War" DMI-21 EVEN—"Measuring Performance" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-23 EVEN DMI-21 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-24 ODD—"Approaches to Force Planning" PMP-20 EVEN—"The Cognitive Perspectives" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-24 EVEN PMP-20 ODD ***SSF PAPER DUE*** 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
17	**18**	**19**	**20**	**21**
0830-1000 **Seminar Rooms** DMI-22 ODD—"Integrating Control and Measurement" PMP-21 EVEN—"Case Study: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-22 EVEN PMP-21 ODD	**0800-1000** **Seminar Rooms** PMP-22 EVEN—"Current Policy Analysis" **0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-25 ODD—"National Military Strategy" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-25 EVEN **1015-1215** **Seminar Rooms** PMP-22 ODD **1330-1500** **Spruance Auditorium** FX-3 ODD/EVEN—OSD Guest Speaker	**0800-1000** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-23 EVEN—"Executing Strategy: Synthesis Case" **0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-26 ODD—"Future Force Planning Exercise" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** SSF-26 EVEN **1015-1215** **Seminar Rooms** DMI-23 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0800-1300** **Seminar Rooms** PMP-23 ODD/EVEN **or on-line** PMP Final Examination **1315** DMI Final Exam Distributed 1330-1630 Electives	**1600** DMI Final Exam Turned In
24	**25**	**26**	**27**	**28**
0830-0930 **Pringle Auditorium** FX-4 ODD/EVEN—"Intelligence" **0945-1045** **Pringle Auditorium** FX-5 ODD/EVEN—"Special Operations Forces" **1100-1200** **Seminar Rooms** FX-4 AND FX-5 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions	**0830-0930** **Spruance Auditorium** FX-6 ODD/EVEN—"Space and Nuclear" **0945-1045** **Spruance Auditorium** FX-7 ODD/EVEN—"Land" **1100-1200** **Seminar Rooms** FX-6 AND FX-7 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions	**0830-0930** **Spruance Auditorium** FX-8 ODD/EVEN—"Air" **0945-1045** **Spruance Auditorium** FX-9 ODD/EVEN—"Maritime" **1100-1200** **Seminar Rooms** FX-8 AND FX-9 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-0930** **Pringle Auditorium** FX-10 ODD/EVEN—"The Reserve Component" **0945-1045** **Pringle Auditorium** FX-11 ODD/EVEN—"Strategic Mobility" **1100-1200** **Seminar Rooms** FX-10 AND FX-11 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
31				
0830-0930 **Pringle Auditorium** FX-12 ODD/EVEN "Diplomacy and Soft Power" **0945-1045** **Seminar Rooms** FX-12 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions				

NOVEMBER 2005

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**
	0830-1630 **Seminar Rooms** FX-13 ODD/EVEN "Force Structure Development and Brief Preparation"	**0830-1630** **Seminar Rooms** FX-14 ODD/EVEN "Exercise Preparation"	**0830-1600** **Seminar Rooms** FX-15 ODD/EVEN "Exercise Preparation"	STUDENT PREPARATION
7	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**
0830-1600 **Designated Rooms** FX-16 ODD/EVEN "Seminar Presentations to NSDM Faculty " **NCC-IPV 7–17 November 2005**	**0830-1600** **Designated Rooms** FX-17 ODD/EVEN "Seminar Presentations to NSDMFX Executive Panel"	**0830-1200** **Spruance Auditorium** FX-18 ODD/EVEN "Seminar Presentations to Senior Defense Officials"	**0830-1000** **Seminar Rooms** NSDM-4 ODD "NSDM FX and Course Review" **1015-1145** **Seminar Rooms** NSDM-4 EVEN	HOLIDAY
14	**15**	**16**	**17**	**18**
		GRADUATION		
21	**22**	**23**	**24**	**25**
28	**29**	**30**		